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There have heen many instances in the history of ideas 
where a theory has generated great interest and attracted many 
adherents. That fact raises the question of what becomes of a 
theory as younger disciples adopt it. This dissertation deals 
with one example of that problem by attempting to answer the 
question: What happened to John Dewey's theory of democracy at
the hands of Boyd H. Bode?
The study opens with a brief introduction intended to 
show how Boyd Bode, like John Dewey, began his academic career 
as an idealist philosopher, gradually reconstructed his beliefs 
amid the changing American scene of the Progressive Era, and 
eventually became a pragmatist. The first chapter is a summary 
of John Dewey's theory of democracy based on his published works, 
and designed to provide a foundation for examining Bode's theory. 
The next three chapters, constituting the bulk of the disserta­
tion, investigate Boyd Bode's thoughts concerning intelligence 
and democracy, the social order, and education in an effort to 
explain his theory of democracy. These chapters are based on an 
analysis of his publications from 191? to 1952. The conclusion 
is a comparison of Dewey's and Bede's ideas about democracy 
drawn from the evidence adduced in the four main chapters.
It appears that Boyd Bode kept John Dewey's theory of
democracy virtually intact. Where he differed with Dewey was in
his emphasis on the ends of the means-end relationship of democ­
racy. He too saw democracy as more than a political system; it 
was an ethical system that he called a way of life. Accepting 
the pragmatic philosophy, he agreed with Dewey that life was con­
tinuously changing; therefore, democracy had to become dynamic, 
and grow with the changing circumstances. Dewey believed that 
intelligence was the means for effecting needed changes in the 
life of the individual and of the society. Bode in effect said that unless the ideal of democracy were kept in mind, changes 
would be made for change's sake. He endeavored to balance
Dewey's stress on method by accenting the need for ideals. Thus
as Bode analyzed American society and, particularly, the Progres­
sive Education Movement in the years following the First World 
War, he developed a theory of democracy that differed from 
Dewey's theory in degree not in kind.
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BOYD H. BODE AND TBE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY;
THE SOCIAL IDEAS OF A DEWEYAN EDUCATOR
INTRODUCTION 
THE MAKING OF A PRAGMATIST
As we experience life, an uncontrolled stream of 
ideas seems to fill our heads. When we sleep, the flow 
continues as dreams, and during our waking hours, we some­
times daydream. On occasion, however, something disturbs 
the random coursing of ideas, and causes us to pause and 
survey our situation. This is the initial condition of what 
John Dewey called reflective thinking. We encounter, as it 
were, a forked-road, an ambiguous situation that presents a 
dilemma and offers alternatives. We momentarily cease our 
activity and gather facts in order to develop ideas for 
resolving the perplexity. Then we test those ideas until 
we have an answer which permits us to resume our lives. The 
demand for the solution to some problem, said Dewey, guides 
the process of reflection. The nature of the problem fixes 
the result of thought, which in turn, controls the thinking 
nrocess.^
“John Dewey, How We Think, A Restatement of the 
Relation of Reflective Thinking to the Educative Process, 
rev. ed. ( Lexington, Massachusetts ; D. C. Heath and
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A clear illustration of that sort of thinking appeared 
in the intellectual development of Boyd Henry Bode, a contem­
porary of Dewey and, eventually, a proponent of experimen- 
talism. Like Dewey, Bode thought his way out of the philos­
ophy of idealism and into the philosophy of pragmatism. The 
story of his intellectual awakening actually began with the 
random coursing of ideas growing out of his early life.
Both Bode and Dewey were products of the Progressive Era.
Bode grew up in the heartland of progressivism, while Dewey 
arrived a newcomer to the midwest. But both men experienced 
the heightened concern for democracy that characterized that 
era. This heritage and his return to the midwest after 
graduate school played an important role in the formation of 
Bode's pragmatic beliefs. He ultimately became a Deweyan 
pragmatist. And, like Dewey, he became a leader in the 
Progressive Education Movement and an outspoken proponent of 
democracy as a way of life. But the story does not end 
there. The fact that Bode initially accepted Dewey’s inter­
pretation of pragmatism hardly indicates whether or not he 
remained an orthodox Deweyan, particularly in developing his
Company, 1933)» PP* 14-1$.
“Historians date the Progressive Era from the 1890s 
to 1919, although it grew out of the changes in American 
life that began in the 1870s. The reformist ideas of 
progressivism lasted in varying degrees through the 1930s. 
The educational phase of American progressivism was the 
Progressive Education Movement which began at the same time 
as the Progressive Era writ large, but lasted into the 
1950s. Both American progressivism and its educational 
phase developed first in the midwest.
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theory of democracy. The solution to this problem lies in a 
summary of Dewey's theory of democracy and a thorough exami­
nation of Bode's theory. Prom the evidence adduced we can 
compare their social ideas and answer the question: What
happened to John Dewey's theory of democracy at the hands of 
Boyd H. Bode? In order to set the stage for this inquiry, 
we should take a closer look at how Bode became a Deweyan 
educator.
Born in Ridott, Illinois in 1873 the son of a Dutch 
Reformed minister, Bode spent his early years in rural com­
munities of South Dakota. He grew up in a period charac­
terized by nationalization, industrialization, mechaniza­
tion, and urbanization. Yet these potentially valuable 
changes also brought dislocation and bewilderment. "America 
in the late nineteenth century," wrote the historian Robert 
Wiebe, "was a society without a core. It lacked those 
national centers of authority and information which might 
have given order to such swift changes."^ Life had been 
centered on the small, rural community. As life in America 
moved farther away from those communities, individuals 
attempted to comprehend the larger world in terms of their 
familiar environment. In most instances, reported Wiebe, 
they failed to understand the new society that they had
These changes led to an examination of American 
life. Robert Wiebe, The Search for Order, 1877-1920 (New 
York: Hill and Wang, 1967), pp. 11-12.
created.^ Having lived through this turmoil, Bode's intel­
lectual awakening, his personal adventure in reflective 
thought, probably began as an effort to make sense out of 
this rapidly changing environment.
Bode's formal education beyond the elementary level 
began in 1889 at the academy of Yankton College. In December 
of that year, his sister Anna died unexpectedly. This trag­
edy helps to explain why he did not return to Yankton after 
Christmas, although what he did from 1890 until the spring 
of 1892 remains a mystery. From April to June 1892, he 
taught in a rural elementary school at Wellsburg, Iowa. Years 
later Bode recalled that in that community a great deal of 
education actually occurred outside of the classroom. Chil­
dren learned a vocation and the basics of economics and gov­
ernment at home. Their fathers taught them all they could 
about religious beliefs; the rest was up to the church. It 
was the community that inculcated and rigidly enforced man­
ners and customs. "In brief," he- commented, "all the heavy 
work in education was done outside the school. My task was 
simply to take care of certain skills and information which 
could not be handled very conveniently at home. " Bode went
on to note that this was a "beautiful, albeit unconscious,"
2example of progressive educational doctrine. One must
Îbid.
^Letter from Robert 7. Bullough, 2? March 1979. Bul- 
lough is the author of the forthcoming book The Democratic 
Movement in Education; Boyd H. Bode; Joseph James
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always be skeptical about a recollection forty years after 
the fact. But, it seems that the division between education 
in the classroom and that which was a part of the daily lives 
of those children left a distinct impression in Bode's mind.
In 1893» Bode returned to the academy and the college 
at Yankton. A year later, he enrolled as a junior in the 
classical course at William Penn College, Oskaloosa, Iowa, 
receiving a Bachelor of Arts degree in 1896. Bode obtained 
a second bachelor's degree from the University of Michigan 
in 1897» where he studied philosophy and German. At 
Michigan, he took work with Alfred Lloyd whose "dynamic 
idealism" was closer to Bode's later pragmatism than his 
earlier Calvinism."
Apparently undecided about a vocation. Bode thought 
about following his father into the ministry. He chose 
instead to pursue a doctorate in philosophy, a decision 
which afforded him a structured setting for wrestling with 
his own philosophical beliefs and the time for deciding 
whether or not to become a clergyman. In 1897» he entered 
the Susan Linn Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell Univer­
sity. There he studied the history of religion and
Chambliss, "The Development of Bode's Pragmatism and Its 
Influence on His Philosophy of Education," Ph.D. disserta­
tion, University of Illinois, 1959» ?P- 3-4; Boyd H. Bode, 
Progressive Education at the Crossroads (New York; Newson & 
Company, 1938; reprint ed.. New York; Arno Press, 1971), p. 49.
pp. 3-6.
Ĉhambliss, "The Development of Bode’s Pragmatism,"
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philosophy, and took minors in moral philosophy and psychol­
ogy. Bode received training in a form of idealism that 
anticipated pragmatism. James E. Creighton introduced him 
to "speculative idealism" which was based on his view that 
philosophical inquiry must begin with experience, and obtain 
within the context of the history of ideas. Bode's other 
philosophy teacher, Evander B. McGilvary, trained with 
George Holmes Howison at California. Howison opposed the 
belief in absolute truth, and developed a personal idealism 
that anticipated William James.^ McGilvary himself identi­
fied with the realists, despite having written a defense of 
Hegelian idealism in his dissertation. He also became very
interested in the new developments in theoretical physics, a
2subject that later attracted Bode. The anti-absolutism 
that McGilvary probably retained from his training and his 
interest in science likely found their way into Bode's 
thinking.
Bode's third teacher was Edward B. Titchner, the 
leading American proponent of structural psychology who had 
taken work with Wilhelm Wundt at Leipzig. Under Titchner, 
Bode came in contact with the rapidly growing experimental
The Encyclonedia of Philosophy. vol. 1, "Creighton, 
James Edwin," by Warren E. Steinkraus; Merle Curti and 
Vernon Carstensen, The University of Wisconsin 1848-1925, A 
History, vol. 1 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press,
1949), p. 651.
2Walter G. Muelder, st. al.. The Development of 
American Philosophy, A Book of Readims, 2nd, ed. (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, i960), p. 524.
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approach to psychology, and the effort to separate psychol­
ogy from philosophy. Bode later adopted an experimental 
view of psychology, although it differed from Titchner*s 
structuralism; but he was never willing to separate psychol­
ogy from philosophy, as he later demonstrated in such works 
as Modern Theories of Education in 1927 and Conflicting 
Psychologies of Learning in 1929. It is interesting to note 
that Dewey also encountered the "new psychology" as a grad­
uate student at Johns Hopkins University. His teacher was 
G-. Stanley Hall, a founder of the "new psychology" and the 
child study movement, who had studied in Berlin with Johannes 
von Kries and Hugo Kronecker and for a short time in Leipzig 
with Wundt.^
Bode's doctoral thesis, "The Principle of Gratia 
Gratum Faciens in the Ethics of Thomas Aquinas," contained 
further evidence of the seeds of pragmatism. The themes he 
developed revealed an interest in an organic conception of 
experience, and skepticism about the inherent superiority of 
one kind of experience over another. He also shared in the 
revolt against formalism, characteristic of the Progressive 
Era, by challenging the faculty psychology in Thomas’ 
explanation of Aristotle's psychology and the formalism of 
good works and submission to authority required by the
“Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental Psychol­
ogy. 2nd ed. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1957),
pp. 412-13, 517-21; see also Dorothy Ross, G. Stanley Hall: 
The Psychologist as Pronhet (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1972).
medieval church.^
In spite of the many precursors of pragmatism in 
Bode’s early development, he clung to the philosophy of 
idealism throughout his graduate study and during the first 
years of teaching. His Calvinistic rearing and the funda­
mentally idealist character of his philosophical training 
no doubt weighed heavily in his thinking. Moreover, he
continued to entertain thoughts of becoming a cleric during 
2these years. On the other hand, the influence of the seeds 
of pragmatism cannot be ignored.
When he graduated from Cornell in 1900, Bode, once 
again, dismissed the idea of a theological career in favor 
of one in academic philosophy. This time the calling of 
philosophy brought him back to the midwest to a position as 
an instructor at the University of Wisconsin. He arrived in 
Madison thinking like an idealist, but departed, nine years 
later, with a significantly different viewpoint. Unlike 
Dewey who was a thoroughgoing Hegelian when he began teach­
ing at the University of Michigan, Bode's early writings 
showed little evidence of any well-defined idealist position. 
Idealism provided the general basis of his thinking, but it, 
apparently, was not wholly satisfactory. He opposed both
See Morton G. White, Social Thought in America. 
The Revolt Against Formalism (Boston; Beacon Press, 
1957); Chambliss, "The Development of Bode’s Pragmatism," 
pp. 7-9.
2Chambliss, "The Development of Bode’s Pragmatism,
pp. 3-6.
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realism and pragmatism. Realism separated the knower and
the known instead of seeing them in terms of purposive
behavior. Pragmatism, argued Bode, attempted to account
for them purposively, but failed to do so, ending in either
realism or solipsism. Nevertheless, Bode exhibited certain
pragmatic sympathies in his early works, such as his belief
that pragmatism could aid in criticizing sensationalistic
theories and his attempt to make sense of the purposive
character of life.̂
By 1908, this search for a satisfactory philosophical
position had left Bode in an intellectual wilderness. As
Joseph J. Chambliss described it:
To say that by 1908 Bode was more nearly a man without a 
position than he had been in 1905 is to suggest that 
while he held less firmly to certain of his former ideal­istic tendencies, he had not yet taken firm hold on any 
other doctrine which he could call his own.2
This comment only indicates that Bode was uncertain about 
his philosophical beliefs, but does not tell us why. It 
appears that there were some influences on his thinking that 
seemed to be drawing him toward pragmatism, or, at least, 
away from traditional idealism. Could there have been any­
thing else disturbing Bode's thinking?
Bode arrived at the University of Wisconsin at an
Ibid., pp. 10, 25-24; Joseph J. Chambliss, Boyd H. 
Bode's Philosophy of Education (Columbus: Ohio State
University Press, 19̂ 3), pp. 4-5.
Ĉhambliss, "The Development of Bode's Pragmatism," 
pp. 23-24.
10
important time in the life of that institution. Since the 
early 1890s, men like President Thomas Chrowder Chamberlin, 
his successor Charles Kendall Adams, and Professors 
Frederick Jackson Turner and Richard T. Ely had struggled 
to make the University responsive to the needs of the state 
and a leading center for the study of the social sciences. 
While Bode was there, two other prominent progressives 
arrived, sociologist Edward A. Ross and President Charles R. 
Van Rise.̂
All of these men were involved in promoting a liberal 
brand of Social Darwinism that was a foundation stone in 
pragmatic philosophy. Herbert Spencer, William Graham 
Sumner and others who took the traditional view of Social 
Darwinism believed that society evolved through survival of 
the fittest. Existing social institutions and their suc­
cessful leaders were the fittest to enjoy wealth and exercise 
power. No amount of social legislation would change the way 
things were. Only slow and painful evolution could cure 
social evils. Those like Ely, Ross, Van Rise and others who 
took the Reform Darwinist view agreed that society had 
evolved, but they believed the process had not stopped with 
the current stage. They held that society and its institu­
tions could and should change rapidly, that the success of 
the so-called Robber Barons had been due to environment, and
Ĉurti and Carstensen, The University of Wisconsin, 
vol. 1 pp. 630-32.
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not to any special "fitness," and that conditions were not
inevitable or static but continually in a state of flux.
Therefore, they could justify experiment and change.Dewey
and other pragmatic philosophers adopted these assumptions
and suggested that philosophical inquiry should serve to
solve problems and clarify meanings for society.
Bode no doubt agreed with the Reform Darwinist
notions of his colleagues. During the nine years that he
worked at Wisconsin, he participated in the effort by the
philosophy department to bring philosophical thought from
the speculative to the practical realm. Since 1894, Frank
Chapman Sharp had aided Ely by teaching courses in social
philosophy. When Bode arrived, he supplemented Sharp's work
through his knowledge of science and his ability to apply
2the theory of evolution to logic and to social action. By 
1909» pragmatism loomed larger on the horizon of Bode's 
thinking.
In that year, he accepted a position in the philosophy 
department at the University of Illinois and began the final 
leg of his journey to pragmatism. Here he also developed an 
interest in the application of philosophy to the practice of 
education that later caused him to reject technical
Eric P. Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1950)1 PP* 85-94. The terms Reform and 
Conservative Darwinists are Goldman's device for distin­
guishing what he sees as the branches of Social Darwinism.
pCurti and Carstensen, The University of Wisconsin, 
vol. 1, p. 652.
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philosophy as being moribund. At this point, Bode’s think­
ing was closer to naive realism than anything else. He had 
begun to move away from idealism when he came to doubt the 
existence of the transcendental element in experience and to 
view the task of philosophy as the search for meanings in 
experience. Now he accepted the notion that things existed 
and were real prior to thought. But he could not adopt the 
corollary that objects of knowledge existed prior to thought. 
Instead, he conceived of thought as purposive. From 1909 to 
1914, he struggled with these ideas, eventually concluding 
that what existed used for the purpose of finding objects 
of knowledge.^ In other words, he was beginning to accept 
pragmatism.
The end was in sight. During the next three years, 
Bode became a committed pragmatist. Part of this time he 
devoted to arguing that behavioristic psychology was limited 
because it rejected the notion of consciousness, and to 
opposing transcendentalism by rejecting "transcendental 
consciousness." He argued that stimulus and response were 
not static entities, but developed as meanings that were 
sought in particular instances. In 1917» he defined con­
sciousness as
... a name for a certain change that takes place in 
the stimulus; or, more specifically, it is a name for 
the control of conduct by future results or
Ĉhambliss, "The Development of Bode’s Pragmatism, 
pp. 32-61 and Bode's Philosophy of Education, pp. 4-5*
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consequences. 1
Bode wrote this statement in an article entitled "Conscious­
ness and Psychology" that appeared in Creative Intelligence, 
Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude. This book contained arti­
cles by such leading pragmatists as John Dewey, George 
Herbert Mead, Horace M. Kallen, and others. Bode clearly 
stood within the pragmatic school.
A second change occurred in Bode's professional life 
at Illinois that eventually gave a totally new direction to 
his scholarly activities. In 1915, a friend and former 
classmate at Cornell, William Chandler Bagley, invited him 
to share the teaching duties in a seminar in the philosophy 
of education. For the next two years Bagley and Bode worked 
together. From 191? until 1921, Bode taught the course 
alone after Bagley left for Teachers College, Columbia 
University. The significance of these events lies in their 
effect on Bode's thinking. He began to grow weary of a 
philosophy that seemed to have no influence on human activ­
ity. This was no mere excursion tangent to the larger realm 
of his thinking. He began to view philosophy in a Deweyan 
sense, as having an intimate connection with education. In 
1921, he accepted a position as professor of education at 
Ohio State University. "I am tired," he said, "of philosophy
Chambliss, Bode's Philosophy of Education, pp. 5-6; 
Boyd H. Bode, "Consciousness and Psychology," in Creative Intelligence, Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude by John Dewey, 
et. al. (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1917),
p. 243.
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that makes no difference and I believe education is a field 
where it may do significant work."^
The move to Ohio State marked a watershed in Bode's 
life and the real beginning of our story. Upon arriving in 
Columbus, he immediately undertook the application of philo­
sophical thought to educational practice. He was convinced 
that both education and philosophy would benefit, recalled 
H. Gordon Hullfish, a colleague and friend, "... the one, 
by gaining a better sense of direction; the other, by
grounding its generalizations in the ongoing experience of
2those who leam." Like Dewey, Bode wanted to do more than 
merely devise a set of educational principles based on the 
philosophy of pragmatism. As a pragmatist, he endeavored to 
put philosophy to work for society by devising a theory of 
democracy for a dynamic social order, and by explaining the 
implications of that theory for the aims and practices of 
education.
For nearly a quarter of a century, betvæen 1921 and 
1944, Bode studied American society and education with the
“Chambliss, "The Development of Bode's Pragmatism," 
pp. 74-76; John Dewey, Democracy and Education, An Introduc­
tion to the Philosophy of Education (New York: The Macmil­
lan Company, 1916; Free Press, 1966), p. 328; Quoted in 
H. C. Sun, Boyd H. Bode (1873-1953) and the Reform of Ameri­
can Education; Recollections and Correspondence (Ann Arbor, 
Michigan; Malloy Lithographing, Inc., 1977), PP* 1-2.
2H. Gordon Hullfish, "Philosophy and Education in 
Interaction," a paper presented at the Conference on Democ­
racy and Education, May 26, 1944, at the Ohio State Univer­
sity. Quoted in Chambliss, Boyd H. Bode's Philosophy of 
Education, p. 7.
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insight of a mature philosopher. In several books and numer­
ous articles, he probed and examined the meaning of democ­
racy, and analyzed the theories and practices of education.
He became a leading critic of progressive education, and his 
opinions were given considerable recognition. He also devel­
oped a reputation as a great teacher. After Bode’s death in 
1953» Hullfish wrote: "Among his many gifts none surpassed
his ability to probe to the depths of another’s mind in a 
manner that brought joy, not resentment, to those whose 
ideas were under challenge."^ As a teacher and scholar, he 
made Ohio State University a leading center for graduate
study in the philosophy of education rivaling Teachers Col-
2lege, Columbia University in quality and importance. We 
are primarily interested, however, in Bode's work as a 
scholar and in the development of his theory of democracy.
The origins of Boyd Bode's pragmatic philosophy and 
his theory of democracy lay in his early years amid the 
devastating social changes of the late nineteenth century, 
in his work as a teacher in a rural school, and in his deci­
sion to pursue advanced work in philosophy. These experi­
ences apparently disturbed his thinking, and caused him to 
reflect upon their meaning, although he did not provide any
Ĥ. Gordon Hullfish, "Boyd H. Bode, 1873-1953," 
Progressive Education 30 (iWay 1953)’ 20?.
2Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the 
School. Progressivism in American Education. 1876-1957 
(New York; Alfred A. Knoof, Inc., I96I; Vintage Books,
1964), pp. 220-21.
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concrete evidence of that fact. One thing is clear, how­
ever, Bode was consciously searching for a philosophical 
position from the time he began to study philosophy seri­
ously. He related his thoughts about the transition in a 
letter to John L. Childs;
I got myself straightened out pretty well— I think so 
anyway— because I had extraordinary advantages. One was 
light teaching schedules in high-grade universities. 
Another was that I could take years and years to 
"reconstruct" myself, which is an unbelievably slow pro­
cess when a person does it on his own. I'll never for­
give my teachers for letting me flounder without the 
help to which I was entitled.1
The result of Bode's reflective thinking was a brand 
of pragmatism that was fundamentally Deweyan in character. 
From his acceptance of education as the workbench of philos­
ophy to his assertion that he "reconstructed" himself to his 
pragmatic educational theory Bode demonstrated his debt to 
Dewey. Moreover, he followed Dewey’s lead by examining 
philosophical and educational issues in the larger context 
of a theory of democracy.
This brings us back to the question whose stage is 
now set. What happened to John Dewey's theory of democracy 
at the hands of Boyd H. Bode? Perhaps we can obtain a clue 
for solving this problem in the comments that John Dewey 
made in 19̂ 7 concerning Bode's interpretation of his ideas ; 
Bode has often been over-generous in what he said about
Letter to John L. Childs, July 9. 1951* Quoted in 
John L. Childs, American Pragmatism and Education, An 
Interpretation and Criticism (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 1956), p. 249.
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the influence of some of my philosophic writings in aid­
ing him to unite philosophy and education. However, it 
makes me proud and happy to feel that I have had even an 
indirect part in the work he has done. Nevertheless, 
strong as is my "will to believe," I have also to tell 
you that whatever came to him from any source somehow 
came out different after it had passed through his mind 
with its unfailing instinct for clarity, his sense of 
humor, and his constant vision of where and how the 
ideas in question should and could enter the lifestream 
of human beings.1
Although Dewey overstated his point, he was apparently
tolerant of the fact that Bode modified his theory of
democracy in light of the changing circumstances following
the First World War.
The question of whether or not Boyd Bode altered John 
Dewey's theory of democracy is an example of one of the most 
interesting questions in the history of thought; What 
becomes of an orthodox theory once it descends into hands of 
younger theoreticians? Inquiries into this issue help to 
explain how and why theories evolved as conditions changed. 
They help to clarify the meanings of the theory's princi­
ples, or explain how and why those meanings came to be 
altered. Finally, investigations into the evolution of an 
orthodox theory provide some insight into what became of 
that theory as its disciples attempted to put it into prac­
tice. This would, in turn, give future followers of the 
theory some information about its strengths and weaknesses. 
In order to gain all of this knowledge, however, we must
^John Dewey, "Boyd H. Bede; An Appreciation," 
Teachers College Record 49 (January 1948); 266-67-
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first understand the orthodox theory itself. Thus we should 
begin this particular inquiry with an explanation of John 
Dewey's theory of democracy.
CHAPTER I 
DEWEY ON DEMOCRACY
Pour years after he completed his doctorate at Johns
Hopkins University, in 1888, John Dewey asserted that:
Democracy, like any other polity, has been finely termed 
the memory of an historic past, the consciousness of a 
living present, the ideal of the coming future. Democ­
racy, in a word, is a social, that is to say, an ethical 
conception, and upon its ethical significance is based 
its significance as governmental. Democracy is a form 
of government only because it is a form of moral and 
spiritual association.!
He went on to suggest that democracy differed from aristoc­
racy as to its means; it began with man himself rather than 
being externally imposed. Although these early statements 
obviously were written by John Dewey the idealist, they con­
tained the basic theme of the theory of democracy that he 
developed as a pragmatist. In this theory, he regarded the 
individual as the fundamental element, the society as the 
crucible of the ethical relationship, and the process of 
education as the means for maintaining the democratic soci­
ety. Issues arising out of concern for each of these ele­
ments occupied the minds of many social thinkers, and
John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy," in John 
Dewey, The Early Works, 1882-1898, ed. Jo Ann Boydston, et. 
al., vol. 1: 1882-1883, Early Essays and Leibniz’s New
Essays Concerning the Human Understanding (Carbondale: 
Southern Illinois University Press, 1969;, p. 2̂ 0.
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manifested the changes in American society during the
Progressive Era. Yet Dewey was not merely riding the train.
In the minds of some, he was the engineer. "We were all
Deweyites before we read Dewey," J. Allen Smith observed,
"and we were all the more effective reformers after we had
read him.Dewey's influence stretched far beyond the
Progressive Era writ large, attracting a host of disciples
in the first half of the twentieth century, among them
Boyd H. Bode.
The origin of Dewey's strong democratic spirit has
2been the subject of some debate. Tradition has had it that 
his interest in democracy grew out of his early years in the 
ostensibly democratic environment of New England. According 
to the story, Dewey became "... infected by some leveller 
miasma creeping on chilly nights up the streets of Burlington
Ibid., p. 2̂ 3; Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, 
p. 159* Quoted by the late Edward A. Ross, in an interview 
with Goldman.
PMerle Curti, The Social Ideas of American Educators 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935; Littlefield,Adams & Co., 1971), pp. 300-07; Jane M. Dewey, ed., 
"Biography of John Dewey," in The Philosophy of John Dewey 
ed. by Paul Arthur Schilpp (New York: Tudor Publishing
Company, 1951)» pp. 3-21; George Dykhuizen, The Life and 
Mind of John Dewey, with an Introduction by Harold Taylor 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1973), 
1-5̂ ; Neil Goughian, Young John Dewey, An Essay in 
American Intellectual History (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 1975), PP* 90-93» For a discussion of Dewey's intellectual development based principally on his writings, see Morton G. White, The Origin of Dewey's 
Instrumentalism (New York: Columbia University Press,1943).
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from Lake Champlain."^ But the clearly marked social divi­
sions in Burlington could hardly have been called demo-
2cratic.
Dewey's democratic attitudes likely originated in 
his experiences in graduate school and beyond. At Johns 
Hopkins his early interest in social problems found an out­
let in the study of history and political science, which he 
had chosen as minor subjects.^ Participation in discussions 
of current political, economic, and social topics, which 
likely included the theories of Richard T. Ely, and encoun­
ters with fellow graduate students like Woodrow Wilson cer­
tainly affected his thinking. At the University of Michigan, 
his exposure to political and social ideas continued. There 
he met Henry Carter Adams whose thoughts about private prop­
erty, free trade, and labor were seen as "radical." Dewey 
also gained from the influence of his first v/ife, Alice Chip- 
man Dewey, who was well read and conversant with contempo­
rary life, and from frequent visits with her grandfather.
Ĝoughian, Young John Dewey, pp. 90-93*
Îbid.
^John Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism, " 
in Contemnorarv American Philosophy, Personal Statements, 
vol. 2 , ed. by George P. Adams and William Pepperell 
Montague (New York: The Macmillan Company 193Ô), p. 20.
Dewey recalled that his interest in social problems origi­
nated in his undergraduate days with a reading of Harriet 
Martineau's translation of Philosophie Positive by 
Auguste Comte; Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, 
p. 30. Dewey chose these miner fields of study in part 
because of a dearth of courses in social, political, and 
economic philosophy at Johns Hopkins.
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Fred Riggs, who championed Indian rights.̂
In the end, it was the social changes which Dewey
experienced that profoundly affected his thinking. The
development of his pragmatic philosophy and his theory of
democracy was an effort to make sense out of a society
bustling with new scientific knowledge, industrial growth,
political ferment, and urban expansion. At first, like many
of his contemporaries, Dewey attempted to reconcile science
with religion. This became a struggle to rid himself of the
philosophical dualisms of the New England culture which had
2left ". . .an inward lasceration." At Johns Hopkins, he
found in Hegelianism a respite in his intellectual journey.
As he recalled:
Hegel's synthesis of subject and object, matter and spirit, the divine and the human, was, however, no mere 
intellectual formula; it operated as an immense release, 
a liberation. Hegel's treatment of human culture, of 
institutions and the arts, involved the same dissolution 
of hard-and-fast dividing walls, and had a special 
attraction for me.3
Dewey adopted Hegelianism for several reasons. The 
organic unity between subject and object in Hegel's philoso­
phy did away with traditional dualism. It aided Dewey's 
struggle with science in that it paralleled the biological
Ely taught economics at Johns Hopkins from 1881 to 
1892. Webster's Biographical Dictionary, 1974; Goughian, 
Young John Dewey, pp. 90-93*
2Goughian, Young Jo^ Dewey, p. 49; Dewey, "from 
Absolutism to Experimentalism," p. 19.
D̂ewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," p. 19.
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unity explained by Darwinian theory. Hegelianism also 
provided a system for Dewey that the eclecticism of his 
first teacher, Henry A. P. Torrey, failed to furnish.^
Pragmatists have held that ends are only tentative.
So it was with Dewey's belief in Hegel's universe. Over the 
next fifteen years, he "drifted" away from Hegelian ideal­
ism, while becoming increasingly concerned with social prob­
lems. "Social interests and problems," he remarked, "from 
an early period had to me the intellectual appeal and pro­
vided the intellectual sustenance that many seem to have
2found primarily in religious questions." Although Hegeli­
anism helped him understand social problems, Dewey came to 
view Hegel's dialectical analyses as mechanical.^ Neverthe­
less, he retained the notion of organic unity in his own 
pragmatic theories.
By the time Dewey arrived at the University of 
Chicago in 1894, his interests in psychology, society, edu­
cation, and in the role of the scientific method in each of 
the subjects were leading him toward his own philosophical 
system. During the next three years, he completed the 
formulation of a brand of pragmatism which he called instru­
mentalism. This doctrine held that ideas developed in
D̂ykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, p. 16. 




experience were plans of action; that all dualisms were 
deadly; that human beings were biological organisms tied 
with nature through experience; that life was a process that 
derived its meanings from human associations; that nothing 
was absolute; that the method of intelligence was the best 
means for solving problems; and that philosophy ought to 
extricate itself from the speculative realm and devote 
itself to social action.
In company with George Herbert Mead, James Hayden 
Tufts, and James Rowland Ange11, Dewey formed what came to 
be known as the Chicago School of Philosophy. From 1894 to 
1904, the year Dewey left Chicago for Columbia University, 
they interpreted and applied pragmatism to psychology, 
ethics, and education. They democratized philosophy con­
tending that the individual should judge his own experience 
based on personal standards. Dewey had anticipated this 
thesis in 1888 when he suggested that; "In a word, 
democracy means that personality is the first and final 
reality."^ He admitted that the individual could learn the 
full significance of personality from society. But the 
choice to develop a personality had to come from the 
individual.^
Although G. Stanley Hall had introduced Dewey to
“Darnell Rucker, The Chicago Pragmatists (Minneap­
olis: University of Minnesota Press, 1969), p. 46; Dewey,
"The Ethics of Democracy," pp. 243-44.
D̂ewey, "The Ethics of Democracy," pp. 243-44.
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evolutionary psychology and its implications for the indi­
vidual, it was William James who profoundly influenced his 
psychological theory. Like James, Dewey held that the human 
mind and body were not separate but constituted an organic 
whole. James saw the individual struggling to find a mode 
of conduct which would disclose the meaning of truth.
Dewey, in contrast, thought that the individual operated 
within a system of associations endeavoring with his fellows 
to find some truth that had meaning for the community.^ He 
envisioned an organic tie between the individual and the 
society. This symbiotic relationship resembled that which 
existed between the individual and nature.
Life, according to Dewey, was a mixture of the pre­
carious and the stable. Existence was a gamble because the 
world was unstable and fraught with uncertainty. There was, 
nevertheless, an element of regularity. When combined with 
the indefinite, Dewey supposed that it produced an ideal 
condition. It made life experimental. As he explained:
The conjunction of problematic and determinate charac­
ters in nature renders every existence, as well as every 
idea and human act, an experiment in fact, even though 
not in desî i. To be intelligently experimental is but 
to be conscious of this intersection of natural condi­
tions so as to profit by it instead of being at its mercy.^
Dewey, "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," pp. 23- 
25. Dewey acknowledged his debt to William James ; Henry 
Steele Commager, The American Mind, An Interpretation of 
American Thought and Character Since the 1880's (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1950)1 PP* 98-99-
John Dewey, Experience and Nature (Chicago: Open
Court Publishing Company, 1929), PP- 4-1, 63, ?0.
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We had to act, as it were, upon the environment, not allow 
it to control us.
Knowledge of the environment came from experience, 
which Dewey thought was our link to the environment. Modern 
man's method of directing these experiences was science.
But science was a tool for solving particular problems, not 
some newly discovered omnipotent force that could change the 
environment. Early man, he remarked, recognized the precar­
ious condition of existence, and devised religions with 
their magic and rites to ward off the unseen forces. Modern 
man faced the same kind of world, and developed the method 
of science to deal with it. Both methods came from experi­
ence. If modern man's tool was superior, said Dewey, it was 
only because it was based on verifiable elements in nature 
and not on figments of his imagination. "But," he admitted, 
"when all is said and done the fundamentally hazardous 
character of the world is not seriously modified, much less 
eliminated.
Dewey applied his beliefs about existence to the 
theater of human association. He contended that human 
beings could not exist alone. They had to be a part of 
society, which gave meaning to experience through association
White, The Revolt Against Formalism, p. 12. White 
suggests that a common approach taken by John Dewey, Oliver 
Wendell Holmes, Charles Beard, and James Harvey Robinson was to explain facts by referring to the past and by employing 
social sciences other than the one under discussion;
Dewey, Experience and Nature, p. 44.
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with others. Babies, for instance, were dependent beings. 
Their activities, remarked Dewey, would be limited to a few 
hours if it were not for the presence of adults with formed 
habits. The young learned to express their native activi­
ties in ways that had meaning by interacting with a matured 
social medium.^
This did not mean that habits were to be imposed upon 
the young. Dewey strongly disagreed with the traditional 
belief that habits were to be inculcated in the human mind. 
He postulated, instead, that human beings were biological 
organisms born with certain native instincts, impulses, and 
the tendency to form habits. The latter two formed the 
important variables for directing experience. Impulses he 
thought formed the bases for reorganizing activities and for 
giving new direction to old habits. Habits were the tenta­
tive structure of organized activities, which when balanced
with impulses yielded consciousness. Dewey viewed this
2phenomenon as the vehicle of knowledge.
In this conception, Dewey reiterated his belief in 
the basic unity of existence. He also used it as a basis 
for criticizing those who wanted to maintain the mind-body 
dualism by explaining knowledge as something separate from 
original power. "The isolation of intellectual disposition
John Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct, An Introduc­
tion to Social Psychology (New York; Henry Holt and 
Company, 1922; Modem Library, Inc., 1930), pp. 89-90.
Îbid., pp. 93, 176-83.
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from concrete empirical facts of biological impulse and 
habit-formation," he protested, "entails a denial of the 
continuity of mind with nature."^
What happened to knowledge if the equilibrium of 
impulse and habit were upset? Dewey's answer was reflective 
thinking, the method of intelligence, which he thought was 
critical to efficacious human action. If each person were 
to become an active and useful participant in a democratic 
society, he could not go blithely along buffeted by the 
forces of the environment. He had to act upon the condi­
tions he faced. Nor could the individual live at the mercy 
of blind impulse or be constrained by rigid habit. Intel­
ligent action meant reflective thinking.
As the opening paragraphs of this essay suggest,
Dewey believed that thinking began with a state of disequi­
librium and proceeded to the formation of a tentative plan, 
to the imagining of a theory that accounted for the pecu­
liarities of the question, and to the consideration of a 
solution. In this process, he noted, the data at hand did 
not give us a solution; they merely indicated it. The best 
sources of suggestions were past experience with a similar 
situation and one's fund of relevant knowledge. If neither 
of these sources were available, warned Dewey, confusion 
would remain. It was futile to expect an individual to deal 
with a problem for which he had no prior experience. On the
^Ibid., p. 186.
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other hand, an unwillingness to he sufficiently critical 
about our ideas or a desire to jump to conclusions would 
hinder reflective thinking. He thought that we should be 
patient and willing to tolerate the condition of doubt 
". . . so as not to accept an idea or make positive asser­
tion of a belief until justifying reasons have been found.
Reflective thinking enabled the individual to act 
with foresight. It allowed one to plan according to pur­
poses or projected ends. Dewey preferred the term ends-in- 
view, implying the tentative nature of these ends. Comment­
ing on the influence of these ends, he suggested that pro­
jecting the consequences of our actions enabled us to know 
what we were about. He frequently reiterated, however, that
these were not "... ends of action. In being ends of
2deliberation they are redirecting pivots in action." In 
other words, an achieved end became a means. Reflective 
thinking, for instance, was an end for human development 
and a means for human action.
When the individual learned to think reflectively, 
his interdependence did not suddenly end. Neither did it 
end with parental nurturing. Dewey continually stressed 
that the individual obtained from others the material of 
intellectual and physical sustenance throughout life.
D̂ewey, How We Think, pp. 15-16.
2Ibid., TD. 18; Dewey, Human Nature and Conduct,
p. 225.
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Although, as one grew he became physically and economically 
independent, he could not carry on his calling or satisfy 
his needs without others. Social ties, he remarked, were 
natural and inevitable, as were physical ties. Even when 
one was alone he thought with language derived from associ­
ation with others. In the case of independent judgment and 
character, Dewey held that it was independence in relation 
to others.̂
Dewey was well aware of the social, economic, and 
political changes that occurred as the United States became 
an industrial giant and a world power during the first 
thirty years of the twentieth century. He remarked that new 
inventions, increasing wants, population shifts, cultural 
mixing, changing domestic life, increasing leisure time, and 
the effects of great combinations of capital on individual 
employment opportunities forced people into closer rela­
tions. Hence, the need for people to understand the ethical 
nature of democracy became more acute. Individuals, com­
mented Dewey, had to avoid drifting and reflect upon those 
social tendencies and social institutions they would favor
and those they would oppose. He held that in a democracy
2social issues took on a moral dimension.
John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics rev. ed.
(New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1932), pp. 24?-48.
Dewey began to develop this idea in his essay "The Ethics of 
Democracy" in 1888. He later expanded his explanation in 
the first edition of the Ethics in 1908.
Îbid., p. 352.
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The charge that this was subordinating the individual 
to the social order, Dewey dismissed as absurd. He asserted 
that the change from personal to social morality made 
personal reflection more important. People had to develop 
more personal knowledge and insight, more substantial con­
victions, and stronger attitudes in their actions. He con­
cluded that social morals meant that the social conditions 
and consequences of personal action were made explicit, and 
required more thoughtful judgment than ever before.̂
The central moral issue for the individual in a
democracy is freedom. The traditional view expressed by
John Locke and others has been that freedom is a natural
right, a condition of human individuality. Dewey thought
that taken at face value this conception was naive. Without
action this type of freedom was mere form. Freedom has also
been interpreted as freedom from restraint. This notion,
2commented Dewey, was both negative and formal. He argued, 
instead, that freedom was a function primarily of individual 
capacity and secondarily of social conditions.
Dewey held that freedom developed as we became aware 
of our own uniqueness, and as we attempted to satisfy per­
sonal needs and desires. He went so far as to suggest that
Îbid., p. 353•
2John Dewey, Freedom and Culture (New York: G. P.
Putnam’s Sons 1939; Capricorn Books, I963), pp. 5̂ -55;
John Dewey and James H. Tufts, Ethics (New York: Henry Holt
and Company, 1908), p. 3̂7-
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the potentiality for freedom was a part of our innate capac­
ity for growth. The more we became aware of this potenti­
ality and the avenues of growth, the more we resisted 
fixity, and thereby realized the possibilities of recreating 
ourselves, the more we were actually free.^
This understanding apparently was a prerequisite to 
achieving the two conditions of what he termed effective 
freedom. First, there had to be positive control of the 
resources of action in order to satisfy needs. Second, the 
individual had to have the intellectual powers of initiative 
and reflection which were the requisites of foresight.
Merely having freedom to act was an empty condition without 
the intelligence to use it. Our actions, observed Dewey, 
likely would be fruitful to the degree that we had consulted 
conditions and planned accordingly. At the same time, 
recalling the precarious nature of existence, he noted that 
we could encounter good or bad luck. He even suggested that 
luck seemed to favor the intelligent over the stupid. "In
neutral and adverse circumstances," he concluded, "study
2and foresight are the only roads to unimpeded action." 
Obviously, he believed that freedom depended first on the 
development of human intelligence.
Dewey saw freedom of action as a gift of nature that
^Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, rev. ed., p. 340.
2Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 438; Dewey, Human 
Nature and Conduct, pp. 304-03.
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was at the mercy of accident. Consequently, it had to be 
supplemented by agreements among men. These agreements, 
Dewey admonished, demanded concessions from individuals.
Some liberties had to be curtailed in order for any liber­
ties to be secure and enduring. As he put it:
They [individuals] must, in short enter into an organi­
zation with other human beings so that the activities of 
others may be permanently counted upon to assure regu­
larity of action and far-reaching scope of plans and 
courses of action.^
He likened this process to buying an insurance policy as a
hedge against future contingencies, and thus securing the
future course of life. He admitted these sacrifices were
necessary, but reasonable, and were justified by the
results.^
This relationship between individual freedom and 
organization Dewey characteristically saw as experimental.
He said that it could not be governed by abstract theory. 
Rather, the experiment had to be judged by its consequences. 
"The question," he argued, "is to the balance of freedom and 
security achieved, as compared with practicable alterna­
t i v e s . A  democratic society was one such experimental 
organization.
Most of Dewey’s works dealing with the social order 
appeared after he left the University of Chicago in 190^.^
D̂ewey, Human Nature and Conduct, p. 307.
Îbid. Îbid., pp. 307-08.
^Ethics. with James H. Tufts (I908), Democracy and
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In May of that year, he accepted a position on the faculty 
of Columbia University, where he remained until his retire­
ment in 1930.̂  He arrived in New York City as the muck- 
rakers were exposing corruption in government and industry. 
Although muckraking died by I909, the progressive star 
remained bright. Progressive standard bearer Theodore 
Roosevelt, for example, remained in the public view and 
later led the ill-fated attempt to win the White House for 
progressivism in 1912. Herbert Croly published The Promise
of American Life in 1909, considered by his contemporaries
2to be an important statement on progressivism. Progres­
sivism remained popular through the Wilson administration, 
although the failure of Wilsonian idealism became the death 
knell of the movement. Dewey, nonetheless, maintained his 
faith in the possibilities of a democratic social order.
In 1908, Dewey explained what he had adumbrated 
twenty years before, that democracy was an ethical relation­
ship that gave significance to a form of government. The
Education (I916), Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920), The 
Public and Its Problems (1926), Individualism Old and New 
(1930), Ethics, rev, ed. (1932), Liberalism yid Social 
Action (1935), and Freedom and Culture (1939).
“Dykhuizen, The Life and Mind of John Dewey, pp. 110- 
17. Dewey and Chicago's President William Rainey Harper had 
disagreed over arrangements for the Laboratory School cre­
ated by Dewey in 1897 as an educational experiment. Dewey resigned on April 5, 19C4 without another position. Within 
a few weeks, he received an invitation from President 
Nicholas Murray Butler to take a position at Columbia 
University.
Ĝoldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, pp. I7I-76, 192.
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evolution of democratic states, he said, was the social 
complement of the growth of a comprehensive good. The 
external structure of democracy was a piece of machinery to 
he used or discarded based on its economy and efficiency. 
"Morally," he explained, "it is the effective embodiment of 
the moral ideal of a good which consists in the development 
of all the social capacities of every individual member of 
society."* This was the environment he had alluded to in 
his description of the individual. It was the ideal social 
order that would enable the individual to act intelligently 
and grow to the limit of his capacity.
Achieving this ideal was not simple. Like most
progressives, Dewey saw many barriers to reaching the ideal
of democracy. The first roadblock, he thought, was distrust
of government. This attitude stemmed from the struggle for
individual freedom against despotism, and resulted in the
persistent demand for laissez faire government. Dewey
admitted the value of limited government under the original
circumstances. But, he said, the situation was different in
the twentieth century. Technological achievements enabled
the public to be well informed. Thus the principal moral
problem of the day was to make government an organ for
2expressing common interests and purposes.
Dewey was concerned about the effects of an
^Dewey and Tufts, Ethics, p. 4?̂ . 
Îbid., pp. 474-76.
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increasingly complex society on the individual and the 
social order. He thought that growing private interests 
were a measure of social progress in that they multiplied 
the sources of happiness. But, he warned, they also tended 
to overwhelm the individual such that he became too con­
cerned about his own affairs at the expense of public needs. 
Politics thus became the bailiwick of experts, which he 
thought inevitably led to corruption. Control of govern­
mental machinery by a few bred secrecy because of indiffer­
ence to the public at large, and encouraged perversion of 
public functions for private advantage. He cited the prob­
lems with control of public utilities as an example. The 
growth of transportation and communication had led to the 
creation of large and powerful industries controlling these 
public services. It also resulted in attempts by these 
organizations to control legislation through political power 
brokers who held the reigns of the party machinery. Dewey 
believed that a true democracy where politics was a public 
endeavor would deter such corruption. But he was not naive 
enough to think that the task was an easy one. "That a 
•public office is a public trust,*" he emphatically stated, 
"is at once an axiom of political ethics and a principle 
most difficult to realize.
Implicit in this comment was his concern about the 
solutions to political problems. He acknowledged the recent
Îbid., pp. 477-78.
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efforts to improve the party structure and make it more
democratic. He was pleased with such advances as the
Australian ballot, the referendum, the recall, the efforts
to promote women's suffrage, and the attempts to equalize
individual opportunities. But he warned that the efficacy
of these solutions had to be measured by an ethical ideal.
As he explained;
The moral criterion by which to try social institutions 
and political measures may be summed up as follows: The
test is whether a given custom or law sets free individ­
ual capacities in such a way as to make them available 
for the development of the general happiness or the 
common good. This formula states the test with the 
emphasis falling upon the side of the individual. It 
may be stated from the side of associated life as fol­
lows; The test is whether the general, the public, 
organization and order are promoted in such a way as to 
equalize opportunity for all.l
In the true pragmatic sense, this ethical ideal of 
democracy as an end was also a means in that it suggested a 
process of growth for the individual and the society. The 
success of democracy as an end, moreover, depended on the 
democratic means, the method of intelligence. It seems that 
Dewey's constant effort to explain the meaning of democracy 
most often appeared as an emphasis on the means to achieving 
democracy. This is not to suggest that he had proposed an 
ideal that was mere form; its dynamic quality negated any 
such accusation. Dewey's v;ay of placing philosophy at the 
service of society was to promote intelligent action that 
implied the ethical ideal of democracy.
Îbid., pp. 478-83.
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As the Progressive Era drew to a close at the end of 
the First World War, democracy faced its severest tests.
The war and the failure of American idealism at Versailles 
left Americans in no mood to promote world order. They 
simply wanted to turn inward, to return to "normalcy," and 
to make money. Conformity became the watchword. Americans 
also became somewhat paranoid about ghosts that seemed to 
threaten their way of life as the Red Scare and the trial of 
Sacco and Vanzetti demonstrated. Reform democracy came 
under increasing criticism. H. L. Menken, for instance, 
lambasted the democracy of progressivism as ". . . the wor­
ship of jackals by jackasses."^ Others, now calling them­
selves liberals, attacked conformity, and avoided criti­
cizing politics and economics. Most reformers took the 
latter position because they wanted to divorce themselves 
from Wilsonian idealism; they wanted to avoid stirring up a 
witch hunt; and, most important, they thought equality of
opportunity was not a problem, rather, the restriction of
2individual liberty was the real threat.
With the coming of the Great Depression some reform­
ers began to speak out against the causes of insecurity: 
mechanization and urbanization. Others seemed to follow the 
attitude of the public in believing that America was still 
the land of opportunity; that security was not a threat ; and
Ĝoldman, Rendezvous With Destiny, pp. 315-16. 
Îbid., pp. 317-18.
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that equality came from individual effort. The New Deal, 
ironically, was more aggressively egalitarian than 
progressivism.^
During the 1920s and 1930s, Dewey maintained the
position on democracy that he had established at the height
of the Progressive Era. In spite of the mood of the 1920s,
he forged ahead in his effort to promote a democratic
social order. He was concerned about a type of conformity
much more serious than that of George Babbitt. He thought
that reverence for liberty, equality, and fraternity as mere
abstractions was a kind of mindless conformity inimical to
democracy. These shibboleths obtained true meaning, he
remarked, when they were construed as characteristics of
2associations that defined a community.
Dewey regretted the loss of the community with its 
closeness, cooperation, and common interests which he 
thought were fundamental to democracy. The brotherhood of 
the community gave meaning to liberty, equality, and frater­
nity. Those who identified democracy with individualism 
either ignored this fact or made these symbols sentimental 
tags. Within the communal experience, he explained, frater­
nity was another term for goods that grew out of a shared 
association and gave direction to the conduct of each good.
Îbid., pp. 368-71.
2John Dewey, The Public and Its Problems (New York: 
Henry Holt and Company. 1927; The Swallow Press Inc., 195̂ )»
p. 149.
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Liberty was the freeing and fulfillment of individual capac­
ities that could only occur in association with others. 
Equality was the unencumbered share by each member of the 
community in the consequences of that association. Sounding 
somewhat like Karl Marx, Dewey held that this was equitable 
because it was based on need and ability to use, not on 
conditions that deprive one so as to provide for another. A 
baby, for example, was equal in that his needs were ful­
filled without being sacrificed to the superior abilities 
of other family members. As he asserted:
Equality does not signify that kind of mathematical or 
physical equivalence in virtue of which any one element 
may be substituted for another. It denotes effective 
regard for whatever is distinctive and unique in each, 
irrespective of physical and psychological inequalities. 
It is not a natural possession but is a fruit of the 
community when its action is directed by its character 
as a community.1
Another revered principle of democracy is individ­
ualism. Celebrated by the founding fathers as the basic 
premise of American democracy, it has pervaded American life 
since that time. Politically and economically it came to 
mean a laissez faire approach by the government. As the 
society became increasingly complex this type of individ­
ualism became meaningless. Yet it retained its status as a 
fundamental principle of democracy.
Dewey saw the widening gulf between individualism in 
theory and practice as a threat to true democracy. To his 
way of thinking it was a question of economic arrangements.
Îbid., pp. 149-54, 211-17.
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In "The Ethics of Democracy" he had contended that political 
democracy was meaningless without economic democracy. Even 
in the time of Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward and Henry 
George's Progress and Poverty this was considered a radical 
position. As corporate capitalism grew and "business became 
the business of Americans, Dewey looked increasingly to the 
economic side of the coin as the basis of individualism.
It was ironic, he commented, that as individualism received 
great support it was being submerged by industrial growth 
and its concomitant social alignments. So pervasive was the 
effect of the increasingly complex industrial order, thought 
Dewey, that it affected all human associations. "The forms 
of associated action characteristic of the present economic 
order are so massive and extensive," he warned, "that they
determine the most significant constituents of the public
1and the residence of power."
Early in the depression, Dewey became so disturbed 
by the effects of this impersonal economy on the individual 
that he issued a clarion call for a change in the social 
order in Individualism Old and New. He suggested that a 
corporate state had grown up around the individual, had 
restricted personal choice and initiative, and had left the 
individual confused and bewildered. The individual seemed
Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy" in The Early 
Works, 1882-1888, pp. 246-49; Curti, The Social Ideas of 
American Educators, p. 5̂ 3i Dewey, The Public and Its 
Problems, pp. 96-97. 10?.
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to lack any sense of social fulfillment. Even the "pecu­
niary oligarchy" showed little evidence of satisfaction.
"As for the many," he said, "they are impelled hither and 
yon by forces beyond their control."" He suggested that a 
stable recovery required the elimination of the old eco­
nomic and political individualism, and the establishment of
a new economic order. This was the only way to make
2equality of opportunity a reality.
Dewey proposed a radical solution for the plight of 
the individual, in the sense that it departed sharply from 
laissez faire capitalism in the direction of socialism. He 
spoke as a tough-minded pragmatic theoretician. Like 
Thorstein Veblen, he assumed that the economy was evolving 
and that the solution had to grow out of the current circum­
stances, not out of old assumptions. He thought that the 
new individualism would emphasize the social dimension of 
thought. It required the controlled use of scientific and 
technological resources for the benefit of the individual.
It also meant taking account of social realities in the 
public interest. In this case Dewey thought that the circum­
stances pointed to some form of socialism. By socialism he 
meant an economy that was planned by the public, not by the
John Dewey, Individualism Old and New (New York: 
Minton, Balch and Co., 1930; Capricorn Books, 1962), pp. 36 
52-54. This material originally appeared in a series of 





Once again, Dewey returned to the method of science. 
The new economic order was not to be a fixed end. As condi­
tions changed and brought forward fresh problems, new solu­
tions had to be found. This evolving order required the 
scientific attitude which, he said, was "... experimental 
as well as intrinsically communicative." Thus Dewey's new 
order would be scientific and would have the primary element 
of community— communication.
In any discussion of democracy, the issue of the state 
inevitably arises. Dewey's theory of democracy was no 
exception. He saw the state as an evolving organism. "By 
its very nature," he commented, "a state is ever something 
to be scrutinized, investigated, searched for. Almost as 
soon as its form is stabilized, it needs to be re-made.
He thought that discovering the state was not a theoretical 
problem, but a practical one. Yet his own suggestions 
belied the practical nature of the problem.
The state began as the natural consequence of asso­
ciated living, which he said, resulted in the formation of a 
public. At first unstructured, a public became a state when 
it was articulated and operated by official representatives. 
In this regard, Dewey acknowledged the basic principle of
Îbid., pp. 87-88, 93-98, 119-20.
Îbid., p. 156.
D̂ewey, The Public and Its Problems, pp. 31-32.
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political democracy that government existed to serve the 
community, a purpose achieved by the community sharing in 
the selection of governors and in the determination of their 
policies. He was not interested, however, in proposing new 
governmental machinery. He thought, instead, that a more 
important problem for democracy was establishing the condi­
tions that would enable a scattered, mobile, and multifari­
ous public to determine and express its common interests. 
This was to be a search for. the conditions under which the 
"Great Society" might become the "Great Community.
A democratically organized public, said Dewey, had to 
have a kind of knowledge and insight that could not yet be 
defined since it did not exist. But the conditions for 
obtaining that knowledge could be delineated. We could 
borrow, he suggested, from the spirit and method of science. 
Two important requirements were freedom of social inquiry 
and the dissemination of its conclusions. Social inquiry 
for Dewey meant the application of the scientific method to 
the problems of society. Dissemination of the information 
garnered from inquiry required the use of every possible 
means of communication in the interest of the public. Meet­
ing these two requirements Dewey thought would provide the 
means for creating the "Great Community." He concluded that;
Democracy will come into its own, for democracy is a 
name for a life of free and enriching communion. It had 
its seer in Walt Whitman. It will have its consummation 
when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the
Îbid., pp. 67, 146-47.
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art of full and moving communication.^
Achieving the conditions of a democratic community
did not, however, mean that every member of the society
would engage in social inquiry. On the contrary, Dewey
foresaw experts conducting such investigations. The many,
he asserted, had to be able to judge the knowledge supplied
by the experts as to its relevance to common concerns. Such
judgments depended on what Dewey called effective intelli-
2gence, the product of education.
Dewey meant by this statement much more than the 
traditional notion that political democracy required an edu­
cated citizenry. It was a process that went far beyond 
traditional schooling. He associated education with the 
process of life. But life in America had undergone a sig­
nificant transformation since the middle of the nineteenth 
century. These changes provided the impetus for the educa­
tional element of his theory of democracy.
The evolution of American life from an agrarian to an 
industrial society generated much concern about education.
In the 1890s calls for educational reform came from many 
corners of the society. Business and labor leaders demanded 
that the schools assume the responsibility for apprentice­
ship training. Settlement workers and municipal reformers 
called upon the schools to teach hygiene, domestic science, 
child care, and manual arts. With the influx of immigrants,
Îbid., pp. 166-83. Îbid., pp. 208-09-
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patriots were calling for "Americanization." Farmers wanted 
the schools to instruct their young in the joys and benefits 
of farming. Their aim, in part, was to keep their children 
on the farm and out of the cities. The common thread in 
these demands for educational reform was the realization 
that in the new industrial society the family and community 
were no longer educating the young as they had in the past. 
Somehow, thought the public, these functions had to be per­
formed. So they turned to the school as the common social 
institution.^
Dewey responded to these calls for reform in 1899 in 
The School and Society. Like Plato, he believed that soci­
ety educated the citizen. He also recognized that the new 
industrial society made it impossible for the family and the 
local community to perform its educational function as it 
once had. Thus the school had to become the primary educa­
tional institution. This did not, however, alter the seat 
of educational responsibility. "What the best and wisest 
parent wants for his own child," he said, "that must the 
community want for all of its children. Any other ideal for
our schools is narrow and unlovely; acted upon it destroys
2our democracy." Education was not to become the exclusive
Lawrence A. Cremin, The Transformation of the 
School, Progressivism in American Education. 1076-1957  
(New York; Alfred A. Knonf, 3jic., 1 9 6 1; Vintage Books, 
1 9 6 4), pp. 116-1 7.
2John Dewey, The School and Society rev. ed. 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1915; combined
with The Child and the Curriculum. 1971), p. 7*
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domain of educators, but had to remain an affair of the 
entire community.
Dewey reminded his audience that a society was a 
group of people held together by common needs and aims grow­
ing out of an interchange of thought and sympathy. This 
sense of community was rapidly disappearing. And the tradi­
tional school, he thought, was too far removed from society 
to teach effectively a sense of community. In order to 
compensate for the social transformation, the school had to 
become a community. By introducing the occupations of the 
home and community of the industrial era into the school 
life such values as cooperation, free communication of 
ideas, order, and discipline would result. Life would 
become the child's environment in school and out. The les­
sons would no longer be abstract, but associated with liv­
ing. The school would become ". . .an embryonic society." 
Dewey thought that this type of education would produce 
individuals who could function in society and participate as 
active associates in the improvement of life for all. As he 
described it:
When the school introduces and trains each child of 
society into membership within such a little community, 
saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing 
him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we 
shall have the deepest and best guaranty of a larger 
society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious.1
In other words, the school was to have an active role in
Îbid., pp. 14-18, 29.
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changing society. This aim clearly indicated the role of 
education in his theory of democracy.
In 1916, Dewey published his most comprehensive 
statement on education and society in Democracy and Educa­
tion. By this time he had come to be recognized as a lead­
ing voice of progressivism, which guaranteed a large audi­
ence for almost anything he produced. Thus it is not sur­
prising that Democracy and Education was hailed by some as 
the most important statement on education since Rousseau's 
Emile.̂
Dewey saw a direct relationship between democracy and 
education. In his clearest statement about this relation­
ship, he reiterated his contention that democracy was more 
than a form of government, that it was a mode of associated 
living and common experience. The extension of human inter­
action to the point where an individual had to consider the 
effects of his action on others, he thought, was analogous 
to the breakdown of class, race, and national barriers which 
had kept men from perceiving the impact of their activity. 
This change widened the environment for the individual, 
increasing the stimuli to which he could respond, and 
thereby liberating personal capacities. But, he said, the 
widening of the area of common concerns which characterized 
a democracy was not the result of deliberate effort. It 
grew out of the new modes of industry, transportation, and
Ĉremin, The Transformation of the School, pp. 119-20.
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communication. The liberation of the individual and the 
widening area of common interests, moreover, were not self- 
sustaining. An increasingly complex society, said Dewey, 
had to see that its members developed personal initiative 
and adaptability. Otherwise, he warned, they would be over­
come by the changes whose significance they could not per­
ceive and whose direction they could not control.^
Once again, Dewey was expressing his fundamental 
ideas about democracy. He meshed educational theory with 
political theory in an effort at social reform that paralleled 
the work of Plato. In a more deeply philosophical sense, he 
was expressing the Aristotlean conception of the relation­
ship between politics and education. Aristotle believed 
that politics and education should be bound by ethics. By 
defining democracy as fundamentally an ethical relationship, 
Dewey linked politics and education through the ethics of 
democracy.
In order to combine effectively education and democ­
racy, the educational system had to meet certain require­
ments not already being met. Dewey criticized the tradi­
tional school for its formalistic orientation and its sepa­
ration from society. The traditional school focused its 
activity on the teacher or the textbook, anywhere but on the 
life of the child. If education and life were to come into 
contact, the child would have to become the center of
^John Dewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 101-02.
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gravity for education.^ This was a radical departure from 
the dominant view of the time that the teacher was the 
authority and the student was the passive receptacle of 
knowledge.
This reorientation required a new conception of edu­
cation. Dewey believed that if the school were related to 
life the educational ideals of culture, discipline, infor­
mation, and utility would cease to be at variance with one 
another. The growth of the child would then become the 
unifying aim v/hose phases were discipline, information, and 
utility. Growth, he explained later, was a process that 
began with certain conditions present in the individual: 
immaturity, the capacity to grow, and plasticity, the
ability to learn from experiences. The expressions of this
2process were habits. But what did this have to do with the 
aim of education?
If we defined education as development and life as 
development, he postulated, then education was life. This 
meant that education had no end beyond itself and that it 
was a process of continual reorganizing, restructuring, and 
transforming. Like many others, Dewey believed that educa­
tion should not cease with schooling. The finest product of 
schooling should be the predeliction ". . .to learn from 
life itself and to make the conditions such that all will
D̂ewey, The School and Society, p. 34.
2Ibid., pp. 91-92; Dewey, Democracy and Education,pp. 49-59.
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learn in the process of living. . . He later made the
social aspect of this statement more explicit by suggesting 
that all social institutions in a democracy had an educa­
tional function. And the test of their value was the
2extent to which they promoted individual growth.
In 1910, Dewey had clearly indicated the importance 
of thinking to the growth process in How We Think. In 
Democracy and Education he reaffirmed its significance when 
he said that thinking yielded knowledge and the use of 
thinking was superior to the value of knowledge. He 
lamented the dearth of theoretical support for the principle 
that the most important outcome for the minds of the chil­
dren was development of their ability to think. "Thinking 
is," he stressed, "the method of intelligent learning, of 
learning that employs and rewards mind.
In each aspect of his theory of democracy, Dewey 
focused on experiences whose meanings were to be derived 
through the method of intelligence. This method was an end 
to be developed. It was also a means to be used in dealing 
with an ever-expanding, increasingly complex technological 
society. It was, for Dewey, the linchpin of democratic 
action. The democratic ideal always appeared in his
D̂ewey, Democracy and Education, pp. 59-60.
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discussions, sometimes subtlely, sometimes explicitly, but 
the means aspect of that means-end ideal dominated the 
explanations. This fact was the cause of much of Dewey's 
consternation about progressive education.
The Progressive Education Movement was the educa­
tional aspect of American progressivism. It began in 18?6 
with the early vocational education movement and ended with 
the collapse of the Progressive Education Association in 
1955 and the disappearance of its journal Progressive 
Education, two years later. To those involved in the move­
ment progressive education meant a broadening of school 
programs to include health, vocation, and family and commu­
nity life. It meant applying in the classroom the pedagog­
ical principles derived from the new psychology and the 
social sciences. It meant designing instruction to the 
variety of children coming into the schools. Lastly, 
progressive education was an expression of faith in the idea 
that a democratic culture could be created without being 
vulgarized, and of the belief that all could share in the 
benefits of science and the arts.^ The movement became, in 
part, a multifarious group of educators who in their honest 
attempts to understand and practice Dewey's educational and 
social theories oftentimes distorted the meaning of the 
conception of experience.
This misinterpretation was the target of Dewey's
Ĉremin, The Transformation of the School, pp. vii-ix.
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criticism of progressive education in Exnerience and 
Education published in 1938. The progressives' efforts to 
condemn traditional education led to making a fetish of 
experience. He reminded them that it was not experience 
itself, but the quality of experience that was important. 
This distortion, thought Dewey, had resulted in school 
activities lacking any inherent social control, freedom of 
movement without freedom of intelligence, activities becom­
ing an end based on impulse and immediate needs, subject- 
matter being too present oriented, and reverence for the 
form of the scientific method.^ In other words, the progres­
sives had adopted Dewey's notion of experience without fully 
understanding the meaning of intelligence.
The misinterpretation of Deweyan theory is not 
surprising considering his explanations of these ideas. His 
writing style was complex, ponderous, often vague, and 
always verbose. Yet this explanation is too simplistic. 
Dewey was cnto something when he accused the progressive 
educators of making a fetish of experience. Pragmatic 
theory acknowledged that truth was relative to conditions, 
and came from experience. This premise easily became: "One
classroom experience is as good as another. " The burden for 
this perversion lay with the progressive educators them­
selves. Like disciples of most orthodox theories they
^John Dewey, Experience and Education (Hew York:
The Macmillan Company, 1938; Collier Books,I963), pp. 27,
57, 61, 69, 79, 86.
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emphasized those aspects of the "truth" that best suited 
their needs. This helps to explain why there were three 
principal groups of progressive educators, the scientists, 
the child-centered advocates, and the social reconstruc­
tionists, each focusing on one aspect of Deweyan educational 
theory. It also provides some insight into the strong anti­
progressive education movement of the 1950s. In spite of 
his criticism of progressive education, however, Dewey was 
optimistic about the potential of education if educators 
would develop a sound philosophy of experience.^ With this 
caveat he returned to the epistemological and metaphysical 
foundation of his philosophy.
However popular the idea of the connection between
the individual and nature through experience, it also became
a point of contention for Dewey's opponents. One.critic
suggested that without ontology, cosmology, and religion
this philosophy was reduced to theoretical sociology and
politics. George Santayana was not so kind. He viewed
Dewey's naturalism as "half-hearted and short-winded." It
was too particularistic, and only concerned with the fore-
2ground of existence.
Evaluating Dewey's theory of democracy, another
Îbid., pp. 89-91.
2Herman Harrell Home, The Democratic Philosophy of 
Education, Companion to Dewey's Democracy and Education [New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1932), p. 2; George Santayana,"Dewey's Naturalistic Metaphysics," in The Philosophy of 
John Dewey, ed. by Schilpp, pp. 251-53-
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conservative critic questioned the emphasis on the dynamic 
aspect of science, contending that it ignored the daily 
procedure in which the scientist dealt with the constants 
of nature. Referring to evolutionary theory, he noted that 
in the memory of man, fixity overshadowed change. As to the 
democratic ideal, this critic suggested that equal develop­
ment of all men was something we did not want, since it 
would eliminate the division of labor, individuality, and 
unique achievement.^
Dewey did not escape criticism from the liberals. 
Probably the most famous instance was Randolph Bourne's 
bitter reaction to Dewey's support of American entry into 
the First World War. This position, he thought, demon­
strated the poverty of Dewey's philosophy. The idea that 
intelligence could make war a socially useful instrument 
was naive at best. He deplored the use of the philosophy of 
intelligence to support the war.
A more radical critic noted the importance and the 
relevance of Dewey’s pragmatism in its cultural setting. He 
praised its criticism of past cultures, and its important 
contribution to the improvement of American culture, espe­
cially in the nineteenth century. But as a philosophy for
Ŵ. H. Sheldon, "Professor Dewey, The Protagonist of 
Democracy," Journal of Philosophy 18 (June 9, 1921): 312-
13, 318-19.
^Randolph Bourne, "Twilight of Idols," Seven Arts 
Magazine 2 (October 1917), PP. 688-702.
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a mature, designed culture, he thought pragmatism was 
wanting, and saw it as transitional to that type of 
culture.̂
Dewey was hard pressed to dispute the conservative 
criticism that his philosophy, its metaphysics, and his 
theory of democracy were limited. He dismissed such criti­
cism as representative of unrepentant dualism. In his con­
stant struggle with philosophic dualisms, he never fully 
explained why they were had. They were products of pre- 
scientific culture, he complained, and were thus obstructive 
in a scientific age. On this issue he always begged the 
question.
Without formally responding to Bourne’s criticism, 
Dewey admitted after seeing the results of the Versailles 
peace conference that there was some justification in a 
consistently pacifistic position. Nevertheless, he held to 
his prewar position that war would remain an alternative in 
human action as long as international and social mechanisms 
remained inadequate.^
This typically Deweyan response is a reminder of his 
view of social action. In order for individuals to direct
Theodore BrameId, Philosophies of Education in 
Cultural Perspective (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
Inc., 1955)1 P* 160.
2John Dewey, "Experience, Knowledge and Value: A
Rejoinder," in The Philosophy of John Dewey, ed. by Schilpp,
pp. 524-25.
D̂ykhuisen, The life and Mind of John Dewey, pp. 165-6 é •
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their activities they had to intelligently survey the 
situation, develop ideas, and test those plans of action 
until they found a solution. The pragmatic test of any 
solution was the extent to which it promoted human growth.
As a means and an end, this process was the basis of the 
ethical ideal Dewey called democracy. As a means to an end, 
it appealed to American practicality. Unfortunately, many 
of those who adopted this method distorted it in such a way 
that it became: "If it works use it." This is not to
suggest that all of Dewey's disciples abused his theory of 
democracy. In spite of his opinion that many progressive 
educators had distorted his theories, there were some 
progressive theoriticians who remained faithful to the 
orthodox theory. This was clearly the case with Boyd H. 
Bode, whose theory of democracy closely resembled that of 
John Dewey.
CHAPTER II 
BODE ON INTELLIGENCE AND DEMOCRACY
Boyd Bode began his tenure at Ohio State in an era 
fraught with contradictions. The disillusionment over the 
failure of idealism in the First World War appeared, among 
some, in words of disgust and despair, and erupted, among 
others, in a wild gaiety that viewed life as meaningless. 
Ezra Pound and F. Scott Fitzgerald vividly depicted this 
mood. Pound in Hugh Selwyn Mauberly who railed
[some] walked eye-deep in hell
believing in old men's lies, then unbelieving
came home, home to a lie,
home to many deceits
home to old lies and new infamy;1
and Fitzgerald in Jay Gatsby whose only purpose in life was 
self-indulgence. The disillusionment also was manifest in 
the rejection of international responsibilities, in the 
restriction of immigration, and in the demand for conformity 
to the American way of life. The anti-intemationalism con­
flicted, said the critics, with the interdependence of a
Ezra Pound, "Hugh Selwyn Mauberly" in American 
Literature, Tradition and Innovation (Lexington, 




technological world.^ The demand for full support of 
America made a mockery of freedom of thought. Nevertheless, 
the temper of the period did not weaken Bode's faith in the 
individual or democracy. Indeed he remained optimistic 
about the possibility of building a truly democratic social 
order.
Like Dewey, Bode saw democracy as an ethical relation­
ship whose purpose was the growth of human capacity. 
Achieving that association required the effective use of 
intelligence in individual and collective action. Both 
Dewey and Bode thought that if man could control natural 
forces through intelligence, he ought to be able to use the 
same means for directing social forces. In this connection. 
Bode examined the relationship between intelligence and 
democracy in light of the circumstances of the 1920s. He 
focused his attention on intelligence in human behavior, on 
the process of thought, and on the role of intelligence in 
making individuals free. His aim, like that of Dewey and 
others, was to continue the effort at reform begun in the 
Progressive Era.
Reform, however, lost much of its appeal in the 1920s. 
The loosely connected popular effort to improve American 
society called the Progressive Movement disintegrated in 
1920. The end came with the collapse of what historian
''"Merle Curti, The Grcvrth of American Thought, 2nd 
ed. (New York; Harner & Brothers Publishers, 1951)» "op. 
686-91.
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Arthur Link called the "progressive coalition," southern and 
western farmers, organized labor groups, social justice ele­
ments, and independent radicals who had supported Wilson in 
1916. Yet the components of the coalition remained as a 
potential movement. Although some progressive elements were 
active during the 1920s, they failed to unite in a concerted 
effort at reform. According to Link, there were at least 
four reasons why these groups could not work together; 
first, they did not have a suitable national political vehi­
cle; second, they were divided internally over such issues 
as the Eighteenth Amendment, immigration, and the distribu­
tion of national income ; third, since most of the objectives 
of the prewar years had been achieved, they could not agree 
on a direction for reform; fourth, they did not have a 
national leadership to unite the movement.^
In addition to its internal difficulties, there were 
certain external reasons for the decline of progressivism. 
For some segments of the population, such as industrial 
workers, the 1920s was a time of economic growth, material­
ism, and general contentment. But while these workers pros­
pered, the farmers, the largest single economic group, faced 
depression. A far more important reason for progressivism’s 
loss of support was the almost wholesale defection of the 
middle classes from the movement. They seemed to be buoyed
Arthur S. Link, "What Happened tc the Progressive 
Movement in the 1920's?" The American Historical Review 
64 (July 1959): 839-42.
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by the idea that they were building a new America through 
mass production and consumption, full employment with short 
hours and high wages, and welfare capitalism. Moreover, 
there was widespread belief that the nation's future was 
safe in the care of businessmen. With the improved economic 
conditions and the possibility of further growth, neither 
the middle classes nor the industrial workers were interested 
in even mild reform measures. They had become a part of 
what Merle Curti later called the "cult of prosperity."^
Another reason for the collapse of progressivism in 
the 1920s was the departure of much of its intellectual 
leadership. Many intellectuals repudiated the ideals of 
progressivism which they had once supported. Some ideal­
ists, for instance, reacted against the Versailles settle­
ment. Others opposed the extension of governmental author­
ity to defend the Eighteenth Amendment or to inhibit free 
speech. Still others became disgusted with the masses who 
opposed so-called radicals, campaigned against evolution, or 
joined the Ku Klux Klan. Progressivism lost the strong 
personal commitment to the cause of democracy that many
novelists, journalists, political and social thinkers, and
2historians had made in the prewar years.
Although the defection of the intellectuals and the
Îbid., 842-44; Curti, The Growth of American 
Thought, pp. 697-704.
2Link, "What Happened to the Progressive Movement in 
the 1920’s?," 844.
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popularity of the "cult of prosperity" undermined progres­
sivism in the 1920s, it did not die. It survived with the 
help of: the farmers who were better organized than at the
height of the Progressive Era; the politically conscious 
labor organizations like the railroad brotherhoods who 
wielded a great deal of power; the Democratic organizations 
in the large cities who remained concerned about the condi­
tion of the lower classes; the remnants of independent radi­
cals, social workers, and social gospel preachers and writ­
ers who continued to work for reform; and the champions of 
public power and regional developments who emerged as a 
vocal element during the decade. Despite their failure to 
unite and gain control of a major party and the national 
government prior to 1932, these groups dominated Congress 
from 1921 to 1927 and continued to influence legislation 
from 1927 to 1930. Thus the progressive elements defied the 
promoters of prosperity by attempting, for example, to 
obtain farm parity through such measures as the McNary- 
Haugen bill of 1924 and by promoting federal support of 
hydroelectric projects, including retaining ownership of the 
Muscle Shoals facility.^
In addition to these political efforts, there were 
intellectuals who helped to keep progressivism alive. Some 
writers openly challenged the "cult of prosperity." Ellen 
Glasgow, Eugene O'Neill, John Dos Passos, and Theodore
Îbid., pp. 845-47.
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Dreiser depicted the materialism of the period as a blight 
on the nation. The most famous example of these protests 
was that archetype of materialistic conformity, George 
Babbitt, created by Sinclair Lewis. These critics were 
exposing the symptoms of an unstable economy of easy credit 
and get-rich-quick schemes. Other intellectuals including 
John Dewey, Charles and Mary Beard, Vernon L. Farrington, 
James Harvey Robinson, and William Allen White aided progres­
sivism by continuing to promote democracy as a workable 
system.^
Boyd Bode was one of those who saw through the facade 
of prosperity, and worked to improve American democracy. He 
recognized that the bulk of the population was not receiving 
a fair share of the much touted benefits of capitalism. The 
fundamental principle of American democracy, he said, was 
faith in the common man. Our political system was based on 
the notion that all men are free and equal. Yet we seemed 
to have developed some of the characteristics of a society 
with internal barriers. He thought that a type of caste 
system had developed in the society. The growth of industry 
and commerce had unified certain interest groups ; but these 
groups had grown narrow and selfish, and an attitude of 
cynical disregard and hostility had arisen. He believed 
that American values in the 1920s were shoddy and
703-04.
Ĉurti, The Growth of American Thought, pp. 696,
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opportunistic :
This state of things has resulted in exploitation, 
grafting, and profiteering; it has bequeathed to us an 
ominous problem of capital and labor; and it has even 
developed a sort of creed, which justifies the practice 
of "charging all that the traffic will bear," of 
"getting while the getting is good," and in general of 
conducting oneself in accordance with the maxim that 
"Business is business."1
These were characteristics, he concluded, of a society con­
spicuously devoid of the spirit of democracy. He implied 
that the limited efforts to develop common interests evinced 
patent disregard for the true aim of democracy, the develop­
ment of human capacity.
Di order to achieve the ideal of democracy, Bode, like 
Dewey, thought that human intelligence had to be developed. 
Intelligence was man's means of using experience to direct 
the environment. Through his intelligence, man had devised 
science as a tool for controlling the natural environment. 
Dewey and Bode believed that intelligence could also be used 
by individuals to improve themselves, and that the collec­
tive use of intelligence would, in turn, produce a demo­
cratic society. These goals, however, could not be attained 
unless education promoted human growth by developing the 
intelligence of the young. Thus Bode largely directed his 
efforts in the 1920s toward insuring that teachers under­
stood the role of intelligence both in human learning and 
behavior, and in the growth of democracy.
^Boyd H. Bode, Fundamentals of Education (New York: 
The MacMillan Company, 1921), pp. 51-52.
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Bode agreed with Dewey that the relationship between 
intelligence and democracy made questions about human behav­
ior epistemological issues, not simply psychological prob­
lems. Their view contrasted with those of men like Edward L. 
Thorndike and John B. Watson who thought that explaining 
human behavior was the task of experimental psychology. As 
a pragmatist, Bode recognized the importance of science and 
the scientific method in human life. But he apparently 
thought that the effort to make psychology scientific was an 
abuse of science since it removed psychology from its philo­
sophical moorings. Consequently, he always examined ques­
tions about human behavior in the context of social and edu­
cational philosophy. And he criticized the experimental 
psychologists for not recognizing that explanations of human 
behavior always began with a theory of mind, an epistemolog­
ical enterprise not a scientific one.̂
The growth of experimental psychology in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century had brought an end to the 
dominance of faculty psychology as the explanation of human 
activity. The collapse of faculty psychology actually began 
in the 1820s with the work of Johann Herbart who theorized 
that the mind was not made up of separate faculties but 
functioned as a unit through ideas. But his psychology was 
not experimental, and, thus, was undermined by the new
^Boyd H. Bode, Conflicting Psychologies of Learning 
(Boston; D. C. Heath and Company, 1929), p. iii.
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psychology. By the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
functionalism of James, Dewey, and Ange 11 was gaining some 
influence in the field. At the same time, Edward L. 
Thorndike, a student of James at Harvard and James McKeen 
Cattell at Columbia, began to develop his theory of stimulus 
and response, based on his studies of animal behavior. His 
theories influenced educational psychology for nearly fifty 
years. In 1913f John B. Watson wrote his famous paper 
"Psychology as the Behaviorist Views It," which marked the 
beginning of behaviorism as a separate school of thought. 
During and after the First World War, the work of Max 
Wertheimer, Kurt Koffka, and Wolfgang K6*hler, known as 
Gestalt psychology, also made some inroads in the United 
States. Each of these theories manifested the impact of 
science on the study of human activity. But Bode thought 
that something had been lost in the process. Instead of each 
successive theory displacing its predecessors, it merely 
competed with them. The proliferation of psychological 
theories created confusion about human behavior and learning 
instead of paving the way to better understanding.^
Like others who had revolted against formalism. Bode 
relied on both history and culture to help explain his
Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, pp. 
21-23; S. Alexander Rippa, Education in a Free Society; An 
American History. 2nd ed. (New York: David McKay Company,
Inc., 1971}f ch. 8; Boyd Henry Bode, How We Learn (Boston:
D. C. Heath and Company, 1940), p. 6. Bode began this book 
as a new edition of Conflicting Psychologies of Learning. 
Since well over half of his material was new, the result was 
a new book.
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theories. The development of the various psychological the­
ories showed the impact of science and the changing theories 
of mind. Faculty psychology, he said, originated with the 
disappearance of animistic beliefs and the separation of 
mind or soul and matter. But the idea that the mind could 
be trained like the muscles collapsed under the weight of 
scientific evidence indicating that the acts of perceiving, 
remembering, and reasoning were responses involving the 
nervous system. Herbert’s theory that the mind consisted of 
a permanent substance and various states, noted Bode, failed 
to do away with the dualism that reality consists of matter 
and psychic or mental stuff. It leaned too heavily on the 
idea that all experience consists of consciousness, thus 
suggesting that matter can be known only by inference. He 
concluded that this theory did not go far enough in suggest­
ing that knowledge resulted from sense perception and the 
association of new and old experiences.^ It was left to 
physiological psychology to shift the explanation in the 
direction of physical reaction. But it was the behaviorists 
who suggested that we should ignore the enigma of mind and 
confine ourselves to observable behavior.
Behaviorism grew out of the effort to make psychology 
a real science. As far as Watson and his colleagues were 
concerned, introspection, the method of traditional psychology.
B̂ode, Conflicting Psychologies of Learning, np. 53“ 
5 4, 70-71, 8 6 , 90-9 6.
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had proven inadequate. They argued that observations of 
behavior would provide objective data. They also held that 
sensations, perceptions, and images were physiological pro­
cesses that constitute what we call experience. Thus there 
is no need for "consciousness" or "mind." Thorndike, whom 
Bode classified as a behaviorist, reduced behavior and 
learning to a neural process of stimulus and response lead­
ing to conditioned habits.”
The problem with behaviorism, said Bode, was that it 
relied too exclusively on the nervous system for its explana­
tions. The environment seemed to do nothing more than throw 
the switch. Furthermore, the results of Kdhler’s tests with 
apes indicated that behavior was more than simply stimulus 
and response. Behavior, according to Gestalt theory, 
included a change in the individual and in the environment 
in a total process. What was important about this interpre­
tation, said Bode, was that it avoided both mental states and 
mechanism.^
Ibid., ch. 9-10. Bode admitted that Thorndike never 
called himself a behaviorist. Nevertheless, he said,
. .he [Thorndike] is at one with the behaviorist in his 
insistence that all conduct, whether animal or human, is 
fundamentally a matter of acquiring conditioned reflexes." 
p. 162. Historians usually classify Thorndike as either a 
functionalist (Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology, 
pp. j6l-64) or a connectionist (Rinna, Education in a Free 
Society, pp. 218-24 and John D. Pulliam, A History of 
Education in America, 2nd ed. (Columbus, Ohio; Merrill 
Publishing Co., 1976), p. 126).
Îbid., pp. 190, 212-31. Gestalt psychology was 
popular among many progressive educators. Pulliam, A History 
of Education in America, p. 129.
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Bode's comment about Gestalt psychology indicated he 
was anxious to maintain a position somewhere between the 
dualism of introspective psychology and the mechanical view 
of behaviorism. As a pragmatist, he had long since rejected 
the dualism of traditional philosophy and psychology. His 
dismissal of the psychology of mental states, then, was to 
be expected. But what about behaviorism? This psycholog­
ical theory had all the accouterments of an objective, 
scientific explanation of how humans behaved. There are two 
clues in Bode's criticism of behaviorism that indicate why 
he failed to find that psychological theory completely 
satisfying.
The fact that behaviorism relied on the nervous 
system and external stimuli alone made human behavior and 
experience too mechanical. More important, behaviorists 
rejected the central element in pragmatic or functional 
psychology— consciousness. This was not, however, the con­
sciousness of traditional psychology with its changing men­
tal states. Bode believed that consciousness was the set­
ting for intelligent human action, a notion that will be 
clarified momentarily. There is one other point about 
Bode's rejection of behaviorism that should be understood. 
His stand was evidence of his effort to temper science with 
philosophy in a world gone mad on science.
Although some of his arguments in 1929 were based on 
recent information, Bode's fundamental beliefs about human
70
■behavior had taken shape as early as 1917- In that year, he 
had explained that experience was a total process that 
included stimulus and response as functions or phases, not 
successive stages. Stressing the unity of experience he 
said that:
The significant circumstance here is that stimulus and 
response resist the temporal separation that we find in 
a purely reflex act; stimulus and response are bound 
together as correlated functions in a unitary, self­
directing process so that these twain are one flesh.1
The word self-directing had a very important meaning for
Bode, as it had for Dewey. It meant that the individual
acted upon the environment with purpose. "All experience is
a kind of intelligence," he remarked, "a control of present
behavior with reference to future adjustment. To be in
experience at all is to have the future operate in the pre- 
2sent." This relationship between the present and future 
responses was the distinctive trait of conscious behavior. 
The relatively unorganized present responses revealed new 
meanings for the experienced object before they became overt 
actions, thereby providing the conditions for intelligent 
action. The book on the table, said Bode, became the book- 
to-be -reached- for , -picked-up, and -opened, otherwise the 
process was a mere reflex. This was a total process that 
began and ended with the individual in which future conse­
quences became stimuli for further action. It was also an
B̂ode, "Consciousness and Psychology," p. 248 
Îbid., p. 249.
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experimental, forward-looking process.^ This is a clear 
example of Bode's acceptance of Deweyan metaphysics and 
epistemology. The individual who is bound to nature 
through experience directs the environment with intelligent 
action that includes a dynamic means-end relationship and 
produces new meanings.
There was, however, one feature of Bode's view of the 
individual that distinguished it from Dewey's. It was his 
emphasis on ideals which developed as he emersed himself in 
pragmatic philosophy. Although his lectures during his 
last two years at Illinois indicated this change, more con­
crete evidence of it appeared in his book Fundamentals of 
Education in 1921. There he devoted an entire chapter to the 
topic of ideals. He believed that humans, in contrast to 
animals, were peculiarly helpless and dependent upon learn­
ing. Unless the meanings of things were discovered so he 
could act with reference to ends and aims, the infant could 
not adjust properly for survival. Humans were bom with 
many and varied impulses that did not have antecedently 
established lines of discharge. The lack of fixed outlets 
for reflexes and instincts enabled the individual to express 
himself in a variety of ways. Our native capacities, said 
Bode, had no ascertainable limit. The more we learned about 
the environment, the more we were able to realize, our ends.
p. 216. Îbid., pp. 250-51, Bode, Fundamentals of Education,
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Experience, then, became the source of new aims. As he put 
it; "Experience . . . has a marvelous flexibility and 
capacity for growth. The whole mass of human achievement 
has its origin in the fact that experience constantly sug­
gests new possibilities, new ventures."^
The process of growth involved struggle and conflict 
as the individual self emerged. When moral choices became 
necessary, said Bode, selfhood began and progressed as life 
opened new vistas and generated new aims. Ideals were 
indispensable guides for determining the significance of new 
situations. He believed that ideals directed our attention 
so that our conduct might be guided by the discernment of 
new meanings, not by impulse or habit. Rational or intel­
ligent conduct meant using ideals to discover the values
that were at stake in a given situation so that they might 
2be conserved.
This was not blind obedience to ideals, which Bode 
rejected as unintelligent. He took Dewey at his word that 
ends-in-view guided behavior. Unlike Dewey, however, he 
placed greater emphasis on the end of the means-end rela­
tionship. He acknowledged the importance of the scientific 
method, as we shall see. He also indicated that humans 
had the capacity to form habits which were the means for
Ĉhambliss, Boyd H. Bode's Philosophy of Education, 
pp. 15-18; Bode, Fundamentals of Education, nn. 5-6.
2Bode, Fundamentals of Education, pp. 68-75*
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dealing with the environment and for expressing impulses. 
But, meanings were the guiding elements. "In proportion as 
conduct is directed by the meanings of things," he remarked, 
"we say that it is intelligent. As our store of meanings 
increases, our habitual reactions are changed."^
From the end of the First World War through 1930» 
the popularity of the educational and psychological princi­
ples of pragmatism increased dramatically. The Progressive 
Education Association, for instance, had eighty-six members 
at its first meeting in April 1919. By 1930, the membership 
had risen to 7̂ 00. Nevertheless, pragmatism’s popularity 
did not inhibit its detractors. One critic chided the prag­
matists for leaving the impression that they had suddenly 
discovered the explanation of the world and reality. They 
had not even gotten themselves into the movement of philos­
ophy, she commented, but knew only from "conflicts," 
"strains," and "immediate experiences." By defining mind as 
mere "impulses" and "desires" pragmatism lacked the larger 
feeling of the "universal whole." Then taking aim directly 
at Dewey and Bode, she said that pragmatic psychology was 
abstract since it held that man was merely a psycho-physical 
organism. Dewey’s reference to "biological adjustment" and
Bode’s phrase "connections of neurons" indicated that their
2psychology did not transcend mere mechanism. She had
B̂oyd H. Bode, Modern Theories of Education (New 
York: The Macmillan Company, 1927)» pp- 198-200.
2Patricia Albjerg Graham, Progressive Education:
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obviously ignored Bode's argument about the role of intel­
ligence in conscious behavior.
Another conservative critic, however, did not miss 
Bode's emphasis on intelligence. He included it as the 
final blow in a series of comments about Conflicting 
Psychologies of Learning in 1929. He noted that Bode failed 
to explain sensations by only saying that they were neither 
movement nor mental states. Finding Bode's Achilles heel, 
his optimism about the individual, this critic asked: "What 
is misbehavior?" He also wanted to know how purposive 
behavior was any less mechanical than reflex. It might be 
less rigid. But, he said, it was ". . •. no less determined 
by the total situation and not at all teleological. Purpos­
ive behavior is not purposed; and, if not purposed, is 
mechanical however adaptive."^ As an idealist, he was 
clearly rejecting Bode's explanation of the influence of 
ends on behavior since those ends were not a priori.
Finally, he acknowledged that purposive behavior released 
intelligence to work for social adjustment. But it was not 
clear to him how the individual used intelligence to think
From Arcady to Academe, A History of the Progressive Educa­
tion Association 1919-1955 (New York; Teachers College 
Press, 1967). p. 23; Katherine S. Gilbert, review of Creative Intelligence, Essays in the Pragmatic Attitude, by 
John Dewey, et. al., in The Philosophical Review, 28 
(March 1919): 206-07.
^Herman H. Horne, review of Conflicting Psychologies 
of Learning, by Boyd H. Bode, in School and Society. 30 
(28 December 1929): 892-93.
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about the nature of the universe.̂  This last comment typi­
fied the conservative criticism of pragmatism.
Bode's preoccupation with psychological theory 
stemmed from his belief that the rush to make psychology- 
scientific had gone too far, and had only contributed to the 
existing confusion about human growth. As long as this 
continued to be a problem, education could not release human 
capacity sufficiently to produce individuals capable of 
creating a true democracy. A further implication was that 
without individuals whose capacity had been released and who 
endeavored to do the same for others, the selfishness and 
greed of the "cult of prosperity" would continue to be a 
weakness in American democracy. However naive this explana­
tion, Bode apparently believed that human beings could con­
trol social forces in an effort to create a democratic 
society.
He also held that the environment significantly 
influenced human growth. He demonstrated this in his psy­
chological theory. He also made this clear in 1931 in a 
book entitled Ourselves and the World, The Making of an 
American Citizen. Prom the start, he left no doubt as to 
his belief about democracy and the individual. Almost as if 
John Dewey had been standing behind him, he wrote that the 
book presented
. . . the idea of democracy as a guiding principle for
^Ibid.
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intelligent living. The conception of democracy which 
it presents reaches far beyond the notion of democracy 
as a political structure and makes it a living process, a way of human grov/th. The test of democracy is to be 
sought not in any specific political machinery, but in the attainment of a rich and abundant life. It is a 
test, therefore, which may be applied to all our 
institutions and practices.^
The individual in this society did not grow or stand 
alone at the point of physical maturity. Human nature. Bode 
admitted, was a product of both heredity and environment.
But it was the environment that played the more significant 
role. Human growth, he suggested, was analogous to the case 
of the modern intelligent farmer who understood that in 
order to have a good crop he had to have good seed and good 
soil. He realized that neither one could entirely compen­
sate for the deficiencies of the other. So it was with 
humans. We had plenty of good seed. But what about the 
soil? The society provided countless supplemental influ­
ences, and the individual was surrounded by and permeated 
with culture. Bode went so far as to suggest that, in spite
of heredity, the society transformed the individual into a
2"genuine human being."
By a "genuine human being," he me^t that humans 
tended to develop certain characteristics that made them 
totally human. Man had ascendancy over animals, made and
Fredrick S. Lumley and Boyd H. Bode, Ourselves and 
the World. The Making of an American Citizen, (New York; 
McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1931)» P* v.
Îbid., pp. 35-36.
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used tools, used imagination, expressed sympathy, thought, 
and participated in the culture. The individual who did not
possess one or more of these characteristics was less than
genuine, since he had to depend on others who had those 
abilities. In this hyperbole. Bode was attempting to make a 
biological distinction between man and animal and a philo­
sophical distinction between two types of human beings. In 
the first instance, he said:
To be genuinely human is to feel, think, and behave in
ways unknown to animals. Man alone is a toolmaker and 
tool user; man alone is a consecutive investigator and 
thinker; man alone is a promoter of fellowship; in brief, 
man alone is an indefatigable coopérâtor in the work of 
constructing and transmitting culture.
The last phrase points to the second instance. As he put it:
A genuine human being is one who is partial to the human 
race, the whole species, rather than to some little 
section of it; and what marvellous resources are to be 
found all over the world for our enjoyment and 
enlightenment 1
These definitions must be explained as a reaction to 
the social situation. Throughout the 1920s Bode argued for 
the creation of a society that would promote human growth.
The principal vehicle for accomplishing this purpose was to 
be the school. But the success of this effort depended on 
teachers having an understanding of human behavior. He 
tried to show the organic relationship between the individ­
ual and the society, and to demonstrate the experimental 
nature of that relationship. He also indicated that the
Îbid., pp. 54-69.
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existing social structure was anti-democratic. By 1931 the 
self-serving conditions of the previous decade had done their 
damage, bringing economic chaos and human suffering. Under 
the circumstances, Bode could not have been blamed for giv­
ing up in despair. But that was unlikely; his faith in the 
individual, or as he preferred the common man, was too 
strong. He simply reemphasized the thesis that humans were 
more than animals, behaviorism notwithstanding; and that the 
nature of existence and the success of democracy required 
cooperation, which had been conspicuously absent in the 
previous decade.
The organic tie between the individual and the society 
did not mean total subordination of the individual. Bode 
believed that in the final analysis each individual was an 
island of thoughts and emotions. An island that no other 
person could fully penetrate. On the other hand, the grov/th 
of thought depended on the acquisition of new meanings whose 
principal sources were other individuals and the society at 
large. Conscious behavior, moreover, involved the use of 
the meanings from past experience for making new adjust­
ments . On occasion, an element of doubt or hesitation inter­
rupted these adjustments. When this occurred, said Bode, we 
made inferences rather than clearly recognizing meanings.^
Inference or thinking varied both in complexity and
Îbid., T5. 50; Bode, Fundamentals of Education, pp.
105-07.
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procedure. He noted that thinking ranged from a momentary 
hesitation to an investigation that lasted a lifetime. For 
instance, a few moments of listening might explain a noise 
heard moments earlier was thunder that indicated an impend­
ing storm. On the other hand, Bode remarked, it took Darwin 
years of study and consideration to develop the theory of 
natural selection. The more complex the process became, the 
more it took on the characteristics of what Dewey called a 
"Complete Act of Thought." Then, surprisingly, Bode 
explained his own interpretation of this process through an 
illustration that incorporated William Chandler Bagley's 
terminology.^
A person entered a room and found a windowpane bro­
ken. He proceeded to explain how the damage had occurred by 
hypothesizing that the glass was broken by children playing 
ball. He observed next that the glass was on the inside of 
the room which indicated that the window had been broken 
from the outside. The center of the pane had a hole that 
might have been caused by the impact of a ball. The facts. 
Bode suggested, were explained by reference to the hypothe­
sis. To explain was to reconstruct the situation by means 
of conceptions. Bode indicated that Bagley called this 
"explanatory deduction." We did not actually reproduce the 
event, but substituted the implications of conceptions to 
discover a further meaning. In this case. Bode remarked, we
^Eode, Fundamentals of Education, pp. 105-08.
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scrutinized and explained.^
Another way of solving this problem was also open to
us. To some extent, we might interpret the situation before
discovering all of the facts. By looking at the hole in the
windowpane we conceptualized the event and deduced that not
only the glass, but the ball as well would be in the room.
Bagley, he noted, used the phrase "anticipatory deduction."
Without observing that the ball was in the room, we inferred
that it ought to be. So we searched for and found the ball,
or at least a ball, in the room. Then to strengthen our
case we inferred that if this were the suspected ball it
ought to have had bits of glass imbedded in it. If this
were true, we would have had further evidence to prove the
original hypothesis. Here, Bode said, we predicted and 
2verified.
Bode was determined that individuals should avoid the 
tendency to make quick judgments or to ossify the thinking 
process. The acceptance of a suggestion or hypothesis
because there were no rival suggestions, he thought was the
mark of an uncritical mind. With regard to fixity in think­
ing, he warned that the process of problem, suggestion, scru­
tiny and evaluation, and prediction and verification was not 
rigid or without complexities. The first two phases might 
occur almost simultaneously or be separated by years. In 
some instances, one procedure might be all that was
“Ibid., pp. 108-10. Îbid., pp. 110-12.
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necessary for solving the problem.^ As far as Bode was con­
cerned, the complexity of thinking hinged on the complexity 
of the problem. To say that thinking always proceeded 
through the specific phases would be a return to the formal­
ism that he despised.
Bode's analysis of thinking contains a paradox that 
requires explanation. At first glance, he apparently com­
bined the ideas of Dewey and Bagley, an opponent of progres­
sive education, in his own explanation. But a careful read­
ing of the discussion and Bagley's own definitions indicates 
that Bode was neither rejecting Deweyan theory nor being 
eclectic. Bode’s emphasis on meanings led him to choose 
Bagley's terms probably because they helped to explain his 
thoughts more clearly than Dewey's words. He believed that 
thinking was a process of developing new meanings. He 
defined deduction as ". . . the process of drawing out the 
implications of meanings." Thinking was deductive in that 
the suggestion or hypothesis arising out of the problem 
guided the inquiry and served to bind the facts together in 
a common meaning. As he explained it:
We may undertake to find facts that can be explained by 
means of the suggestion, or we may predict, on the basis 
of the suggestion, what facts we shall find. In either 
case, to be sure, we employ deduction, since we combine 
or relate meanings in such a way as to show that certain 
facts are "just what you would expect."2
The procedure employed varied, depending on whether the
-Ibid., pp. 111-14. Îbid., pp. 121-22, 125.
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evidence could be predicted or had to be found first in 
order to solve the problem. In the latter case, induction 
was employed before the reconstruction, or deductive process 
could take place. Bode held, moreover, that this instance 
demonstrated the true meaning of going from the particular 
to the general.^
Despite his use of Bagley's terminology. Bode adhered 
to Deweyan theory. He began and ended with a fundamentally 
Deweyan interpretation. He admittedly used Dewey's language 
when he labeled the experience that began with a condition 
of doubt a "Complete Act of Thought." He indicated that 
deduction and induction had meaning with regard to the 
hypothesis developed, not as independent methods. Neverthe­
less, he laid greater stress on the importance of the new 
meanings derived, rather than on the process itself. With­
out new meanings individuals would not have new instruments 
for achieving their purposes. Ultimately, Bode defined 
thinking in clearly Deweyan terms. "Thinking," he remarked,
"requires finding and the elaborating and the testing of 
2hypotheses."
Bode demonstrated his confidence in the common man by 
his emphasis on conscious behavior and the individual's 
ability to control his own environment by thinking of new 
meanings. Since the environment was continually changing, 
the individual had to be able to adaot to the needs of the
Îbid. Îbid., p. 114.
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moment. This was what he meant when he said that experience 
involved intelligence. A high degree of flexibility or 
indeterminateness of response characterized a high order of 
intelligence. The development of this ability, he empha­
sized, was particularly important for the individual as a 
means for resolving conflicts of personal ideals. Intelli­
gence entered the conflict as a means of devising a more 
comprehensive good that incorporated the lesser ideals."
This same device, thought Bode, could be applied to 
the society. The multiplicity of desires could be directed 
by intelligence. He also postulated that the highest ideal 
for man was the progressive construction of a moral order. 
Achieving these ends entailed meeting two conditions.
First, there had to be a standard for evaluating the control 
of desires. Typifying the pragmatic struggle with philo­
sophic dualisms, he argued that morality had to be taken out 
of its traditional setting in a supersensuous world and be 
brought into the world of experience. This meant a differ­
ent emphasis on moral values. Bode believed that the con­
ception of growth, which applied to both the individual and 
the society, would be the natural choice for the needed 
criterion. "It is an interpretation," he explained, "which 
gives a different outlook upon life and an increased signif­
icance to the meaning of what in religious phraseology is 
called the brotherhood of man and the coming of the 'Kingdom
Îbid., p. 235.
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of Heaven uoon earth.
The second condition that he proposed reflected his
acceptance of Reform Darwinism. He noted that man had
extricated himself from the fetters of evolution. No longer
at the mercy of his environment, he directed and controlled
it. "The development of science," he said, "has made us
less inclined to ask whether nature is favorable to man and
much more interested to discover how nature may be used to
serve the purposes of man." This attitude had not been
developed in the realm of moral conduct. The individual, he
thought, had to realize that the fundamental moral problem
was attaining control over social forces in order to fashion
human motives and create a truly democratic social order.
The existence of injustice became a challenge to the mind of
man. Once again emphasizing ideals Bode concluded that; "A
world in which there were no new ends to be created, no new
adjustments to be made, would leave no room for intelligence
2and could impose no moral obligation."
In order to pursue the creation of new ends, whether 
they be personal or social goals. Bode contended that the 
individual had to be free. He indicated, however, that 
there was some confusion concerning this moral principle. 
Freedom was not the absence of restraint, a condition he 
thought was nonexistent. It was not inactivity, a condition 
synonymous with disintegration and decline. It was not high
Îbid., pp. 236-38. Îbid., pp. 239-40.
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position. On the other hand, freedom was doing what we 
liked to do. "Freedom," said Bode, "is doing the things 
that we do well artistically, skillfully." Furthermore,
". . .we have the fullest sense of freedom when wh [sic] 
can devote our energies to the things that we really like to 
do and can do well."^ But, he continued, we were not free 
from compulsion. We were subject to the rigors of self­
compulsion. This was why, he said, there was no such thing 
as the total absence of restraint. Freedom also had a
social meaning. A sense of freedom came with doing some-
2thing worthwhile for ourselves and for others.
Freedom had a larger purpose beyond a sense held by 
the individual. It consisted of forming goals or objec­
tives. Once the goals were formed, one had to persevere in 
their realization. As he put it, ". . . true freedom 
requires steadiness of purpose."^ These were not fixed ends, 
but ends based on existing conditions. Thus, freedom was 
bound up with intelligence. The intelligent person, he 
argued, shaped his purposes with respect to his environment, 
adjusting them as circumstances changed.
Even the shaping of purposes required a standard for 
judging their value. Using William James* idea that a baby 
was not free but controlled by his environment. Bode
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, np. 124-32.
Îbid. Îbid. Îbid.
86
suggested that the individual became free in proportion to 
his ability to hold immediate reactions in abeyance and 
alter them with regard to pertinent considerations. To the 
extent that an individual's final action was the product of 
reflection, Bode thought that it was an obvious expression 
of that person's values or "way of life." This made it a 
free act. He said that "... freedom is made possible by 
the fact that there is a 'frame of reference' or 'way of 
life' in terms of which the matter in hand can be judged. 
Otherwise there is nothing to go by and our reactions become 
random and blind.
In this instance, Bode's argument had virtually all 
of the trappings of the orthodox theory. Freedom, as Dewey 
had suggested, began with intelligence. As the individual 
learned to control the environment he became free. This 
resulted from conscious or purposive behavior by the individ­
ual. In a social setting it involved the application of 
science to control natural forces and intelligence, or 
social morality, to control social forces. These were the 
devices for liberating human beings so that they could grow 
to their capacity. In this sense, individuals and society 
modified restraints, thus achieving the second condition of 
freedom. Bode's explanation of freedom differed from 
Dewey's only in the stress that the former placed on
B̂oyd H. Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life (New York: 
The Macmillan Company, 1937)» P* 4̂.
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purposes.
Instead of merely accepting Dewey's theory, Bode 
applied the principles of pragmatism to his own beliefs, and 
modified them in light of the changing environment. The 
self-serving attitudes among some groups in the 1920s, the 
lack of broad common interests, and the obvious disparity 
between the rich and the rest of the population left 
American society in a condition that he believed was the 
antithesis of democracy. There seemed to be little or no 
effort to promote the growth of the individual coming from 
the beneficiaries of prosperity. Thus Bode joined other 
progressives who were working alone or in organizations to 
keep reform alive in the 1920s by opposing the "cult of 
prosperity."
Bode's reform effort was, in large part, an attempt 
to define the relationship between intelligence and democ­
racy. This task required an explanation of the role of 
intelligence in human behavior. He began by criticizing the 
existing theories of human behavior, which had resulted from 
the growth of experimental psychology. He rejected the the­
ory of mental states since it retained the mind-body dual­
ism. More important, it supported the notion that the indi­
vidual acted alone, or, at best, with some form of transcen­
dental guidance. The theory of stimulus and response was 
science run amok. Despite the behaviorists* claims of sci­
entific objectivity, he concluded that this theory described
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humans as little more than animals who lived at the mercy of 
the environment, responding to a multiplicity of stimuli. 
Neither of these theories explained how the common man could 
direct the environment toward the creation of a democratic 
social order. Finally, Bode thought that humans had the 
ability to act upon their environment through experience, a 
conscious process guided by intelligence. By using intelli­
gence individuals would become free, and thus be able to 
direct their lives toward continually developing purposes. 
The highest purpose, as far as he was concerned, was the 
total development of each human being, the ideal of democ­
racy. In order to achieve this end, the society needed 
"genuine human beings" who acted intelligently as individ­
uals, and who cooperated in the use of intelligence to make 
democracy a way of life.
The changing environment affected Bode's thinking in 
another and more fundamental way. There seemed to be some­
thing missing in some segments of American society in the 
1920s. He implied that the materialism and the rush to suc­
ceed among certain groups in the society had left the ideals 
of equality of opportunity and freedom empty shibboleths.
The worship of science and its methods blinded many to an 
essential philosophical question: Toward what purpose or
end were these efforts being directed? Bode was saying that 
some Americans had lost sight of the ideal of democracy.
Too much emphasis was being placed on means or on selfish
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ends. He was trying to balance the means-end relationship.
In order for individuals to create a true democracy, they 
not only had to act intelligently, they also had to act with 
regard to the ideal of democracy. Bode thought that this was 
a necessary step in creating a democratic way of life. As a 
pragmatist, however, he knew that this step had to be taken 
in a social setting. An analysis of Bode's thoughts con­
cerning the social order will clarify this point.
CHAPTER III 
BODE ON THE SOCIAL ORDER
As the crisis triggered by the debacle of 1929 deep­
ened, the seemingly indomitable American optimism languished 
into bewilderment and fear. Efforts to bolster public 
morale failed in the face of declining wages, rising unem­
ployment, and lengthening bread lines. Even Boyd Bode, who 
steadfastly believed in the common man, exhibited unusual 
concern in his writings throughout the depression. In 1931, 
for instance, he used a revealing metaphor about the effects 
of the depression. The relationship between society and the 
individuals who composed it, he said, was analogous to the 
relationship between a ship and its scow in tow. Cut the 
scow loose and it would drift helplessly subject to winds, 
currents, and waves. Humans "cut loose" from society, he 
warned, ". . . are the sports or playthings of all of the 
natural forces in the world about them— winds, storms, dis­
eases, starvation, attacks by wild animals, devastating 
habits, wild fancies, and yet more."^ In a sense the depres­
sion had "cut individuals loose" from society. In order to 
alleviate their suffering and to prevent such a catastrophe
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, pp. 121-23.
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from happening again, Bode thought that Americans had to 
cooperate in the rebuilding of the social order. He pro­
moted this idea and the creation of a democratic society by 
demonstrating how democracy had come to mean more than polit­
ical equality; by analyzing the meanings of liberty and 
equality particularly with regard to the economic system; 
and by delineating the characteristics of a democratic 
social order. He developed his ideas in response to the 
depression and, later, to the threat of fascism. But it was 
the effects of the former that concerned him most. He 
apparently assumed that things could get worse if Americans 
did not cooperate for the betterment of the social order.
In fact conditions did deteriorate as never before.
The middle class had suffered inconveniences in previous 
depressions. This time, however, the appalling material 
losses jarred their confidence to its foundation. With 
collapsing incomes and decreasing land values many profes­
sional people and individuals living on incomes from invest­
ments found themselves seeking public relief along with 
millions of others. The worsening conditions brought a 
change in values. The successful businessmen and the con­
servative politicians who were the heroes of the 1920s fell 
from grace. Intellectuals expressed their concern in a 
variety of literary and scholarly publications. Those who 
had condemned business the decade before now could point out 
that the economic system could not even provide people with
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food and clothing. Even more startling were the criticisms 
of economic and legal experts. Thurman Arnold of Yale Law 
School argued that the capitalism previously praised as the 
good was fraught with slogans, myths, and rationalizations. 
Dean Wallace Donham of the Harvard Graduate School of Busi­
ness Administration held that the current trial of capital­
ism might determine the future of western civilization. 
Finally, even the doctrine of inevitable progress, a cardi­
nal tenet of American thought, came into question as the 
crisis worsened.^
In their quest for a plan of reconstruction some 
people looked to science. At the turn of the century 
science could have provided, at least, psychological secu­
rity for intellectuals in the middle of growing national 
turmoil. By the 1930s, however, all was not blissful in the 
American love affair with science. People were aware that 
science could provide enough food, clothing, and shelter for 
everyone to live decently. But the facts belied the possi­
bilities. Malnourishment and starvation abounded in some
quarters, while fruit rotted on the vine and crops were
2plowed under.
Even science itself had lost its air of certainty. 
Studies of relativity in physics and functionalism in biol­
ogy had undermined scientific determinism. The universe
Ĉurti, The Growth of American Thought, pp. 717-20, 
Îbid., p. 722.
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appeared to be in a constant state of flux. Biologists 
theorized about the possibility of "macroevolution," trans­
formation from one species to the next in a quantum leap.
The evidence adduced by American functional and physiolog­
ical psychology and German Gestalt psychology stressed the 
bearing of psycho-physical processes, of the totality of 
experience, and of individual characteristics in human 
activity, like Bode, the psychologists, in part, were react­
ing against the oversimplifications of the popular theories 
developed by Watson and other behaviorists. Although many 
eminent scientists continued their investigations into these 
new theories undisturbed and the masses lived on unaffected 
by the uncertainties, the descriptions of these ideas given 
to the thoughtful lay public in the popular periodicals 
added to their sense of bewilderment.^
The conditions of the 1930s also brought a resurgence 
of reform ideas. Students of American society joined the 
quest for security amid disruption and the decay of values. 
They wrote about insecurity, women working, the decline of 
independent farming, employee ownership of corporations, and 
the loss of youthful confidence as the average age moved 
upward. Some intellectuals, including Max Berner, Sidney 
Hook, Louis Hacker, and George Counts, seriously contem­
plated Marxism and Marxist proposals for reconstruction. 
Literary critics Vernon Calverton, Edmund Wilson, and
Îbid., pp. 722-25.
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Malcolm Cowley, and such writers as John Dos Passos,
Theodore Dreiser, and Genevieve Taggard were to some extent 
stirred by Marxism. Despite its apparent popularity, how­
ever, Marxism never had the widespread impact hoped for by
its adherents and feared by conservatives. The New Deal,
... 1 even with its setbacks, helped people to cope with fear.
From the other end of the political spectrum, came 
calls for change that had a fascist tone. Some American 
visitors to Germany came home extolling the virtues of 
Hitler's efficient methods. The ability of Huey Long to move 
the masses in his home state of Louisiana and in the sur­
rounding region worried the opponents of fascism. The dema- 
gogery of Father Coughlin and the activities of fascist-like 
societies, including the Khaki Shirts, the Silver Shirts, 
and the Crusaders, aroused alarm. In general, however, the
clamoring of fascists and their organizations like that of
2the Marxists was met by popular indifference.
Amid the chaos, the men and women of the arts and 
letters threw off the subjective concerns of the 1920s and 
exhibited a renewed concern with social issues. Plays like 
Waiting for Lefty, Of Mice and Men, and One Third of a 
Nation; novels such as The Big Money, The Grapes of Wrath, 
and Union So uare; and documentary photography and art
Îbid., pp. 730-32; Goldman, Rendezvous With Destiny,
pp. 368-71.
Ĉurti, The Growth of American Thought, pp. 734-35*
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including You Have Seen Their Faces. Is this the U.S.A.?, 
and An American Exodus all were expressions of a new social 
consciousness and a growing interest in the social situation 
of the common man. In 1936, for example, Carl Sandburg 
showed his faith when he wrote :
In the darkness with a great bundle of grief
the people march.
In the night, and overhead a shovel of stars, for 
keeps, the people march:
"Where to? what next?"^
Boyd Bode too believed in the common man. But he 
knew that mere faith in the individual was not enough to 
build a democratic social order. People had to work 
together, developing common interests, ideals, and purposes. 
They also had to realize that social and political ideals 
changed as circumstances changed. A clear illustration of
this phenomenon, thought Bode, was the changing meaning of
the conception of democracy itself.
At the time of the Revolution, he noted, democracy 
roughly meant political equality for all white men. After 
the Civil War political democracy included all free men 
regardless of race, color, or previous condition of servi­
tude. During the period of economic growth, he continued, 
the meaning came to include fair and just economic opportu­
nity. By the time of the First World War, in an attempt to 
make the world safe for democracy, the conception became the
Ibid., pp. ?40-4l; Carl Sandburg, "The People, Yes," 
in American Literature, Tradition and Innovation (Lexington, 
Massachusetts : D. C. Heath and Company, 1969), stanza 10.
96
application of the Golden Rule to all collective efforts of 
life. Although in 1921 Bode, ironically, did not mention 
how democracy had recently come to include women with the 
ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment, he indicated in 
1927 that democracy included all human beings.^
During the latter stages of the evolution of democ­
racy, Americans became enthusiastic about scientific and 
technological developments. The ability to harness the 
forces of nature, said Bode, became a source of pride and 
embodied the ideal of America. This ideal, however, became 
somewhat clouded by the realization after the First World 
War that science and machinery could not solve all problems 
and by distress resulting from European criticism of 
American materialism. Despite these concerns, said Bode, 
America had a great national tradition in democracy. As a 
doctrine and an experiment, it was more radical than Bolshe­
vism. America, he noted, was a symbol of hope for the down­
trodden around the world. More important, the meaning of
democracy had expanded over the years, thereby increasing 
the potential benefit to the individual. Bode explained 
that;
The whole drift of things has been toward the interpre­
tation of the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness in the sense that we are members one of
another, with a common interest in the cultivation of a
common life. No one, not even the humblest citizen, is 
to serve simply as a hewer of wood and a drawer of
B̂ode, Fundamentals of Education, p. 7 and Modern 
Theories of Education, p. 9-
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water; but everyone is to be recognized as a member of a 
great brotherhood, and to share in the opportunities, the 
achievements, and the aspirations which are our common 
possession. There are to be no peasants, no serfs, as 
there are no hereditary privileges and titles, because 
each citizen is to rise to the full stature of his spir­
itual manhood even as a son in his father's house.^
This was the American creed, he concluded, based on a faith
in the common man.
The common man, however, did not always have a clear 
understanding of democracy. Bode noted that the average 
American saw democracy as an eternal verity, but only had a 
vague notion as to its meaning. When asked to explain the 
meaning of democracy, individuals tended to suggest such 
things as majority rule and the right to vote, or repeat 
legends of great democratic leaders such as Thomas Jefferson, 
or express a vague identification with personal liberty and 
equality of opportunity. Bode saw nothing wrong with these 
definitions. He indicated that each one was based on the 
idea that democracy was ". . . a state of mind, that a demo­
cratically organized society seeks to protect the interest
of all its members through joint responsibility and joint 
2control."
But great ideals, warned Bode, were subject to the 
danger of being destroyed by the very institutions and prac­
tices they created. Over time, these institutions could begin 
to impose themselves as ends instead of means. A society, he
^Bode, Modern Theories of Education, pp. 3-9* 
Îbid., pp. 9-11.
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contended, remained democratic as long as its institutions 
and practices were evaluated as to their effects on individ­
uals. It became aristocratic when the well-being of the 
individual was subordinated to some other end. One lesson 
that we could learn from history, he said, was that the 
issue of aristocracy versus democracy had been a phase of 
the larger struggle between fixed habits and vested inter­
ests on one side and the requirements of an expanding life 
on the other. "When democracy is identified with estab­
lished forms," he argued, "it ceases to be democracy."^
During the 1930s, Bode continued to worry about the 
fact that democracy in America was characterized by fixed 
beliefs and habits. The increasing threat of fascism in 
Europe after 1933 exacerbated Bode’s fears, and led him to 
write a scathing indictment of American democracy. In 1937» 
he criticized the fact that democracy continued to be seen 
as a political conception associated with majority rule. 
Americans, he said, still assumed that belief in democracy- 
carried ". . .no necessary implications with respect to 
economic, ethical or religious beliefs." On the other hand, 
fascism in Germany and communism in the Soviet Union had 
furnished comprehensive schemes for the organization of life. 
In other words, they had become distinctive ways of life. 
Bode used this paradoxical argument to demonstrate the weak­
ness in American democracy. "As compared with these points
Îbid., pp. 11-13.
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of view," he complained, "democracy is lacking in definite­
ness of purpose." The tendency to be sentimental about the 
principles of democracy had become a substitute for a defi­
nite plan of action. Even worse, he said, American democ­
racy had become a facade for the tyranny of vested interests 
who "... are generally able to emasculate legislation 
which is unfriendly to them.
Bode did not favor fascism or communism; and he did 
not advocate that the American government should impose 
democracy on the public. His point was that fascism and 
communism had pervaded life in Germany and the Soviet Union, 
respectively, in a manner analogous to the way he thought 
democracy ought to permeate American life. He went on to 
argue that if democracy were to survive the threat of total­
itarianism, particularly fascism, it could not "... be 
limited to majority rule, but must furnish a guiding princi­
ple for the formulation of national policy. In our present
2terminology, it must signify a way of life."
In his discussions about the changing meaning of 
democracy during the inter-̂ /far period. Bode endeavored to 
make the point that democracy meant more than a political 
system; it was a way of life. He knew that the achievements 
in science gave man greater control over his environment. 
These developments also increased the complexity of society.
^Bode, Democracy as a IfJay of Life, pp. 3-9' 
Îbid., p. 15.
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thus making individuals more dependent on each other. If 
democracy were ever to become a way of life in an interde­
pendent world, individuals would have to cooperate with each 
other in order to control social forces. Could this goal be 
reached under the existing social organization? Bode appar­
ently did not think it was possible. By arguing that insti­
tutions and practices could not become fixed if the society 
were to remain democratic, Bode was reacting against the 
established habits of the 1920s, such as the reverence for 
laissez faire capitalism when in fact it no longer existed. 
He was also responding to the increasing threat of fascism 
in the 1930s. Finally, he was alluding to his belief that 
the greatest barrier to building a democratic social order 
was the fundamental division in our culture between estab­
lished patterns of the past and the needs of a dynamic soci­
ety. From the late 1920s until 1952 he continually raised 
the issue of the "cleavage in our culture."
The dire economic conditions of the depression and 
the danger of fascism stirred Bode to study this cultural 
dualism closely. By 1935 he had arrived at some tentative 
conclusions as to the origins and effects of the cleavage. 
This phenomenon, he argued, seemed to manifest itself most 
clearly in our inability to achieve the American dream, 
equality of opportunity. Originating on the frontier, this 
ideal continued to be frustrated by our ill-conceived 
practices.
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The frontier, remarked Bode, set its own standards 
based largely on the survival of the fittest. Social dis­
tinctions were of little value; self-reliance, resourceful­
ness, and persistence were more important. With the growth 
of the frontier, he said, the common man became very impor­
tant. There was glory in commonness. As long as the fron­
tier was open and men could grow, there was little danger of 
social stratification. Sounding like Frederick Jackson 
Turner, he asserted that the frontier spirit became imbedded 
in the American tradition. "It became a tradition of faith 
in the common man, a tradition of faith in the supreme and 
ultimate value of personality, a tradition which required 
every man, as a solemn right and duty, to stand on his own 
two feet and to exercise independence in thought and 
action."^ He reasoned that this dream of the good life was 
preserved by the frontier, not by the social order.
In addition to the belief in the common man. Bode
thought that the romantic attitude toward government also
appeared on the frontier. The frontiersmen sympathized with
the idea that freedom required limited government. They
believed that this freedom and the opportunities of the
2frontier were sufficient for democracy.
Boyd H. Bode, "The Great American Dream," in 
American Philosophy Today and Tomorrow, ed. by Horace M. 




Bode criticized this conception as an oversimplified 
view of democracy. It underestimated, he commented, the 
significance of social organization in the development of 
the individual. Although the frontier developed admirable 
qualities, they were sharply limited. It failed to encour­
age esthetic appreciation, social cooperation, intellectual 
stimulation beyond daily problems, education beyond the 
rudiments, and individual development of abilities beyond 
obtaining property. To make matters worse, complained Bode, 
the frontier ideal received powerful support from Wild West 
stories that labored to create a Golden Age that had been 
the immediate past. The roughhev/n men raised in the bosom 
of nature became the ideal. "Thus the American dream," he 
lamented, "was transformed into a daydream, a bedtime story. 
It became a lingering recollection of something that never 
happened, of a fulfillment that never took place, of a West 
that never was on land or sea."'
Despite this fantasy, the frontier ideals contributed 
to the growth of a tradition that Bode believed was funda­
mentally Jeffersonian. We greatly expanded the functions of 
government while holding to the idea that the government was 
merely extending the room for the individual, as it had dur­
ing the frontier era. We talked of maintaining our way of 
life, while we in fact subordinated the interests of the 
many to the interests of the few. Consequently, he noted.
Îbid.
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we had a chasm between theory and practice. In theory we 
held to equality of opportunity; in practice we surrendered 
political and economic control to the great corporations. In 
theory we held to the inalienable right to develop our 
powers ; in practice we measured success by income and pos­
sessions. In theory we protected independent thought ; in 
practice we demanded conformity in the name of Americanism. 
"In theory we endorse liberty of conscience; in practice," 
he complained bitterly, "our requirements for citizenship 
. . . make it doubtful whether Christ himself, if he were to 
return to this earth, could meet these requirements."^ Our 
Jeffersonian words, he added, clashed with our Hamiltonian 
actions.
Bode concluded that American democracy had become an 
orthodoxy not unlike those of the past. It was ironic, he 
protested, that this development had tended to afford privi­
leges to the same vested interests as those that had domi­
nated the older undemocratic societies. Amid the transfor­
mation of American society from a rural to an industrial 
society, he commented, many people continued to live under 
the illusion that the principles of democracy had been fixed
by the Constitution. But the events in the autumn of 1929
2exposed us in all our nakedness. Bode obviously was react­
ing to the existing economic and social conditions in Amer­
ica. He may also have been alluding to the fact that
Îbid., p. 71. Îbid., pp. 73-74.
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Germany, which had manifested a ''cleavage® in its democracy 
in the 1920s, had fallen prey to fascism.
In 1952, at the age of seventy-nine. Bode was still 
wrestling with the problem of the "cleavage in our culture." 
This time the question of what moral standards to apply to 
scientific achievements, which he had first raised in 1921, 
became the impetus for developing his clearest statement on 
the issue. Bode suggested that the real origin of the cleav­
age was to be found in Plato’s dualistic universe. Instead 
of building a moral system of this world, Plato developed a 
transcendental morality that he imposed upon the world of 
appearances. Christian theology adopted the two worlds. 
Moreover, it became imbedded in western culture, but not 
without conflict. In politics the clash occurred between 
government by divine right and government by the consent of 
the governed. In economics it was the sanctity of free 
enterprise versus the desirability of government control.
In theology it became purity of doctrine versus freedom of 
conscience. In education the struggle occurred between cul­
tural subjects and practical subjects. As these battles 
progressed, he said, concessions were made, but without giv­
ing up the dualism.̂
Man’s inability to give up the dualism, he contended.
Boyd H. Bode, "The Cleavage in Our Culture," in 
The Cleavage in Our Culture, Studies in Scientific Humanism 
in Honor of Max Otto, ed. by Frederick Burkhardt (Boston: 
The Beacon Press, 1952), pp. 3-7*
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indicated his fear of losing his sense of direction. This 
was a mistake. By using science to the fullest extent, man 
could build "the Kingdom of Heaven on earth." He meant, of 
course, the scientific machinery and the scientific method. 
However utopian these possibilities seem. Bode realized that 
these changes had to obtain gradually. The success of this 
effort, he believed, ultimately depended on whether or not 
man could eliminate the "cleavage in the culture." The 
protracted struggle between the two worlds had left man 
confused.
This confusion is the greatest threat to our national 
ideal of democracy. We cannot have it both ways. Either 
democracy is a way of life which can generate its own 
standards and ideals from purely social relationships 
and thus maintain its own distinctive system of ethics, 
or else democracy must be trimmed down so as to make it 
fit into a transcendental or metaphysical framework and 
thus be deprived of the claim that it represents a 
distinctive way of life.̂
In his distress over the philosophical dualism in 
American culture. Bode remained squarely within the Deweyan 
tradition. His explanations in "The Cleavage in Our Cul­
ture" are reminiscent of Dewey’s thoughts in Reconstruction 
in Philosophy. Bode’s long struggle with dualisms paral­
leled the Master’s in another way. He too failed to provide 
convincing reasons why the dualisms were bad. He indicated 
that they had caused confusion in men's thinking. He was 
correct in attributing the perplexity to the contradictions 
between theory and practice. But he ignored the possibility
“Ibid., pp. 12-13.
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that the confusion also might have resulted from a lack of 
understanding of the meaning and application of the ante­
cedent standards.
As might he expected, Bode's pragmatic anti-dualism 
appeared in his discussions of the primary tenets of democ­
racy, liberty and equality, during and after the depression. 
Like John Locke, Bode noted that people seeking liberty 
often formed organizations or institutions to secure that 
liberty. They established rules of conduct and authorities. 
But then the rules changed more slowly than the cravings of 
people. As a result of these desires, some individuals 
wanted to change the rules, but were prevented from doing so 
by those in authority. "What helped human growth at first," 
he said, "now turns out to be in its way.Institutions 
lost their vitality when they became contented and self- 
centered, and when they deterred the development of new 
interests and new truths.
The conception of liberty began as the idea that 
individuals were ends not means or tools of the state, and 
evolved into the notion of equality of opportunity without 
restriction imposed by the government, except for the rules 
of fair play. "It meant," observed Bode, "that government 
provided the equality and nature provided the opportunity." 
But conditions had changed drastically since the halcyon 
days of frontier America. Liberty could no longer be
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, pp. 1̂ 3-44.
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secured by limiting governmental interference. "A man is 
not free," he asserted, "if he is illiterate or if he cannot 
find a job or if he has to choose between starvation and 
working for a subsistence wage under conditions that are a 
menace to life and health."^ He thought that the state had 
to intercede in such circumstances or there could be no such 
thing as liberty.
Gradually governmental regulation and centralization 
increased through such measures as compulsory education, 
collective bargaining, and social security. As a conse­
quence, said Bode, some people were uncomfortable because we 
seemed to be following the path of the totalitarian states. 
But this apparent dilemma dissolved if we looked again at 
the moral standards of liberty. Totalitarian states, he 
indicated, established a central dogma such as racial superi­
ority, national superiority, a religious doctrine, or a 
philosophy of economics. Then they demanded that each indi­
vidual conform to that standard. Jefferson’s ideal, in con­
trast, was not conformity, but liberty. The difference 
between totalitarianism and democracy, he indicated, was not
in the amount of governmental regulation, but in the purpose
2that guided the application of those rules.
But the matter of liberty was not completely settled.
B̂oyd H. Bode, "Conceived in Liberty," Childhood 
Education, 24 (September 194?): 5-7*
Îbid.
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Bode pointed to the fact that the competing methods of 
applying liberty manifested the "cleavage in the culture." 
The founding fathers believed that liberty was an inalien­
able right, an eternal verity. Bode rejected this moral 
standard as a throwback to supernaturalism. The other 
method, bom in the New England town meeting and in the 
Revolution, was the idea of the consent of the governed.
This ideal, he said, assumed that morality was a matter of 
social relations, not theology. This gave liberty a posi­
tive connotation because the problem of freedom became a 
problem of continuously readjusting the conditions of a 
common life. It also meant discussion and agreement. Lib­
erty then became a guiding principle for reconstructing 
social relations using the democratic process and the scien­
tific method. Bode summarized his argument when he declared 
that the bases for fulfilling the American dream were moral 
standards that were relevant
... to the problem of making men free through changes 
in social relationships. The solution of the moral 
problem lies in the future and not in the past. It lies 
in the painstaking study of maladjustments and not in 
the contemplation of the cosmic order sub specie 
aeternitatis. Its reliance is not on conformity but on 
method, so as to secure the liberation of intelligence 
for the continuous improvement of human life through the 
medium of social relationships.^
In this instance, Bode used a Deweyan argument to explain
the meaning of the ideal of liberty.
Îbid.; Boyd H. Bode, "Education for Freedom," 
Teachers College Record, ^9(January 1948); 280-82.
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Taken as a whole, Bode predicated his discussion 
about liberty on two problems. First, he was responding to 
the growing fear of the spread of communism manifested in 
the belief that the growth of government signaled a loss of 
liberty and a move toward totalitarianism. Second, like 
Dewey, he believed that the public did not understand that 
securing liberty in an interdependent society required 
cooperation and the employment of the method of intelli­
gence. This was also true, they thought, with regard to 
equality of opportunity.
The economic chaos of the 1930s had a similar effect 
on Dewey's and Bode’s thinking about equality. Both men 
believed that achieving equality of opportunity meant alter­
ing the economic structure of the nation. They knew that 
accomplishing that task would not be easy. But Bode was not 
as specific as Dewey about the means of obtaining equality.
Bode began by noting our professed loyalty to the
doctrine of equality of opportunity. He warned though that
if someone undertook to suggest that our economic order must
be restructured in order to achieve genuine equality of 
opportunity, he would encounter outrage and would be sus­
pected of being on Moscow’s payroll. Admitting that this 
was an overstatement. Bode pointed out that Americans seemed 
unsure of themselves, and lacked their former youthful zeal. 
The spirit of the frontier did not appear as glorious. "The 
present economic collapse," he said, "is driving home the
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truth that the era of individualism is coming to an end; 
that character and average intelligence do not guarantee a 
competency; that the social organization must enlarge its 
responsibilities and widen its purposes.""
He added that the individualism of the frontier was 
not a finished product, but still a dream. We had to, 
therefore, go beyond the belief that the individual would 
come to full expression if left alone. There were no inner 
standards of conduct. As with liberty, the standards had to 
be sought in dynamic social relations. Unless we revised 
the standards, he warned, equality of opportunity would 
become an empty phrase. "It becomes our task to build a
social order in which the great but inchoate dream of the
2frontier will find meaning and fulfillment."
The attainment of this goal required a new economic 
order. Bode's prescription for the economy can best be 
described as economic democracy. In 1931» he hinted that 
the nation ought to adopt a system that sought the just 
distribution of wealth. By seeking justice instead of indi­
vidual gain, people might or might not share equally; but 
they would at least deal with the problem as human beings and 
not as animals fighting over food. This would require the 
elimination of the selfish individualism among employers, the
^Boyd H. Bode, "Equality of Opportunity; the Great 
American Dream," Nation's Schools 11 (June 1933): 11.
Îbid., pp. 11-12.
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exploitation of laborers, and the conditions of poverty.
Bode thought that some effort had been made in this direc­
tion. He spoke favorably of such devices as collective 
bargaining, arbitration, joint (employer-employee) confer­
ences and ownership, and public ownership. He never indi­
cated which method or methods were most acceptable. Never­
theless, he clearly suggested that a plan should be devised 
to make industrial practices serve human needs more fully, 
so that millions need not be on the brink of poverty. Even 
though the task was very large, admonished Bode, the nation 
should have the determination to accomplish it.̂
On another occasion, he suggested that the trend 
toward an increasingly complex life through scientific 
development provided a clue for determining the course of 
social progress: moral and social conduct should consist
of the promotion of changes in our industrial civilization 
so as to create an ". . . agency for liberating the minds 
and refining the emotions of all who take part in it."
This meant, said Bode, that private enterprise would be 
abolished in favor of some form of cooperative control. The 
program would not only revise present beliefs and practices, 
but would establish a distinctive standard for citizenshin
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, pp. 25̂ -
74.
2Boyd H. Bode, "Education at the Crossroads: What
Principles Should Determine the Curriculum?" Progressive 
Education 8 (November 1931)' 54?.
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and for judging right and -wrong conduct.̂
As the depression lengthened, Bode continued to argue 
for an economy aimed at human development. In 1935» partly 
in response to the radical pronouncements of George Counts 
and his colleagues at Columbia University, he noted that to 
a conservative the economic and industrial life was a means 
for the individual to express initiative and capacity; for a 
reformer it was a means for self-expression outside of eco­
nomics and industry. In both cases, he said, it was a means 
to an end. He thought the economic and industrial life 
ought to become an end in itself. By bringing together all 
elements of industry for planning, as in the NBA, there 
would be a shift away from obsessive concern for profits. 
Such things as buyer protection, abundance instead of scar­
city, and worker security would become the principal con­
cerns. This would result, he remarked, in a new psycholog­
ical attitude. A concern for moral and aesthetic purposes 
would develop. Liberty and equality of opportunity would 
take on a new meaning. The focus of the spiritual life
would become the construction and reconstruction of new aims
2and ideals as the social life changed.
Prior to 1937» Bode's recommendations for altering 
the aim of the economy paralleled Dewey's, although he never
^Ibid.
2Boyd H. Bede, "Education and Social Reconstruction," 
The Social Frontier 1 (January 1935): 19.
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unequivocally indicated what type of economic system seemed 
best for accomplishing the desired end. This position was 
characteristic of him, considering his view of the means-end 
relationship in solving problems. Late in the depression 
years, however, he moved, ever so cautiously, toward a 
specific statement about the economy. The pattern for trans­
forming industry, he said, was not to be predetermined, but 
should develop from the practice of shared effort among 
employers, employees, and the public in the shaping of busi­
ness policy. This program would not aim at a more equitable 
distribution of economic returns, although that result would 
naturally follow. Nevertheless, it would attempt to remake 
the aim of business. Instead of profits, the aim would be 
widened to make business ". . .an instrumentality for 
securing an educational outcome or result."^ He meant, of 
course, the development of common interests and individual 
growth. A short time later, he argued that in the case of 
the economy we had to determine the desired result before we 
could decide on a remedy. For Bode the desired end was the 
extension of genuine democracy. He asserted that ". . .as
long as democracy is advanced there is no reason why we
2should worry about how things are going to shape up. " He
B̂ode, Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 57-58.
2Boyd H. Bode, "Ends and Means in Education or, the 
Conflicts in Our Cultural Heritage," in What is Democracy? 
Its Conflicts, Ends and Means, ed. by Winifred Johnston 
(Norman, Oklahoma: Comparative Books, 1939), pp. 18-19.
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went so far as to say that this meant we had to he open to 
the possibility of a "workers society." This alternative, 
among others, should be considered. But, he warned, it 
could not be made an integral part of democracy. No one 
could know ahead of time what would work. Hence, the spiri­
tual and experimental qualities of democracy had to be pre­
served at all cost.̂
Bode seemed to be drifting toward the position Dewey 
had taken in Individualism Old and Nevf. But he stopped 
short of clearly indicating that a form of socialism was the 
answer to the nation's economic woes. Perhaps he saw no 
need to repeat or expound further upon Dewey’s statements. 
His own ideas, though they were vague, resembled Dewey's.
It appears, however, that the explanations for Bode’s 
thoughts about the economy lie elsewhere. Both men obvi­
ously were concerned about the national calamity. Dewey's 
willingness to be forthright about an economic solution may 
have stemmed from his experiences in his father's store and 
from his formal training in economics. Bode was the son of 
a minister, and had no formal training in economics.
Although a half century had past since Dewey had formally 
studied economics, he probably had a better grasp of that 
subject than Bode. Dewey clearly was more disposed to be 
tou^minded about the economic situation.
Nevertheless, the most important reasons for Bode's
-Ibid.
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position are to be found in his emphasis on the means-end 
relationship and in the focus of his -writings during the 
depression. Since he was concerned about the ends of action 
and the ideal of democracy, Bode naturally would have 
stressed the reorientation of economic aims while only giv­
ing terse attention to the means to those ends. Further­
more, Dewey had already delineated the method for developing 
the new economic order which Bode acknowledged by indicating 
that the spiritual and experimental qualities of democracy 
must never be lost. As for the focus of Bode’s work, his 
first concern still was the application of philosophical 
thought to educational practice. In order to accomplish 
that task thoroughly. Bode worked diligently at analyzing 
the social situation and at explaining its meanings for edu­
cation. He apparently wanted to maintain a balance between 
the two elements, a sort of means-end relationship. He did 
not, however, soften the accent on the democratic ideal.
Two of the three books that he wrote during the depression 
dealt principally with the society. In each, however, edu­
cation was an important element. In fact Democracy as a Way 
of Life was a prescription for creating a democratic society 
whose primary vehicle for continuous growth was the school. 
Most of Bode’s articles also showed the balance between 
social and educational ideas. Bode’s writings during the 
1930s closely paralleled Dewey’s works of the period 1897 to 
1916 in their balanced emphasis on society and education.
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After 1916, Dewey devoted most of his writing to technical 
philosophy and to broad social concerns that emphasized 
meanss and included discussions about education. In a 
sense then, Bode was more Deweyan than Dewey in his work 
during the depression.
One final comment must be made about the work of both 
men. As pragmatists, they believed in a dynamic social 
order. Consequently, whether they emphasized means or ends 
in social action, their statements always were tentative. 
Neither Dewey nor Bode would allow himself to be trapped 
into providing the method or the answer to a problem. Both 
of them steadfastly refused to say, for instance, that 
democracy was the ultimate form of social organization. 
Rather, it appeared to them to be the best proposal yet 
devised by humans.
With this thought in mind. Bode presented his ideas 
about a democratic social order. He argued that democracy 
began with the individual who had the ”... ability to 
share imaginatively in all sorts of experiences, to regard 
nothing human as foreign to oneself . . . This was the
moral ideal for the individual and the society. Communities 
also had to adhere to this ideal in their relations with 
other groups or societies. Bode held that a negative atti­
tude toward others constituted the absence of democracy, 
which had been a problem in the class systems of the past.
^Bode, Fundamentals of Education, pp. 46-4?.
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and still existed in the exclusive interest groups in the 
United States. Individuals and communities had to believe 
in the idea of a society that provided for the full expres­
sion of native capacity through cooperation based on the 
recognition of mutual interests and through the progressive 
modification of institutions and practices.^ Democracy, 
therefore, began as a state of mind.
Achieving the ideal of democracy meant that the
scientific method had to be applied to the problems of the
social order, and that individuals had to be willing to
change. Concerning the use of scientific techniques Bode
remarked that:
Scientific integrity requires that the formation of new 
beliefs shall be determined solely by evidence, and not 
by bias or tradition. Similarly the concept of democ­
racy means that no item of doctrine or creed may be fenced off for the purpose of exempting it from changes 
in the way of rejection or revision. Democracy requires 
the same open-mindedness toward values or interests as 
science requires toward evidence. In this respect the 
spirit of science is the same as the spirit of democ­
racy.2
That individuals must be willing to change meant they must 
learn to use the culture as a means for growth. Thus sci­
ence, literature, art, and vocation were to become a means 
to this end.3
By suggesting that a democratic social order must use
pp. 13-14. 
2
Îbid., pp. 4-9-50; Bode, Modern Theories of Education,
Bode, Modern Theories of Education, p. 257•
Îbid., pp. 262-63.
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the scientific method and the culture as means for growth 
and change, Bode was not demanding change for change's sake. 
Social flexibility, he thought, was indispensable for the 
fullest possible growth of all individuals. But social sta­
bility was just as indispensable. "The line has to be 
drawn," he said, "somewhere between utter flexibility and 
utter rigidity— in the family life, in the church, in the 
school, in the factory, in the government, and therefore in 
society as a whole. Even though he called for both flex­
ibility and stability. Bode continued to emphasize the 
former. He expressed the concern that social patterns tended 
to assume special sanctions, and thereby become fixed, abso­
lute, and a haven for special interests. "The fact that 
these patterns have ceased to be the happy way of doing 
things," he warned, "is disregarded and so we became obliv­
ious to the cleavages in our social life which would other-
2wise be intolerable."
Bode's fear of stagnation was evident in the social 
conditions he wanted to eliminate because they were inimical 
to maximum individual growth. The first of these barriers 
to democracy was fixity, a condition that hindered growth. 
Therefore, he would allow only enough fixity to achieve 
structural stability. Next, there should be no social strata 
by birth. "Now, this does not mean," he observed, "as many
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, p. 101. 
2Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 60.
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suppose, exactly equal opportunity at scratch; it simply 
means being born amid all of the opportunity that one can 
and will use. Tyranny also was an unwanted social condi­
tion that had to be eradicated from politics, religion, edu­
cation, business, and the home. Bode thought that mutual 
assistance would remove fear from the society. Finally,
ignorance had to be wiped out. Ignorance, he commented, was
2related to folly ar̂ d supported tyranny of all sorts.
As one might expect. Bode thought there were certain 
characteristics of society necessary for promoting growth. 
There had to be a minimum material base for adequate living. 
One could not live a valuable life, he commented, when he 
did not have enough to eat or wear, or did not have enough 
shelter or walking space. Acknowledging the disparity 
between the many who were starving and the few who were liv­
ing in luxury, he noted that probably there were enough 
resources to feed, clothe, and house all Americans ade­
quately. Another indispensable feature was goodwill. He 
meant by this a lack of jealousy, envy, hatred, selfishness, 
ill-wishing, and cruelty. On the other hand, goodwill meant 
the presence of aggressive and continuous well-wishing and 
the strong desire that others be well, happy, and prosper­
ous. In order to achieve this goal. Bode indicated that
200.
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, pp. 198- 
Îbid.
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effort, toleration, and generosity were necessary.
The next two characteristics were closely related to 
each other and to goodwill. Whatever the source, inherited 
or developed, said Bode, intelligence was necessary for the 
betterment of society. It had to direct goodwill. "Intel­
ligence," he declared, "is the supreme reconstructor of the 
world." Its main use was directing social change sc as to 
build a better society. We could not, he noted, prevent 
social changes, but we certainly could direct them through 
intelligence. This could not be done, however, by individ­
uals working alone. Like Dewey, Bode believed that discus­
sion, shared communication, was essential to the successful 
direction of social change. In effect, the act of sharing 
intelligence was democracy in action. As he said it:
When human beings come together and consider their prob­
lems from every angle in a dispassionate and illumi­
nating way they are practicing democracy. They are 
practicing democracy when they learn from those who 
differ from them, even those of other creeds and races. 
The closed mind is the worst enemy of democracy because 
it is the antithesis of growth. Sane discussion is 
democracy; but it also enlarges the ideal of democracy: it keeps people growing.2
Despite his desire to promote goodwill through intel­
ligence and discussion. Bode realized that all would not be 
sweetness and light. Human living involved various wants 
and needs for the individual and the group. Frequently, he 
noted, these wants came into conflict with each other, thus 
requiring some agency for maintaining order. Unless humans
Îbid., pp. 200-09. Îbid.
121
wanted to live in anarchy, they had to have an organization 
whose responsibilities were the settlement of conflicting 
claims, the protection of life and property, and the estab­
lishment of certain forms of cooperation for the common good. 
Bode thought that human life would be intolerable without an 
"all-powerful organization," a government, to prevent grow­
ing personalities from crowding and overpowering others. He 
defined the government as ". . . a number of specialists 
organized and functioning authoritatively to keep the people 
of a given area living together in an orderly manner.
But, like Dewey, he went no further in describing the 
structure of government.
Nevertheless, Bode was willing to allow for extreme 
forms of governmental methods under certain conditions. He 
noted that even democracy had had to resort to "dictator­
ship." Lincoln's extraordinary powers during the Civil War 
were in a sense "dictatorial." Yet, he reminded, we still 
revered him as one of the finest democratic leaders. In 
order to explain this paradox. Bode indicated that the ordi­
nary dictatorship endeavored to control the minds of individ­
uals by establishing patterns of belief and conduct, and by 
tolerating no deviation from them. Democratic governments, 
on the other hand, with or without legislative authority 
attempted to free individuals from the chains of authority 
where authority inhibited spiritual growth. He thought that
“Ibid., pp. 3̂ 8-5̂ *
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the difference was significant. Both forms of government 
fed the hungry and provided work for the unemployed. None­
theless, he remarked,
. . . the further obligation that [an] occupation must 
contribute to the mental and moral development of those 
who are engaged in it and that the institution of pri­
vate property must be modified to whatever degree may 
be necessary to realize this end— this is peculiarly a 
democratic conception of industrial organization. It is no less democratic if this type of organization happens 
to be enforced by "dictatorial" powers wielded by a 
single individual.!
In allowing for the possible use of dictatorial 
powers in a democracy. Bode was carrying pragmatic philos­
ophy to its logical conclusion. Like Dewey who supported 
the use of war to achieve democracy, Bode thought that 
dictatorship could be used to promote human growth. But, 
these means were clearly temporary. Bode's example of 
Lincoln's extraordinary powers indicated that he viewed the 
use of dictatorial powers as an aberrant means. On the 
other hand, such powers in the hands of less intelligent 
mortals could have been disastrous. And such philosophical 
apologetics by Dewey and Bode, implied or otherwise issued, 
came dangerously close to "the end justifies the means."
Bode would have dismissed such criticism as indica­
tive of a lack of faith in the common man. He believed that 
individuals working together could build a democratic social 
order. He also assented to the use of revolt, as a last
^Boyd H. Bods, "Blueprints of Tomorrow," Independent 
Woman I3 (May 1934): 155 •
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resort, to achieve such an end. If we found ourselves 
unbearably constrained by customs, laws, or beliefs, he 
asked, what could we do? First, we would have to assure our­
selves that our motives were not fundamentally base and 
antisocial. Then study the situation in all its aspects to 
see that others would not suffer more if released. If the 
action seemed feasible, we could spread the information and 
discuss it with others in order to learn. But if constant 
intelligent agitation failed to obtain our release, he 
asserted, "... then, as a last resort, we may have to 
revolt, as in the case of the American Revolution. In the 
last analysis the right of revolt can never be taken away 
from man.
The use of dictatorial powers and revolt were extreme 
measures that Dewey and Bode, nonetheless, thought were 
legitimate means for achieving or preserving democracy. Yet 
both men believed that intelligent individuals would be able 
to create a democracy without such actions. Since democracy 
had evolved from a political system into a social organi­
zation, both men thought that the entire society would have 
to be reorganized. "It calls for a reconstruction of beliefs 
and standards in every major field of human interest," com­
mented Bode, "and thus takes on the universality of philos­
ophy and of religion, which is to say that it becomes a
^Lumley and Bode, Ourselves and the World, pp. 209-10.
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generalized or inclusive way of life. ” Each man noted the 
barriers to this end that stemmed from the dualisms in phi­
losophy and in the culture. Bode, in particular, thought 
that before any attempt to reorganize the society could be 
made, individuals had to recognize the "cleavage in our cul­
ture ." Ultimately, the building of a democratic social 
order required intelligent action on the part of all members 
of the society. Individuals learned through experience.
But Dewey and Bode held that if left to their own devices 
individuals would become intelligent only through a labori­
ous, wasteful, and inefficient process. Thus they believed 
that the school was the best vehicle for creating intelli­
gent individuals who could in turn develop a democractic 
social order. Understanding this faith requires an examina­
tion of Bode's ideas about education.
B̂ode, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 51*
CHAPTER IV 
BODE ON EDUCATION
After more than a decade of struggling with the social 
and educational issues of the inter-war period, Boyd Bode 
wrote that:
The school is, par excellence. the institution to which a 
democratic society is entitled to look for clarification 
of the meaning of democracy. In other words, the school 
is peculiarly the institution in which democracy becomes 
conscious of itself.1
In this statement, he not only indicated the place of the 
school in his theory of democracy, but adumbrated his view of 
the means-end relationship between education and the demo­
cratic ideal. The school should do more than reflect and 
perpetuate the existing order; it should be the vehicle for 
making the young aware of the democratic ideal, thereby 
creating informed citizens who could work for a society dedi­
cated to continuous human growth. Although he maintained an 
optimistic outlook about the potential of education. Bode knew 
that it would be difficult to make the school something other 
than a mirror of society. He devoted considerable effort 
toward making the school an instrument of democracy by 
attempting to clarify the aims of education; by analyzing the
“Bode, Democracy as a Way of Life, p. 95*
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theoretical issues growing out of those aims; and by offering 
constructive criticisms of the theories and practices of 
progressive education. Bode became, as it were, a gadfly who 
frequently stung the Progressive Education Movement in an 
attempt to realign it with Dewey's educational theory.
At the end of the First World War, the Progressive 
Education Movement, like progressivism itself, became frag­
mented. During the 1920s a growing interest in the arts and 
in Freudian psychology virtually eclipsed thoughts of social 
reform and led to the development of a child-centered peda­
gogy. In an attempt to make education "scientific," some edu­
cators became obsessed with educational testing and measure­
ment, or with the use of science to promote educational effi­
ciency. With the coming of the depression, still other 
progressive educators attempted to revive social reformism, 
and found themselves in the middle of a controversy that 
nearly destroyed the movement. Underlying each of these seg­
ments of progressive education was the growth of profession­
alism in the movement. These educators increasingly demanded 
technical knowledge that would distinguish them from the 
layman.̂
The child-centered pedagogy of the 1920s developed 
from the confluence of two streams of thought. Following the 
war, the intelligensia in the Greenwich Villages of New York,
Ĉremin, The Transformation of the School, pp. 179-85*
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Chicago, and San Francisco became more interested in the arts 
than in social reform. They developed an eclectic viewpoint 
that mixed doctrines of self-expression, liberty, and psycho­
logical adjustment into an individualism that resisted the 
limitations of conformity as well as the discipline of social 
reform. This outlook helped give rise to a pedagogical argu­
ment that each individual had a unique potential to be creative 
and that schools which promoted the free development of this 
potentiality were the best insurance for creating a society 
devoted to human growth.̂
Educators such as Caroline Pratt, Hughes Mearns, Satis 
Coleman, and Florence Cane applied this obviously Rousseauan 
doctrine in their private schools in New York City. Where 
Dewey had included Rousseau's ideas in his promotion of 
social reform, these and other educators extricated the idea 
of self-expression from the larger theory, and made it the 
fundamental doctrine of progressive education. In 1928,
Harold Rugg and Ann Shumaker surveyed the pedagogical innova­
tions across the nation. Unlike John and Evelyn Dewey, who, 
in a similar survey in 1915 entitled Schools for To-Morrow, 
had seen the essence of progressive education as social 
reformism, Rugg and Shumaker interpreted the current educa­
tional activity as a part of the constant struggle of the 
artist against the shallowness of industrial society. They 
thought that the solution to this historic battle lay in the
^Ibid., pp. 201-02.
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triumph of creative' self-expression.^
The application of this doctrine on a hroad scale 
produced both beneficial and disastrous results. On the 
positive side, creative self-expression employed in art 
classes brought forth a plethora of excellent student poems, 
music, paintings, sculpture, and theater sets. Throughout 
the decade, for example, superb student art filled the pages 
of Progressive Education. On the other hand, child- 
centeredness became a fad that resulted in the worst forms 
of freedom. In too many classrooms, liberty, spontaneity, 
and individuality became license, purposelessness, and defi­
ance. Thus, chaos replaced education in the name of 
2expressionism.
The second intellectual current that led to the child- 
centered movement of the 1920s was Freudianism. After Freud 
had lectured at Clark University in 1909 and Abraham A. 
Brill, a psychiatrist, had subsequently translated Freud's 
works, the Greenwich Village intelligensia became so inter­
ested in these ideas that by the time of the war psycho­
analysis was a popular topic of discussion. Following the 
war, specific applications of Freudian doctrine to pedagogy 
began to appear. The year 1919 saw the publication of 
Hygience and Childhood by William A. White, superintendent 
of St. Elizabeth's Hospital, and The Child's Unconscious by 
Wilfrid Lay, a secondary school teacher who held a doctorate
Îbid., pp.-183,206-07. Îbid., pp. 206-0?.
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from Columbia. In addition, Brill gave lectures at New York 
University for individuals concerned with the problems of 
pedagogy and education. Over the next few years other 
books, articles, reviews, and commentaries appeared, while 
teachers and laymen alike were exposed to the ideas of 
Freudian pedagogy.^
As might be expected, educators were selective in 
their analysis and practice of psychoanalytic conceptions. 
Teachers were encouraged to view the "unconscious" as the 
true source of motivation and behavior in both themselves 
and their students. Education was supposed to "sublimate" 
the child's "'repressed’ emotions" into socially beneficial 
activities. Some Freudians went so far as to suggest that 
ultimately the classroom was a situation full of emotion 
that only teachers trained in psychoanalysis could under­
stand. Others, like Isador H. Coriat, an early president of 
the American Psycho-Analytic Association, tried to use these 
notions to build a foundation for rational behavior.
Margaret Naumburg, a leading progressive educator, used 
psychoanalytic principles to design a school program that 
was supposed to transform individuals, not the society. A 
few educators used Freudianism to justify anti-intellectual 
concerns. Their preoccupation with repression and emotion 
led them to reject authority and rationality, and thereby 
allow liberty to become license. This tragic outcome and
Îbid., pp. 207-09.
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the chaos produced by self-expression made progressive edu­
cation a rich subject for humorists' cartoons for nearly a 
generation.^
The scientific movement in progressive education 
began as Edward Thorndike's dream of a science of pedagogy, 
and received a tremendous boost from the rapid development 
of intelligence and aptitude tests prior to the First World 
War. With the creation of the Binet scale and its Stanford 
Revision, Americans quickly recognized the value of the 
scale notion, and devised instruments for measuring intelli­
gence and achievement. Harold Rugg described the excited
activity surrounding these events as the "orgy of tabula- 
2tion." With the American declaration of war in 1917, tests 
were used to determine the intelligence of army recruits. 
Robert Yerkes, president of the American Psychological 
Association, and his colleagues unfortunately compared the 
data with a Stanford-Binet scale designed for children. The 
results were calamitous. "Scientific" evidence "proved" that 
the average mental age of Americans was fourteen years. 
Growing out of this debacle was the so-called testing con­
troversy that raged off and on for the next twenty years.
On one side were educators, particularly some college admin­
istrators, who supported their arguments for limiting college 
enrollments with these test results. Others, like John Dewey 
and Boyd Bode saw the tests as helpful devices for
^Ibid., pp. 207-15- ^Quoted in Ibid., p. 187.
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classification, but hardly useful as justification for 
restricting educational opportunities.^
The growth of science also lent support to the drive 
for efficiency in public education. In 1911. the National 
Education Association tasked its Committee on Economy of 
Time in Education with developing systematic measures for 
making schooling efficient. From 1915 to 1919 the Committee 
submitted four reports in which it suggested that economy 
could be achieved by eliminating nonessential knowledge, by 
improving teaching methods, and by structuring courses to 
conform with child development. The committee members 
believed they were using science to guide pedagogy. Ulti­
mately, the Committee's work gave rise to two curricular 
reform movements. The first was an effort to use the find­
ings of science to improve the teaching of traditional sub­
jects. The most important educator in this group was Eugene 
Randolph Smith whose Education Moves Ahead was a superb 
example of an attempt at reform while preserving traditional 
values. The second movement led by Franklin Bobbitt of the 
University of Chicago and Werrett W. Charters of the 
Carnegie Institute of Technology, followed directly in the 
path of the Committee on Economy of Time. These anti­
formalists endeavored to "scientifically" analyze society in
2order to determine the criteria for building a curriculum.
The third group to develop within the Progressive
^Ibid., pp. 185-92. ^Ibid., pp. 192-200.
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Education Movement "began in the 1920s with the effort to 
keep social reform alive. While John Dewey, Boyd Bode, and 
George S. Counts criticized Bahbittry and the' "cult of 
prosperity," William H. Kilpatrick searched for a method 
that would teach the young how to deal with rapid social 
change. When disaster struck in 1929, all of these men as 
well as John Childs, Jesse Newlon, R. Bruce Raup, Harold 
Rugg, and others joined with liberals in an effort to find a 
solution to the chaos. But it was George Counts who became 
the driving force behind the formulation of a radical posi­
tion that racked the already fragmented Progressive Education 
Movement.̂
In 1932 Counts argued in Dare the School Build a New 
Social Order? that the school should become an agent of 
social change and assist in building a collective economic 
order. Dewey had proposed the first notion in 1897 and the 
second one in 1930. What then made Counts argument so radi­
cal? In order to accomplish the proposed ends. Counts 
thought that teachers had to formulate a comprehensive
social theory "... and become less frightened ... at the
2bogies of imposition and indoctrination." He had clearly 
rejected the philosophy of experimentalism.
Fearing the taint of radicalism, the Progressive 
Education Association attempted to divorce itself from
Îbid., pp. 215-28.2George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social 
Order? (New York: The John Day Company, 1932), pp. 9-10.
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Counts and those who supported him. Thus Counts, Kilpatrick, 
Childs, and others began to search for an outlet for their 
ideas since Progressive Education was no longer open to 
them. They decided to found their own journal which they 
called The Social Frontier. The first issue appeared in 
October 193̂ * At first, the editorial position of the jour­
nal was radical, although not outside of the mainstream of 
liberalism in the 1930s. It remained radical, until the 
journal experienced a significant loss of subscriptions 
after 1935* The editors spoke favorably of a collective 
economy, accepted the inevitability of the class struggle, 
and held to an economic interpretation of history. Although 
they flirted with Marxism, these radicals, who called them­
selves social reconstructionists, recommended the use of 
democratic methods to achieve their goals.^ Their radi­
calism was too much for the Progressive Education Movement.
By the end of the decade, the movement was paralyzed by its 
internal fragmentation. Thus as the critics of progressive
Charles A. Bowers, The Progressive Educator and the 
Depression: The Radical Years (New’ York; Random House,
1969)• Bowers argued that the social reconstructionists 
were unduly alarmist. He said that their proposed solutions 
to the economic chaos, at least in the early years, were 
more radical than those of the communists. But the evidence 
does not support his contention. Despite attempts to enlist 
socialist support against the growing threat of fascism in 
1935t the American Communist Party continued to call for vio­
lent revolution, a notion abhorrent to the social recon­
structionists . See Dalton B. Curtis, Jr. "The Progressive 
Educator and The Social Frontier," Proceedings of the Twenty- 
sixth Annual Meeting Southv/estern Philosophy of Education 
Society (Norman, Oklahoma: The College of Education, The
University of Oklahoma, 1976), pp. 23-40.
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education grew in number after 1935» the movement did not 
have enough strength to meet these challenges.^
Despite progressive education's internal problems,
Bode was optimistic about the potential benefit of its basic 
theory for education and the society. While Dewey focused 
his attention on general social philosophy during the inter­
war period, Bode devoted himself to social and educational 
issues. As time passed, it became increasingly obvious that 
progressive educators were deviating from Dewey's teachings. 
Thus Bode's attempt to interpret Dewey's theories in light 
of the changing conditions and to criticize constructively 
the notions of progressive educators grew in significance.
In a discussion reminiscent of The School and 
Society, Bode began his first full-length study of educa­
tional theory. Fundamentals of Education, in 1921, by 
explaining the aims of education. As society became increas­
ingly complex, he noted, education became detached from 
immediately practical ends. The life of the adult and that 
of the child grew apart. Thus, he argued, a conception of 
general education became necessary to close this gap in a 
way that would benefit the child. Here he made a subtle 
distinction between replicating adult life and creating a 
worthwhile environment in the school. Some things adults 
did were good, other things were not. Consequently, edu­
cators had to keep the bad out of the school environment.
Ĉremin, The Transformation of the School, p. 181.
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and to promote the good. The school endeavored to prepare 
children for an adult life, not as it actually existed, but 
as it was idealized and refined. Education, said Bode, 
became ". . .an agency both for conserving the past and for 
'progress and reform."'^
The success of this process required the creation of 
a theoretical foundation derived from reflection upon the 
aims and values of life. Like Dewey, Bode asserted that life 
was a process of growth. "Human beings," he remarked, "con­
stantly utilize previous experiences for the creation of new 
aims, new ideals, new opportunities; and in so doing they 
give more fulness, more richness, to life, they make life 
more worth living." In a sense, a similar process occurred 
in the classroom. Almost as if he were observing the activ­
ities in Dewey's Laboratory School at the turn of the cen­
tury, he noted that the children created a new environment, 
gained new opportunities and new incentives, and thereby 
enhanced the value of life. Although the civilization 
developed slowly and painfully, the children reached matu­
rity by traversing the same ground in an environment where 
the materials were skillfully designed to promote growth. 
Thus, he asserted, "... education is growth, it is a pro­
cess in which appreciations, aims, and ideals develop and 
expand. ... It means a liberation of capacity.
^Bode, Fundamentals of Education, pp. 3-4. 
Îbid., pp. 7-8. ^Ibid., p. 8.
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Having reiterated Dewey's notion that both life and 
education were growth, Bode then carried the theory one step 
farther. Whereas Dewey believed that growth had no end 
beyond itself, Bode suggested that when growth was postu­
lated as an ideal it had to refer to a specific type of 
development. When it was first suggested, the conception of 
growth represented a departure from the limiting inclina­
tions of other ideals. But educators had a tendency to make 
growth one-sided by emphasizing, for instance, discipline or 
utility. This thrust would either impair or totally block 
the child’s capacity for understanding and appreciation. 
Instead Bode believed that "the ideal of growth means train­
ing of such a sort as to facilitate understanding and appre­
ciation of all human interests."^ He later criticized 
Dewey's conception, that growth had no end beyond itself,
for not adequately dealing with the possible need for a
2total reconstruction of experience.
Bode’s ideal of growth could be achieved only in a 
social setting. He meant that teachers had to demonstrate 
the relevance of subject matter to life. This would not 
only conserve the spiritual heritage, it would open the door 
to the future. But, he warned, educators could not solve 
life's problems ahead of time; nor could they make choices
Îbid., pp. 11-13*
2Boyd H. Bode, "Education as Growth; Some Confusions," 
Progressive Education, 1^ (March 1937)s 155-57*
137
for others. As he put it:
What we can do, however, is to acquaint them [children] 
with the main things that should he taken into account, as based on the experience of the race, so that they 
may have a proper sense of values when they are called 
upon to make their own decisions; and it is in this sense that we can provide a general education.1
In other words, the fundamental aim of education was the
development of intelligence through an understanding of
experience, the child's and that of all humanity.
Achievement of this aim depended on the use of a 
social criterion as a standard. Education, said Bode, 
involved gaining an understanding of the meanings which 
things in the environment had for members of the community. 
This was necessary for full participation in the life of the 
community. Bode cited Dewey's suggestion that the essen­
tials for education were those things that were connected 
with the experiences shared by the widest groups. But, he 
said, this social criterion was vague. It could easily be 
interpreted quantitatively without regard to the child's 
environment. "The reference to the social environment," he 
admonished, "does not consist in counting noses, but in giv­
ing a broad outlook to the life that is lived by the pupil." 
Education was to begin in the local vicinity, but was not to 
be limited to it. Bode argued that an education which 
failed to bring in the widest possible social context but 
remained concerned only with particular interests had two
^Ibid., pp. 13-15.
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results: It intensified the class spirit inimical to demo­
cratic institutions; and it did not foster, except by- 
chance, he said, "... the catholicity of spirit and toler­
ance of attitude which is so vital to the life of a democ­
racy.
With regard to the condition of democracy and educa­
tion in the 1920s, Bode expressed the same concern as he had 
about the social order. He thought that the growing gap 
between democracy as it was being practiced and the demo­
crat ical ideal was evident, for instance, in the efforts to 
"Americanize" the immigrants. Too often "Americanization" 
became a jingoistic demand that only English be spoken. 
Instead of doing this, educators should have taken a clue 
from democracy itself. "Americanism" meant an understanding 
of community life. This had to include training in the 
ideals by which the community life mightbe understood and 
evaluated. The outstanding features that appeared in the 
lives of great men, in our literature and art, in the momen­
tous public movements, and in the ways of expressing the 
spirit of the nation provided, said Bode, a vision of the 
larger "... life that contains beauty and a wider fellow­
ship.
But education had to do more for society than provide 
examples of the democratic ideal. Bode noted that the char­
acter of society determined that of its educational system;
^Ibid., pp. 30-3 2, 3 8 . ^Ibid., pp. 53-5 6 .
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and the educational system in turn determined the character 
of society. This would he a hopeless circle, he said, if it 
were not for the changes occurring in society. These new 
conditions called for corresponding changes in education. 
Thus education was obligated not only to preserve the tradi­
tions, but to prepare the way for the future;
. . . education must cultivate the knowledge and the 
temper of mind by means of which progress can be made to 
depend less upon conflict and haphazard adjustment and 
more upon intelligent coSperation on the basis of mutual 
understanding or sympathetic insight. This does not 
mean that the schools are to be used as a means of pro­
paganda, but as a means of cultivating an interest in 
things that pertain to our common life and an apprecia­
tion of the fact that we are "members one of another."!
He thought this could be accomplished by making the social 
criterion our measure of educational values. Thus education 
was to assist the individual to look to the future in per­
sonal and community affairs.
In 1927» Bode published a more detailed study of edu­
cational theory. Modern Theories of Education. It is inter­
esting to note that the thrust of this book, once again, 
paralleled one of Dewey’s— Democracy and Education. Here 
Bode defined democracy as ". . . a social organization that 
aims to promote cooperation among its members and with 
other groups on the basis of mutual interests." The idea of 
the "mutual recognition of interests" indicated that democ­
racy meant humanizing the social order. Under the current 
circumstances, he said, society consisted of many groups.
^Ibid., pp. 60-61.
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It was a welter of conflicting special interests and it was 
easy for individuals to see the viewpoint of their particu­
lar interest group. But if they were not educated to see 
beyond those limited concerns, they could not help to 
resolve the society’s conflicts. "Our national safety," he 
asserted emphatically, "lies in the general intelligence of 
our citizens, which means the ability and the disposition to 
understand both sides of such questions and to adjust them 
in the light of the common good."^
Humanizing the social order meant humanizing educa­
tion. Bode was distressed that education was failing in this 
task. Instead of promoting democracy in the schools, as 
might be expected, educators had developed an educational 
system that reflected an Aristotlean conception of culture. 
They maintained an aristocratic tradition by separating cul­
tural subjects from practical subjects. Somehow, for exam­
ple, pure science was better than applied science. Bode 
thought that those who had studied the cultural subjects 
were inadequately prepared for leadership in a democracy, 
pointing to the absence of an educated political leadership 
as proof. On the other hand, those who had studied the 
practical subjects were equally mal-educated. They did not 
have the humanizing influence of a broad outlook. To have 
perpetuated this cleavage, clearly would not have been demo­
cratic. How then could we, as Bode asked, "... make
^Bode, Modern Theories of Education, pp. 14-15.
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education safe for democracy?"^
In the first place, he argued, we had to realize that 
we could not succeed by increasing the quantity of educa­
tion; it was the quality that was important. We could no 
longer tolerate the existing clash of the old and the new,
the traditional and the progressive. Second, we were to
remember that education could not be separated from social 
theory, from a conception of social structure. That social 
organization, of course, was democracy. Third, education 
was to look to the future. Bode thought that a concern 
about future changes was a distinguishing characteristic of 
democracy. An educational system, therefore, was not to be 
regarded as fixed. Separation between cultural and voca­
tional programs was intolerable. The issue came down to
whether we believed that our "Golden Age" was in the past or
in the future. There was no doubt what Bode thought:
A truly democratic society regards its institutions and 
practices as instrumentalities that are to be modified 
or discarded with the growth of experience. It is con­
sciously in process of becoming; at every point in its 
history it is imbued with the sense that it is still in a formative stage. The purpose of education is not to 
fit the individual for a place in society, but to enable 
him to make his own place. Our business is not to train
for three classes in society, as Plato thought, or for
any other fixed number, but for as many classes as there
are individuals to be educated. In other words, a democ­
racy must expect to outgrow its organization as a child 
outgrows his clothes. The organization of the moment 
may serve a valuable and necessary purpose, but it must 
not be regarded as final. We put shoes on a child to protect his health not to bind his feet.2
^Ibid., pp. 15-16, 233- ^Ibid., pp. 233-37-
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It was evident that Bode had accepted the thrust of Dewey's 
educational theory.
Making "education safe for democracy" required devel­
oping in the individual the ability to educate himself.
This meant providing for the creation of new standards in 
relation to new conditions and needs. It also meant, said 
Bode, creating in the mind of the student ". . . a sense of 
living on the ragged edge of things, a sense that life is an 
experiment, a constant venture into the unknown.
The final requirement for creating a democratic edu­
cational system was the introduction of the conception of 
the democratic social order. This meant understanding the 
thinking process by which individuals were humanized and 
educated for membership in the democratic social organiza­
tion. Needless to say, he was referring to the "Complete 
Act of Thought." Introducing the democratic ideal also 
required teachers to have a social vision. The implication
was that they had to understand that democracy was a way of 
2life. This emphasis on the introduction of a social ideal 
or criterion was clear evidence of Bode's constant emphasis 
on ideals. Education aimed at developing intelligence 
through a program based on the democratic ideal, both of 
which served as a means and an end.
Bode, like Dewey, obviously believed that the school 
was a powerful, if not the most powerful, institution in the
^Ibid., pp. 238-40. ^Ibid., pp. 240-41.
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social order. It could be used to stultify or to change the 
society. The fact that social conditions in America in the 
1920s were not conducive to democracy, Bode held, was prin­
cipally the fault of education. But he was convinced that 
all was not lost. Man had learned to control the physical 
environment through science and technology. He no longer 
had to accept what the fates would allow. As a consequence, 
he could alter the material surroundings to suit his needs. 
Bode believed that social environment could also be directed 
to suit human needs. "When our educational systems become 
imbued with a humane social ideal." he asserted, "our social 
development will rival our material development and man will 
no longer be the creature but the master of his environment.
Throughout the 1930s Bode maintained the position he 
had established in the previous decade concerning the aims 
of education, although the chaos wrought by the depression 
caused him to place greater emphasis on the need for a 
social ideal. He noted, for instance, that the chief defect 
in education was the lack of an ". . . adequate mission or 
social gospel," despite the availability of the method of 
intelligence. Education was supposed to assist the young in 
developing a personal philosophy of life. By contrasting 
the conflicting tendencies of life, a new insight would 
illuminate old beliefs and habits. The reorganization of 
experience thus established, he argued, would bring a wider
^Ibid., pp. 242-43. (Italics not in original).
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perspective and would result in a unified social outlook or 
philosophy of life. Education also was supposed to create a 
sense that democracy's "Golden Age" was in the future ; that 
the spiritual heritage was an unfinished dream; and that 
equality of opportunity was a product of the social order. 
All of this was based on the faith that as the meaning equal­
ity of opportunity changed, the American people would con­
tinue to grow with it. Finally, Bode's effort to promote 
the theme of a social ideal culminated in 1937 in Democracy 
as a Way of Life. As the title suggested, he believed that 
democracy was to become a philosophy of life. And the 
school was the best institution available to achieve this 
end. Bode observed that;
Democracy must enter the lists, not as a symbol of a 
vague humanitarianism, or of a cumbersome parliamen­
tarian procedure, but as a distinctive way of life. It 
must espouse a conception of values for which abso­
lutism provides no room and which it cannot hope to 
understand. Educationally it must insist that no man, 
even though he be a teacher, has the right to appoint 
himself the keeper of his neighbor's soul.
Once again, this goal rested on a belief in the power of
individual intelligence. Democracy, he concluded,
". . . stands or falls by its faith in the common man.
Throughout his professional career. Bode stressed the 
importance of meanings in human activity. Whatever the
Boyd H. Bode, "The New Education Ten Years After: 
Apprenticeship or Freedom," The New Republic. 4 June 1930» 
p. 64; Bode, "Education at the Crossroads," 5̂ 6; Bode, "The 
Great American Dream," p. 79; Bode, Democracy as a Way of 
Life. pp. 112-14.
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activity, meanings influenced the conduct of behavior. This 
was particularly true in the interpretation of educational 
theories. Bode constantly strove to insure that educational 
conceptions were clearly understood before they were put 
into practice. Di this regard, he raised questions about 
such issues as growth, indoctrination, freedom, and liberal 
education during the depression and the Second World War. 
Although these were not the only educational issues debated 
at the time, they were the ones that were easily misinter­
preted, and in some cases posed a threat to the ideal -of 
democracy. There were, of course, other issues raised by 
the activities of the three branches of the Progressive 
Education Movement which will be discussed later.
As previously noted, Dewey equated growth with educa­
tion, whereas Bode added that growth had to result in an 
"understanding and appreciation of all human interests." At 
the hands of progressive educators, growth had assumed a 
Rousseauan interpretation, development from within the indi­
vidual. In this sense, argued Bode, it had become an obsta­
cle to clear thinking on the part of the teacher. Too often 
they defined the goal of guidance as "inner growth" or 
"self-directing from within." Bode attributed this explana­
tion to the fear of imposing ideas on the young, a common 
problem among progressive educators. Yet even if these edu­
cators pointed to "self-direction" promoted by "wise influ­
encing," they would still have had an empty conception since
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they had no goal toward which to direct that guidance. 
Growth had to be based on a social criterion.^
On another occasion, he recommended that educators 
should make growth a social conception. Democracy, he said, 
had no creed but a common concern for providing the maximum 
opportunity for development of individual capacity. This 
would lift growth to the position of a moral principle, a 
principle of social conduct. Having said this, he quickly 
parried the accusation that this was merely imposing a new 
standard on society. On the contrary, he argued, a democ­
racy takes the idea of individual development as a guiding 
ideal. As he put it;
It is a recognition of the fact that an individual can 
rise to his full intellectual and moral and esthetic 
stature only as a member of a social order. The ancient 
opposition between the individual and society is over­
come by making growth or the development of capacity a common purpose and a common concern.2
Thus Bode believed that growth was a means and an end.
Another issue that troubled Bode was the question of 
indoctrination. Although a perennial problem in the class­
room, George Counts had made it a public issue in 1932 when 
he suggested that teachers should rid themselves of the fear 
of imposition and indoctrination. Two years later the 
American Historical Association's Commission on the Social 
Studies called for the development of reasoned skepticism in
B̂oyd H. Bode, "Education as Growth; Some Confusions,"
153-55.
2Boyd H. Bode, "Education as Growth," Educational 
Forum. 8 (November 1943); 6-9.
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students, and followed that with the recommendation that the 
form of American society should he shaped in accordance with 
the fundamental tenets of popular democracy and individual 
liberty and dignity. Bode viewed the juxtaposition of rea­
soned skepticism with the ideals of America as a form of 
indoctrination. "In plain English," he remarked sarcasti­
cally, "this means that a student can think as he likes, 
provided that he does not disagree with the professor."^ He 
argued further that if we were to predetermine the direction 
of social change, we could not, at the same time, focus on 
maximum intellectual development of the common man.
Bode would not allow the subject of indoctrination to 
be laid to rest, because he thought it was anti-democratic. 
In 1935» he used a paradox to make his point about this 
issue. He suggested that the only form of this method per­
missible was indoctrination in the notion that indoctrina­
tion of beliefs was wrong. Although this play on words was 
criticized as an indecisive position, the critic obviously 
ignored Bode’s constant struggle against indoctrination. On 
another occasion, he declared that a school which estab­
lished beliefs became an instrument for preventing progress. 
Instead, education was to provide an understanding of the
Renort of the Commission on the Social Studies, 
Conclusions and Recommendations, by A. C. Krey, chairman 
(New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934), P* 39; Boyd H.
Bode, "Which Way Democracy?" The Social Studies, 25 (November 1934): 34-3-44.
^Ibid., 346.
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changing social circumstances in order to allow for thought­
ful reconstruction. Finally, in 1938 Bode criticized the 
social reconstructionists' method of teaching students about 
social problems by having them accept the teacher's analysis 
of society. He asserted that such "... conditioning in 
education is the negation of democracy." Rather, the stu­
dent should be assisted in an independent reconstruction of 
experience with reference to the ideal of democracy.^
Closely related to the problem of indoctrination was 
the issue of freedom in education. By the late years of the 
depression, the chaos in progressive classrooms and the calls 
for "indoctrination" clearly indicated that some progressive 
educators did not understand the meaning of freedom either 
in the traditional or Deweyan sense. In 1938, Bode took the 
time to repeat what he and Dewey believed was the true mean­
ing of freedom, that which begins with intelligence. "In a 
democratic social order," he commented, "the schools have a 
distinctive obligation, to provide for the continuous exami­
nation of traditional beliefs and practices, on the ground
Bode, "Education and Social Reconstruction," 22; 
Bowers, The Progressive Educator and the Depression, p. 149; 
Boyd H. Bode, "The Next Step in Education," Journal of Home 
Economics. 27 (October 1935)! 488-89; Boyd H. Bode,"Dr. Childs and Education for Democracy," The Social 
Frontier. 5 (November 1938): 39* For a more thoroughtreatment of this topic see Dalton B. Curtis, Jr. "Boyd Bode 
and Social Reconstructionism," Proceedings of the Twenty- 
seventh Annual Meeting Southwestern Philosophy of Education 
Society (Norman, Oklahoma'; The College of Education, The 
University of Oklahoma, 1977). PP* 179-91.
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that 'time makes ancient good uncouth.'"" With the current 
conflict between the rural, individualistic and the indus­
trial, centralized order, he continued, the schools were to 
illuminate this cleavage so as to provide students with the 
tools for making intelligent and independent judgments.
This could not be accomplished either if the teachers 
attempted to interpret the social order for the students, or
an outside authority tried to prescribe a set of beliefs.
2Rather, there was a third alternative.
Bode held that a democratic approach would promote 
true freedom in the schools and, by implication, in the 
society. From the democratic viewpoint, the patterns of 
society were derived from a reciprocal relationship. They 
were justified by the fact that they promoted and maintained 
common interests among men. Democracy meant, he said, that 
all existing forms of organization were subject to modifica­
tion whenever changes would further common interests and 
purposes. As for the schools, they were not to accept the 
responsibility for inculcating specific beliefs, since such 
notions might lead to fanaticism. Democratic education meant 
examining our cultural heritage, in order to illuminate con­
flicting interests, and to show that democracy had a higher
Boyd H. Bode, "What is the Meaning of Freedom in 
Education?" in Educational Freedom and Democracy; Second 
Yearbook of the John Dewey Society, ed. by Boyd H. Bode and 
Harold B. Alberty (New York: D. Apple ton-Century Company,
Inc., 1938), pp. 4-5.
^Ibid., pp. 5-9.
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obligation than protection of a specific pattern of belief 
and action. Bode concluded that schools had the obligation 
to make students intelligent about the ideal of democracy by 
promoting understanding of its meaning. Ten years later, he 
described this as inteliectualizing the democratic process.^ 
When the progressive educators revolted against 
formalism in education, they rejected the traditional con­
ception of a liberal education. But as Bode pointed out 
they discarded the old view of a liberal education without 
any understanding of what it ought to have been. Toward the 
end of the depression, others joined the discussion in the 
name of democracy and liberal education. In 1936, Robert 
Maynard Hutchins, president of the University of Chicago, 
called for a liberal education that would develop the ratio­
nal intellect. This was to be accomplished through the 
study of the classics of western civilization. Two years 
later, a group of conservative educators, led by William 
Chandler Bagley, suggested that education should aim at 
strengthening the ideals of American democracy through sub­
jects that contained the essential knowledge of the human 
tradition. Finally, in 19^5 the Harvard Committee on "The 
Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society" pub­
lished its now famous report that called for an education 
designed to continue "the liberal and humane tradition" of
^Ibid., pp. 9-13; Boyd H. Bode, "Education for 
Freedom," 283-84.
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America.^ Thus, Bode and the progressive educators found 
themselves in the middle of a growing controversy over the 
meaning and content of a liberal education.
As might be expected. Bode argued that a liberal 
education was not contained in specific subject matter. 
Therefore, we had only one choice, to develop human capacity 
through social living in order to enrich life. This would 
lead to the identification of morality with the protection 
of diverse interests by continuously widening the foundation 
of common concerns and purposes without reference to super­
natural principles. Education, he believed, was liberal to 
the degree that subject matter fostered an underlying philo­
sophy of life. Democratic education required an emphasis on 
scientific inquiry; an historical examination of present 
problems and future possibilities; and an appreciation of 
art and literature as expressions of experience. Finally, 
if education were to liberate human intelligence, Bode 
thought that we could not compromise between the "closed 
system" of the past and what William James called the "wide- 
open universe." As he put it:
It is mere verbiage to say that we must educate for
“Bode, Modern Theories of Education, p. 232;
Robert Maynard Hutchins, The Higher Learning in America (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 193̂ ); William C. Bagley, "An
Essentialist*s Platform for the Advancement of American 
Education," Educational Administration and Supervision, 24 
(April 1938)1 24i-56; General Education in a Free Society:
Renort of the Harvard Committee. with an Introduction by 
James Bryant Conant (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1945).
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freedom. Every system of education can claim to be edu­
cation for freedom, since it claims to be truth, and 
since truth is what makes us free. Freedom in the 
abstract is an empty concept; its meaning derives from 
the philosophy or world-view that lies back of it. The 
issue confronting us is basically a moral issue ; it has 
to do with the meaning of liberty and democracy. The 
present situation, therefore, seems to point to a mini­
mum requirement for a liberal education. To be liber­
ally educated a person must have an adequate apprecia­
tion of the challenge to our traditional beliefs which 
^ows out of science and which meets us in all the important areas of life.l
Once again. Bode had returned to his thesis of the'"cleavage
in the culture" and to the idea of the social criterion for
education.
Bode saw similar difficulties in the Harvard Report 
on general education. He noted that the committee had iden­
tified three basic constituents that were vital to the char­
acter of our heritage; the ideal of the "free man" inher­
ited from ancient Greece ; walking with God in the light of 
faith from the teachings of Christianity; and reliance on 
the scientific method promoted by the growth of modern 
science. Bode suggested that the committee’s acceptance of 
these tenets was tantamount to adoption of the two-world 
view. But this was not the only problem with the Harvard 
Report in Bode's opinion. Its greatest weakness lay in the 
assumption that the heritage could be predetermined. "The 
possibility is ignored," he remarked, "that the heritage may 
be a process of growth which must be dealt with as we go
^Boyd H. Bode, "The Problem of Liberal Education," 
School and Society, 59 (24 June 1944); 435-36.
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along, without any stultifying preconception as to the 
limits within which our reinterpretations must be confined—  
a preconception which in its practical consequences amounts 
to a conspiracy to restrict [the] scientific method."^ Bode 
obviously thought that graduates of such a program would not 
be adequately prepared to function in the type of democratic 
social order that he envisioned.
Nevertheless, at least one member of the committee 
did not agree with Bode's assessment. Raphael Demos, a 
professor of philosophy at Harvard, satirized Bode's argu­
ment as the story of the courtship between the virile youth 
of America and the vivacious "Miss Innovation" that was 
ruined by the interference of the old hag "Miss Tradition." 
He noted that tradition was not viewed as static, and that 
Bode's call for a critical reexamination of the elements of 
tradition was exactly what the committee had in mind. He 
also denied the "two-worldism," and indicated that the 
report was Whiteheadian, not Platonic. Assenting to the 
need for faith in science. Demos then blasted Bode for mak­
ing the scientific method an absolute. In his reply, Bode 
reiterated his contention that the report implied the "two- 
worldism. " He also added that try as they might to claim 
that their premises were not final, the committee could not
^Boyd H. Bode, "The Harvard Report," Journal of 
Higher Education. 1? (January 1946): 2-8.
154-
remove the implication of finality.^
More than any other individual, Bode undertook to 
strengthen progressive education by acting as its critic. 
From the 1920s to the early 1950s, he endeavored to show the 
members of the movement where they had deviated from the 
ideal of democratic education. Commenting on the child- 
centered movement he noted that the belief in the power of 
human desires and impulses had resulted in the "... sancti­
fication of childish whim as educational gospel." The focus 
on individual differences, freedom, and self-expression had 
produced a "soft pedagogy" that pandered to whims and self­
ishness or to one-sided vocational training. As previously 
noted, his comments concerning the use of mental tests par­
alleled Dewey’s. He condemned their use as a device for 
limiting education, contending that the results indicated 
just the opposite, that education had to account for a 
broader range of interests and abilities. jUi connection 
with the other segment of the scientific wing, he argued 
that the doctrine of specific objectives derived from scien­
tific studies confused the gathering of scientific facts 
with the scientific method. What was needed, he thought, 
was a social theory that provided a foundation for develop­
ing educational objectives. Finally, Bode criticized the
Raphael Demos, "Mr. Bode and the Harvard Report on 
Education," Journal of Higher Education, 1? (February 194-6): 
57-62; Boyd H. Bode, "The Harvard Report Once More," Journal 
of Higher Education, 17 (April 194-6): 201-04-.
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social reconstructionists for their myopic suggestion that 
education should focus on economic reorganization. This 
notion ignored the fundamental division in the culture which 
had to be understood before the young could develop a philos­
ophy of life. He also contended that their proposals for 
indoctrination were patently anti-democratic.^
In 1938» the year Dewey published Experience and 
Education. Bode devoted an entire book to evaluating progres­
sive education which he entitled Progressive Education at 
the Crossroads. He began by suggesting that the confusion 
in progressive education stemmed from the confusion in the 
society growing out of the demand for recognition of the 
individual. Ultimately, recognition of the common man would 
mean making democracy a complete way of life. "Progressive 
education," he asserted, "is confronted with the choice of 
becoming the avowed exponent of democracy or else of becom­
ing a set of ingenious devices for tempering the wind to the 
2shorn lamb." There was no doubt where Bode stood on this 
issue.
Progressive education, he said, manifested the 
"cleavage in the culture." It was confused as to its
Bode, Fundamentals of Education, pp. 231-32;
Bode, Modem Theories of Education, pp. 18-19, 90-93» 310- 
311, 327; Bode, "Education and Social Reconstruction," 20- 
21. For an examination of Bode’s criticisms of the social 
reconstructionist wing see Curtis, "Boyd Bode and Social 
Reconstructionism."
2Bode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads.
pp. 9-26.
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foundation. On the one hand, it expressed the democratic 
spirit in its faith in the individual and in the power to 
create new standards based on human values and in accordance 
with changing conditions. On the other hand, its emphasis 
on the child was little more than Rousseauan absolutism.
Too often it focused on the individual instead of the ideal 
of democracy. Progressive education had built pathetic 
hopes on the notion that the sources of education lay in 
interests, needs, growth, and freedom. Bode warned that 
progressive education had to renew itself in the spirit of 
democracy or be left behind.^
In order to clarify what he meant concerning the 
sources of education Bode examined the doctrines of inter­
est, needs, growth, and freedom. He criticized progressive 
education for focusing on immediate individual interests.
The doctrine of interest, instead, meant that education 
should focus on reconstruction of experience toward a total 
pattern derived from the use of intelligence, a critical 
element for democratic action. Concerning needs, Bode 
asserted that if we took democracy seriously, we had to 
realize that our basic need was to understand the conflict 
between tradition and democracy; all other needs were to be 
determined in terms of this issue. Summarizing his earlier 
comments about growth, he commented that education was a 
process of growth, but growth did not provide its ov/n
Îbid., pp. 28-44.
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direction. Growth should he developed, he argued, toward 
. .a plan for living intelligently in a topsy-turvy 
world; and as such must have reference to the issue of
democracy, . . . Finally, Bode repeated the thesis that
2democracy required freedom derived from intelligence.
The final criticism that Bode leveled at progressive 
education concerned its lack of a social philosophy. Adopt­
ing democracy as a way of life and becoming the vehicle to 
that goal was the linchpin of progressive education's 
future. Without this unifying element all else would be 
meaningless. In the end, Bode, like Dewey, believed that 
progressive education had the potential to make democracy a 
way of life.̂
It was unfortunate that the Progressive Education 
Movement ignored Dewey's and Bode's criticisms. Had the 
members of the movement heeded the early admonitions of 
these two leaders, it would not have been necessary for them 
to write Experience and Education and Progressive Education 
at the Crossroads. As it turned out, these books were a 
last gasp attempt to save progressive education from itself. 
But the effort was to no avail, the educators went blithely 
along until circumstances and the verbal attacks of Arthur 
Bestor, Robert Hutchins, Hyman Rickover, and others made a 
spectacle of the Progressive Education Movement.
Îbid., pp. 45-85. Îbid., pp. 85-99.
Îbid., pp. 99-122.
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Yet this tragedy could not overshadow the work of 
Boyd Bode. As an educational theoretician he clarified and 
restated Dewey's educational theory. But he also developed 
his own interpretation of pragmatic educational theory in an 
effort to balance the means-end aspect of that philosophy. 
Bode recognized that Dewey's greatest contribution to educa­
tional theory was more on the side of method than on that of 
ideals. He said the two could not be divorced, but then 
admitted that to date the emphasis had been on method. 
Alluding to his own stress on ideals, he suggested that the 
disparity would be corrected as the total philosophy was 
realized.^ Thus Bode devoted nearly a quarter of a century 
to the application of the theory of democracy to the prac­
tice of education. He believed that if democracy were ever 
to become a way of life, education would have to clarify the 
meaning of this ideal and promote the total development of 
human capacity.
B̂oyd H. Bode, "John Dewey," Educational Research 
Bulletin, 8 (October 1929): 3̂ 3*
CONCLUSION 
DEMOCRACY AS A WAY OF LIFE
In 1937» John Dewey suggested that democracy was more 
than a political form or a method of conducting government; 
it was a way of life, both social and individual. The cen­
tral fact of this way of life was the requirement of par­
ticipation by all individuals in the fashioning of values 
that govern community living. This was necessary for both 
social welfare and individual development. In the same 
year, Boyd Bode asserted that democracy was no longer the 
term for a set of political beliefs, but a viewpoint based 
on the principle of common interests and purposes. The 
most important element of community living in a democracy 
was the sharing of interests. And the primary function of 
government was furnishing the conditions for broadening the 
extent of common purposes among individuals. By making the 
principle of shared concerns the basis of human living, 
democracy assumed the characteristic of universality, and 
thus became a way of life.̂  The fact that Dewey and Bode 
defined democracy in virtually the same fashion suggests 
one answer to the question with which we have been concerned;
John Dewey, "Democracy and Educational Administra­
tion," School and Society 45 (3 April 1937): 457; Bode,
Democracy as a Way of Life, pp. 48-51.
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What happened to John Dewey’s theory of democracy at the 
hands of Boyd Bode? A comparison of their theories will 
make the answer more complete.
Beginning with their intellectual development, there 
were some distinct similarities in the lives and thinking of 
these two men. They were products of the Progressive Era, 
a period characterized by significant social, political, and 
scientific developments. It was a time in which the place 
of the individual in a democracy and the structure of democ­
racy itself became important issues. The changes in the 
American scene growing out of this time profoundly affected 
the thinking of both men. And their formal academic train­
ing in the philosophy of idealism gave them a similar van­
tage point from which to analyze life in the United States. 
But for Dewey and Bode alike, idealism proved to be inade­
quate as a philosophy of democracy, each having come to this 
conclusion in the heartland of progressivism, the midwest.
It must be recognized, of course, that Dewey changed 
his thinking in the process of developing a philosophy that 
would both explain social change and serve as a tool for 
directing the improvement of society. By the turn of the 
twentieth century, he had built his ideas into a systematic 
philosophy, later called pragmatism, that incorporated an 
experimental outlook, and from which he derived his theory 
of democracy. He believed that democracy was a social and 
ethical theory whose fundamental principle was the
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development of human capacity. The idea expressed in this 
definition of democracy, moreover, permeated his writings 
for more than half a century.
Bode began his academic career as a critic of the new 
experimentalist philosophy. But his lack of commitment to 
any one school of idealism, his association with leading 
progressive thinkers and their Reform Darwinist views, and 
his reading of Dewey and James led him to conclude that a 
pragmatic, experimentalist position better enabled one to 
grasp reality and to deal with the neverending problems of 
existence. By 191?» Bode had gained recognition as a prag­
matist. And his thinking clearly reflected the influence of 
Dewey, a fact that he acknowledged in 1921. The focus of 
his work, furthermore, was in the Deweyan tradition. Dewey 
had asserted that philosophy in the broadest sense was a 
general theory of education. Bode put this idea into prac­
tice as a professor of philosophy of education at Ohio State 
University.
As for his theory of democracy. Bode accepted Dewey’s 
definition. He also agreed that a theory of democracy had to 
consider the individual, society, and education. This is 
not to suggest, however, that he adopted Dewey’s theory 
entirely. There were definite similarities in their expla­
nations. But Bode faced different circumstances than had 
Dewey while attempting to devise his theory of democracy. 
Consequently, he departed from Dewey's theory at certain
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important points, a development which Dewey must have viewed 
with tolerant understanding; after all, Bode was modifying 
his thoughts in light of changing conditions.
Like Dewey, Bode saw life as a process in which the 
individual and nature were organically hound by experience. 
Life, moreover, was fundamentally a social process since 
individual experiences became meaningful in relation to the 
experiences of others. Knowledge gained from experience was 
man's means of directing the environment. But controlling 
the environment, said Dewey and Bode, required the use of 
intelligence, which enabled individuals, and in turn society, 
to grow to the limit of their capacity. Thus they saw 
intelligence as the method of democracy.
Dewey held that the basis of intelligent action was 
reflective thinking. This type of thinking was essentially 
the use of experimentation in making decisions. Bode agreed 
that reflective thinking was critical to intelligent action, 
but emphasized the importance of meanings in that process.
The creation of new meanings from the interaction of old 
ones was the real substance of intelligent action, or pur­
posive behavior as he sometimes called it.
Intelligent action on the part of individuals or 
society also meant that choices had to be made as to the 
best course of action. Thus Dewey and Bode believed that 
democracy was a moral process. And of all the moral issues 
raised in a democracy, freedom was the most important. Both
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men argued that true freedom began with intelligence. Per­
haps the best example of Bode's acceptance of Dewey's con­
ception of freedom and his effort to clarify its meaning for 
some progressive educators appeared when he made the follow­
ing statement in 1938:
According to Dewey, freedom is achieved through the 
exercise of intelligence, whereas the less discrimi­
nating of his disciples understand him to mean that 
intelligence is achieved through the exercise of 
freedom.1
But while Dewey focused on the means to freedom, Bode 
stressed that freedom also meant the intelligent formation 
of purposes. Finally, they agreed that freedom in a social 
setting meant the application of intelligence to control 
social forces in order to promote human growth.
With regard to the social order itself, Dewey and 
Bode believed that a democracy was a society that embodied 
the moral ideal of the full development of human capacity. 
Neither one, however, was willing to delineate a specific 
governmental structure for the society. The particular form 
of government was not important as long as it enabled all 
individuals to participate equally in the political process. 
In order to share in political activities, individuals had 
to be liberated intellectually and physically so as to have 
equality of opportunity. Nevertheless, they thought this 
end could not be achieved under the existing economic
B̂ode, Progressive Education at the Crossroads,p. 98.
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system. Both men argued for an economic structure that 
would involve public planning and implementation. Dewey 
wanted a form of socialism that would employ the method of 
intelligence. Bode gave tacit assent to a planned economic 
system, but never clearly outlined its structure. He was 
more concerned with making equality of opportunity the true 
aim of the new economic order.
Dewey and Bode also believed that building and main­
taining a truly democratic social order depended on the use 
of intelligence. In this connection, Dewey called for a 
social order created and developed through the spirit and 
method of science. Such a society required freedom of 
social inquiry and the dissemination of its conclusions. He 
believed that democracy would come into its own through 
shared communication. Bode concurred with Dewey, but also 
saw other needs that had to be met. He held that the social 
order had to be humanized by meeting basic needs of food, 
clothing, and shelter, and by promoting goodwill. Goodwill, 
in particular, demanded the use of intelligence and shared 
communication. I:\ the end. Bode argued that the growth of 
intelligence and the creation of a true democracy could not 
be achieved until Americans overcame the contradiction 
between the fixed meaning of democracy and the new dynamic 
way of life which he called the "cleavage in our culture." 
Acceptance of the new meaning of democracy. Bode thought was 
the best solution to the social conundrum.
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Dewey and Bode alike held that education was the 
vehicle for creating and maintaining a democratic way of 
life. Struggling against the separation of schooling and 
daily living, they proposed that the school become a means 
for making the young aware of the meaning of democracy, 
thereby creating informed citizens who could build a society 
dedicated to continuous human growth. They based their 
argument on the premise that both education and life were 
processes of growth. Dewey stopped with this idea, postu­
lating that growth had no end beyond itself. Bode, on the 
other hand, suggested that growth had to refer to a specific 
type of development, the appreciation and understanding of 
all that was human.
Bode also emphasized the need for using the ideal of 
democracy as the social criterion for educational practice. 
Like Dewey, he thought education had to develop in the indi­
vidual the ability to reconstruct experience through reflec­
tive thought. At the same time, he reiterated the need for 
education to have an adequate social gospel so as to enable 
the young to devise a personal philosophy of life. Ulti­
mately, Dewey and Bode were confident that education would 
promote the total development of human capacity and make 
democracy a way of life.
Thus in answer to the question at hand, it is clear 
that Boyd Bode kept John Dewey's theory of democracy virtu­
ally intact. He differed with Dewey in his emphasis on the
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ends of the means-end relationship of democracy. He too 
saw democracy as more than a political system; it was an 
ethical system that he called a way of life. Accepting the 
pragmatic philosophy, he agreed with Dewey that life was 
continuously changing; therefore, democracy had to become 
dynamic, and grow with the changing circumstances. Dewey 
believed that intelligence was the means for effecting 
needed changes in the life of the individual and of the 
society. Bode in effect said that unless the ideal of democ­
racy were kept in mind, changes would be made for change’s 
sake. Thus he endeavored to balance Dewey’s stress on 
method by accenting the need for ideals. The difference in 
their theories of democracy was in degree not in kind.
The explanation for this difference lies in the 
circumstances that each man faced. Dewey developed his the­
ory of democracy in response to the conditions of the late 
nineteenth century. With the new scientific developments 
and the demand that the individual have a greater voice in 
political, economic, and social events, Dewey devised a the­
ory of democracy that employed the method of science and 
placed great faith in the individual. Bode, on the other 
hand, started with Dewey’s theory and modified it under the 
circumstances of inter-war period. Where social reform and 
promotion of the individual had dominated the Progressive 
Era, in the 1920s this viewpoint engaged in a struggle with 
the so-called "cult of prosperity." Thus the ideal of
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democracy seemed, to Bode, to be fighting for its life. In 
the 1930s, social reform gained the upper hand in the face 
of economic chaos and, later, the threat of fascism. But 
the circumstances also brought extremists out of hiding.
Here Bode argued for the most part against extraordinary 
measures, and called for the building of a way of life based 
on the democratic ideal. Finally, Bode developed his theory 
of democracy in response to the distortions of Dewey's 
theory perpetrated by the Progressive Education Movement. 
Through all of this he too kept his faith in the individual.
This optimistic faith in the individual seems to be 
the principal weakness in Dewey's and Bode's theories. They 
naively believed that the individual could direct the envi­
ronment and control social forces. Nevertheless, they had 
little evidence to support that argument. They pointed to 
the achievements in science as proof of the conviction that 
man could control the environment. It does not follow, how­
ever, that if man can direct nature he can direct society 
equally as well. Man's understanding of human behavior at 
the time Dewey and Bode were writing was elementary at best. 
If philosophers and psychologists could not agree on what 
caused one individual to act, how could anyone possibly 
predict, let alone intelligently control, the actions of an 
entire society?
In their simplistic hopefulness about human capabili­
ties, Dewey and Bode believed that individuals could easily
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■ give up the ancient philosophical dualisms and make democracy 
a way of life. They were in a sense calling for intellec­
tual and social changes on the scale of the Reformation or 
the Scientific Revolution. Yet in both instances there was 
tremendous resistance to change among those with vested 
interests in the status quo. And at times that resistance 
took the form of violence, the antithesis of intelligent 
action. This does not mean that Dewey’s and Bode's dream 
can never be realized. It does mean, however, that attempts 
to change centuries of human tradition have been slow and 
painful, and have nearly always carried with them the specter 
of violence.
Even accepting the method of intelligence did not 
always produce the expected results. Dewey himself used the 
method of intelligence to justify American involvement in 
the First World War. And Bode, who steadfastly argued against 
indoctrination, all but demanded acceptance of democracy as 
a way of life when he argued that individuals must give up 
traditional dualisms or væaken democracy. Bode tended to be 
dogmatic about the notion that individuals could not simul­
taneously believe in the old dualisms and democracy.
Finally, the confusion about Dewey's theories and the 
resulting failures in the Progressive Education Movement 
demonstrated that even highly educated individuals had dif­
ficulty employing the method of intelligence to cooperate 
among themselves or to educate children.
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The stress on means in Dewey's theory exemplified a 
significant problem in the philosophy of pragmatism. In 
their rush to dissolve absolutes and make ends relative, 
commented the historian Eric Goldman, the pragmatists and 
their disciples created the conditions that could produce 
the politics of self-aggrandizement, weakness in ideological 
commitments, and the doctrine of expedience.̂  There is no 
way of knowing whether Bode foresaw the dangers of prag­
matism that Goldman later alluded to, since he never 
expressed such fears. Nevertheless, he too recognized a 
weakness in the pragmatic explanation of ends. As an ide­
alist, he had criticized pragmatism for its feeble attempts 
to define the relationship between the knower and the known 
in terms of purposive behavior. He apparently was never 
satisfied that this weakness had been eliminated from prag­
matism, even though he accepted that philosophy. As a prag­
matist, he worked unrelentingly against what he saw as an 
emphasis on means at the expense of ends in Dewey's philoso­
phy and in progressive educational theory.
Thus the strength of Bode's theory lay in his empha­
sis on ends or ideals. His interpretation of the theory of 
democracy provided a countervailing force to Dewey's posi­
tion. He was also pointing to the dangers of failing to 
maintain the means-end relationship manifested in the 
attempt to make ends out of means and in the failure to look
^Goldman, Rendezvous With Destir -, pp. 199-200,
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"beyond immediate, limited ends. In the first instance, 
Americans, then as now, made science an end in itself. As 
he indicated, this problem was evident in the rush to make 
psychology scientific and divorce it from philosophy, and 
in the endeavor to convert education into a science. Bode 
ultimately believed that as long as Americans failed to 
recognize the cultural conflict between a way of life based 
on absolute principles and one founded on a dynamic philoso­
phy, democracy would remain a meaningless ideal instead of 
becoming an ethical system in which the development of human 
capacity was both a means and an end. In the second 
instance, he noted that the concern for immediate ends among 
progressive educators led to an emphasis on the child's eva­
nescent interests and immediate needs instead of an attempt 
to cultivate long-term interests and a personal philosophy 
of life based on the ideal of democracy. He also thought 
that the social reconstructionists' worry about the economic 
system was another example of placing too much stress on 
immediate ends. They were ignoring the more serious problem 
of the'"cleavage in the culture" that blocked the path to a 
democratic way of life.
Bode's constant concern with ideals was an attempt to 
build a truly pragmatic theory of democracy that made the 
development of human capacity a means and an end. This 
effort seems to have been predicated on the belief that if 
Americans did not attempt to make democracy a way of life.
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American society would remain a divided culture and thus a 
weak democracy; or it would languish into a social order 
whose only aim was the satisfaction of selfish purposes. In 
education, his emphasis on a social ideal and growth with a 
purpose was an attempt to help progressive educators keep 
Dewey's theory on an even keel in order to provide a better 
education for the young and to make the school a vehicle of 
a truly democratic society.
The examination of Boyd Bode’s theory of democracy 
has provided further insight into the philosophical and 
educational thought of the Progressive Era and the Progres­
sive Education Movement. It has also provided evidence as 
to what happened to Dewey's theory of democracy at the hands 
of one of his disciples. But what about the other disci­
ples? What happened to Dewey’s theory of democracy at the 
hands of William H. Kilpatrick, George S. Counts, John L. 
Childs, and Harold Rugg? Historical inquiries into the 
social and educational theories of each of these men would 
make our knowledge of early twentieth century ideas and 
pragmatic theory more complete. Such studies would also 
provide modern day educators with a better understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of pragmatic educational theory 
and practice.
In closing, we should remember that the theories of 
democracy of John Dewey and Boyd Bode were fundamentally 
forward-looking. A sense of the future was implicit in
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their belief that society was dynamic and thus required that 
human beings had to adjust to changing circumstances. This 
theme, moreover, continues to influence many current educa­
tional and social theorists amid the impact of the rapid 
increase in knowledge growing out of the scientific develop­
ments in the nuclear age. Dewey and Bode, however, were not 
unique in their thinking about social conditions. But there 
was an element in their social ideas that seems to be miss­
ing today. Although Dewey and Bode participated in the 
revolt against the formalism of the past, they were ever 
mindful of the need to be aware of the past to explain the 
present and to suggest directions for the future.
We have been living in a time in which social and 
educational thought has been patently ahistorical. Jacques 
Maritain, the eminent French philosopher, put it succinctly 
when he said that one of the characteristics of our "cock­
eyed times" is that we suffer from "epistemological time- 
worship;" by which he meant that unless knowledge is new we 
tend to reject it.̂  The leading educators of the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, for instance, went blythely along develop­
ing and using the "latest ideas" without being aware of the 
successes and failures of those progressive educators who 
had tried similar techniques thirty or forty years earlier.
Jacques Maritain, The Peasant of Garonne; An Old 
Layman Questions Himself about the Present Time, trans. 
Michael Cuddihy and Elizabeth Hughes (New York: Holt,
Rinehart and Winston, 1968), pp. 12-lj.
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Their attempts to focus on the child and be egalitarian also 
tended to vulgarize education. Educators in the current 
"back-to-basics" movement seem equally to be unaware of the 
past. Yet both of these educational movements are predi­
cated on the goal of preparing children for a modern, tech­
nological, democratic society.
Equally as unfortunate is the fact that some of our 
present social theorists, commonly known as futurists, also 
seem to lack a sense of history. A common theme in their 
works is that our current circumstances are unique and, 
therefore, we can no longer afford to take a "rear-view 
mirror" approach to social problems. Nevertheless, their 
solutions for the survival of our way of life resemble the 
suggestions of Dewey and Bode. Such an idea as "anticipa­
tory democracy" is little more than Bode's notion of the 
application of intelligence to democratic purposes. The 
concern for obtaining unbiased information to be used in 
dialogues designed to solve current problems and plan for 
the future is reminiscent of Dewey's discussion about shared 
communication in The Public and Its Problems.
Modern day educators and social thinkers pay lip 
service to democracy and human development. But they are 
being neither democratic nor sensible when they ignore the 
theories of democracy that others have suggested in the 
past. Thus a significant conclusion that can be drawn from 
the social ideas of John Dewey and Boyd Bode is that
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democracy has a past, a present, and a future. This means 
that those educators and social theorists who are working 
to improve society and democracy in America should be aware 
of the theory and practice of democracy in the past in order 
to deal with it in the present and plan for its future.
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